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NOTES
Antitrust-Division of Territory by Competitors in a
Franchise System
The defendant in United States v. Sealy, ITcorporated' was a
corporation that owned the Sealy tradename and licensed small manufacturers around the country to make Sealy bedding products. Scaly
was not an ordinary trademark licensor, however, because almost all
of its stock was owned by the manufacturers, 2 who completely controlled its day-to-day activities. Nevertheless, Sealy provided a number of services which were designed to allow the small manufacturers
to compete more effectively against larger bedding producers: it advertised and promoted the Sealy name on a national basis, rendered
technical and management assistance, and conducted research. It
also worked with the manufacturers to fix retail prices. Finally, it
served as a device whereby each manufacturer could maintain an
exclusive territory in which to sell its product. Sealy licensed only
one manufacturer to make and sell under the Sealy name in a particular area. In return each manufacturer promised not to make or
sell outside its area.
In the district court the case was tried on the theory that Sealy
and the manufacturers had conspired to fix retail prices and allocate
territory in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 The district
court held that there was a conspiracy to fix prices and enjoined further efforts to regulate retail prices except for the use of suggested
retail price lists. The district court also found that there had been no
conspiracy to allocate territory. It found that there were agreements
to allocate territory, but that they were ancillary to a lawful plan of
trademark licensing and therefore reasonable. 4
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the Government
argued that Sealy was a joint venture of the manufacturers and that
1388 U.S. 350 (1966).
'Stock in Sealy, Inc. was owned disproportionately by all of the manufacturers, and the corporation was usually under the control of several of
the largest shareholders. Rudnick, The Sealy Case: The Supreme Court

Applies the Per Se Doctrine to a Hybrid Distribution System for Trademarked Bedding Products, 57 TRADEMARKI REP. 479 (1967).
'United States v. Scaly, 1964 Trade Cas. 71258 (N.D. Ill.).
4Id.
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the agreements to divide territory should be viewed as horizontal
agreements among competitors. The United States Supreme Court
agreed. Drawing on the lower court holding that there had been
price fixing, the Court further held that where manufacturers combine to fix prices and use territorial restraints as part of such a plan,
the territorial restraints must be considered per se unreasonable and
unlawful.'
Although the use of a central agency in the form of a corporation to advertise and market a trademarked product seems to have
been found mostly in the bedding industry, the technique is of general interest because it offers a possible way for small manufacturers
to enter a national market. The basic elements of the Sealy organization are not affected by the opinion. Sealy may still advertise nationally, suggest retail prices and in general promote the
efficiency of its licensees. But it has been suggested that territorial
limitations are an important part of such an organization.' It will
therefore be of interest to see to what extent agreements to divide
territory are affected by Sealy.
The Government argued that the agreements to divide territory
were horizontal in nature because it desired to take advantage of the
rule that horizontal divisions of territory by competitors is per se unreasonable. This rule was recently expressed in White Motor Company v. United States7 where the issue was whether vertical territorial restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on its dealers were per
se unlawful. In White Motor, the United States Supreme Court held
it would not determine the vertical issue until extensive market evidence should be presented at a trial. Only then did the Court feel a
proper decision could be made whether to use a per se or rule of reason
approach to the solution of vertical territorialization.8 The rationale
of the decision in White Motor is important here because of the comparison made by the Court between vertical and horizontal territorial restrictions. It was felt that vertical restrictions might deserve rule of reason treatment because a manufacturer could have
strong procompetitive reasons for imposing territorial restrictions.
By contrast, horizontal agreements to divide territory were considered per se unreasonable because of the high probability of antiu388 U.S. at 357.

' Rudnick, supra note 2.
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
8 Id. at 261.
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competitive effects and the low incidence, if any, of good effects.
In Sealy the Supreme Court said it "would violate reality to treat
[the territorial agreements] . . . as equivalent to territorial limi-

tations imposed by a manufacturer upon independent dealers as
incident to the sale of a trademark product. Sealy, Inc. is an instrumentality of the licensees for purposes of the horizontal territorial
allocation."' 0
Having found the arrangement in Sealy to be horizontal, it is
striking that the Court did not use the rule that horizontal divisions
of territory by competitors are per se unreasonable." The theory
actually used by the Court was that the territorial division should be
found per se unreasonable because it was part of a per se unreasonable plan of price-fixing. It was, as stated by the Court, "part of 'an
aggregation of trade restraints' including unlawful price fixing and
policing . . . unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act without the
necessity for an inquiry in each particular case as to their business or
economic justification, their impact in the market place, or their
reasonableness.' 2 The fact that the Court used this approach rather
than apply the easily available per se rule against horizontal division
of territory expressed in White Motor may indicate that the Court
did not consider Sealy an appropriate case for that rule. This leads
therefore to the question whether, absent price fixing, the rule of
reason might have been applied to the issue of territorialization
alone.
A strong argument can be made that where competitors of little
market power have franchised and advertised a brand name (and
no price-fixing is practiced), the Court should then treat territorial
restrictions under the rule of reason. At least one writer has noted
that the per se rule expressed in White Motor is derived from a line
of cases in which the competitors were possessed of large shares of
the market and great market power. 13 It was also suggested in an
amicus curiae brief filed with the White Motor case that the per se
rule should not be applied in the horizontal franchise situation where
9

Id. at 263.
o388 U.S. at 354.
"'Zeidman, The Growth and Importance of Franchising-ItsImpact on
Small Business, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1191, 1200 (1967); Williams, Distribution and the Shermam Act-The Effects of General Motors, Schwinn
and Sealy, 1967 DuxE L.J. 732, 737.
1-2 388 U.S. at 357.
"sRudnick, supra note 2, at 465.
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no price fixing is involved. 4 The Court paid little heed to this brief
in White Motor, but it may, by way of an interesting dictum in
Secaly, be hinting that it overstated the rule in White Motor:
It is argued . . .that a number of small grocers might allocate

territory among themselves on an exclusive basis as incident to use
of a common name and common advertisements, and that this
sort of venture should be welcomed in the interests of competition,
and should not be condemned as per se unlawful. But condemnation of appellee's territorial arrangements certainly does not require us to go so far as to condemn that quite different situation,
whatever might be the result if it were presented to us for decision. 15
The case for application of the rule of reason is also buttressed by
the dissent in Sealy. The dissent argued that the rule of reason
ought to be applied, but hung this conclusion on its view that the
restrictions were vertical in nature. 6 It would seem, however, that
the facts of the case make it more desirable to view the arrangement as horizontal, because Sealy, Inc. was completely dominated by
the manufacturers and had little life of its own. Thus it could be
argued that the real point of the dissent is that in an appropriate case
of territorial division by competitors of little market power and with
a small share of the market, the rule of reason should be applied.
If it is still possible for firms with little aggregate market power
to use territorial division in a franchise system under the rule of
reason, the next question is what factors would be considered in applying the rule of reason? As to anticompetitive effects, it is clear
that any division of territory will cause some reduction in competition. Indeed, it has been argued that division of territory is even
more damaging to competition than price fixing, because it eliminates
all intrabrand competition in the sale of the product.Y7 As to pro"' Brief as Amicus Curiae, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
235 (1963). This brief was filed by Serta Associates, a bedding licensor,
to correct a false impression it felt that White Motor Company was making
on the Court. White Motor Company, in an attempt to distinguish between
vertical and horizontal arrangements, had assumed that horizontal territorial
agreements were per se unlawful. Serta attempted to show in the brief that
the rule of reason should be applied. See Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Today: 1967, at 71.
" 388 U.S. at 357.
11Id. at 378.
" Brief for Appellee, United States v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1966).
In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), it was said
that "[h]orizontal territorial limitations, like '[g]roup boycotts, or con-
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competitive effects, the main argument in justification is that, notwithstanding a reduction in intrabrand competition, division of territory can lead to an increase in interbrandcompetition.18 This is said
to result from the fact that each manufacturer will concentrate his
efforts on the maximum penetration of his area, rather than waste
effort trying to sell in the areas assigned to his counterparts. This
concentration is said to insure keener competition between rival
brands than would be the case if the franchisees were in competition
with each other.19 The rebuttal to this justification is that if interbrand competition were healthy, prices would be so low that franchisees would not need protection from their counterparts. If this
is so, it would appear that the attempt to limit intrabrand competition is only a ruse to eliminate at least some degree of competition
from the market as a whole.2"
Perhaps a stronger argument for territorial division can be made
when firms adopt franchising in order to enter a new market or to
prevent the failure of their businesses due to changing market conditions. In such event a temporary restraint on territory might be
acceptable because of the promise of an additional product in the
market. This argument draws support from the dicta in Scaly which
seems to contemplate the situation where firms may wish to franchise
in order to meet the competition of giant merchandisers. 2" As the new
brand became established, and as interbrand competition were imcerted refusals by traders to deal' . .. are naked restraints of trade with
no purpose except stifling of competition."
18Brief for Appellee, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1966).
1This argument is more often made on behalf of a manufacturer who is
attempting to justify territorial limitations placed on the retail sale of franchised goods. See generally, Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112
U. PA. L. Ryv. 159, 166 (1963); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution
under the Sherman Act, 75 HAv. L. R~v. 795, 827 (1962).
"oIn Brief for Appellant, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1966)

at 15, the Government argued:

Protection from the competitive inroads of the relatively few manufacturers who compose the Sealy system and who in the aggregate
compose but a small segment to the bedding industry would be futile
if the competition from other brands were as effective as competition
within the Sealy family. The principal justification suggested by appellee for the territorial restriction-that Sealy cannot attract
licensees without offering them protection against competition from
existing licensees-presupposes that the restriction is an effective
method for reducing the competitive pressures upon the manufacturers
who are party to the scheme.
21388 U.S. at 358.
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proved, it would seem that intrabrand restrictions would become less
important to the franchisees and eventually could be lifted.
Sealy adds a new dimension to the law of antitrust because it is
the first case in which the agreements of firms with little market
power to divide territory have been found unlawful.2" Yet because
the Court used the presence of price fixing to find the agreements per
se unlawful, it is possible to argue that not all horizontal agreements
to divide territory need be per se unlawful. It would seem that it
might be possible to convince the Court to apply the rule of reason
favorably, especially where the success of a new entry or a group
of failing firms was at stake.
HENRY

C.

MCFADYEN

Civil Rights-Racially Discriminatory Employment
Practices Under Title VII
In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Incorporated,' the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that present
differences in departmental seniority of Negroes and whites that
resulted from the company's past and intentional racially discriminatory hiring policy were unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Quarles was the
first such case to be litigated under Title VIi.
Prior to 1966, Phillip Morris employed Negroes only in one
of three departments covered by a collective bargaining agreement
with Local 203 of the Tobacco Workers International Union, the
prefabrication department." The jobs available in prefabrication
were generally lower paying and less desirable than those in either
" Cases behind the rule in White Motor, all involving firms with large
market power, are Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. National Lead Company, 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
1279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.Va. 1968).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. There were also allegations of racial
discrimination in the employer's hiring practices, employment and promotion
of supervisory personnel, and the payment of wages. The court summarily
dismissed the first two issues, and found racial discrimination in the payment of wages only as to two Negro employees.
'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
'Negroes were also employed for seasonal work in another department,
but this was covered by a different collective bargaining agreement.
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the fabrication or the warehouse and shipping departments for which
whites were hired. Each department had its own job progression
ladder and seniority roster, and Phillip Morris usually hired employees for entry level positions in a department, filling higher rated
jobs by advancement based primarily on departmental seniority.
Further, the company prohibited interdepartmental transfers by
Negroes until 1961, when the collective bargaining agreement was
changed to permit a few transfers each six months. The employees
competed for the transfers on the basis of seniority, merit and
ability. Later a provision was added to allow transfers in the discretion of management, but transfers were conditioned on the loss
of departmental seniority. However, in the event of layoff, the
employee could return to his previous department with his employment date seniority unimpaired. The effect of all this was to "lock
in" the Negro employees in the less desirable jobs while whites with
no seniority in the company were hired into the better jobs off the
streets. After exhausting his administrative remedies," the plaintiff
brought this action on behalf of the Negro employees as a class who
had been hired and had continued to work under these conditions.
The Negro employees sought to be trained and promoted to fill
vacancies on the same basis as white employees with equal ability
and employment seniority.
Although racial discrimination in employment has been dealt
with previously by other measures,' Title VII of the Civil Rights
5 In

Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967),

the court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently exhausted their administrative remedies.
Title VII provides for the complainant to file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "within ninety days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred. . . ." After investigation, if the commission
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,
the commission must attempt to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion. If voluntary compliance fails, the complainant has thirty days
to commence suit in the appropriate federal court. Further, upon timely
application, the court in its discretion may allow the Attorney General of
the United States to intervene if he certifies that the case is of general public
importance. Also, in certain instances the Attorney General may bring suit
on his own initiative. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5-6 (1964).
' The first attempt by the government to eliminate discrimination in
employment was in the form of an executive order issued by President Roosevelt in 1941. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941). It prohibited
discrimination in government and defense industries. An executive order
issued by President Johnson requires that all government agencies include
a nondiscrimination clause in all of their contracts. However, contractors
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Act of 1964 represents "the first time the Congress of the United
States has declared racial discrimination in private employment unlawful." Following the pattern established by state fair employment
practice laws, Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice"
for any employer covered by the Act :'
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... 9
Nor may an employer, on such grounds, "limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee. .. ."10 Labor organizations covered
are to undertake not merely to refrain from discrimination; in addition, they
are to promise to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment without regard
to their race, creed, color or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11246, 3
C.F.R. 167-68 (Supp. 1965). To process complaints, each President created
a Committee on Fair Employment Practices or, as it was called under President Kennedy, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
Many states attempted to eliminate racial discrimination in employment
by enacting state fair employment practice laws. In 1945 New York, the
first of thirty-six states to pass such a statute, established a commission
and directed it "to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment ...
because of race, creed, color, or national origin ..... " Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y.
Sess. Laws 125. Further, the statute specified a number of "unlawful employment practices." Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y. Sess. Laws 131.
The National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act have also
offered assistance in the elimination of racial discrimination in employment.
Since the statutes provide for the representative union to be the exclusive
representative of the employees, a duty of fair representation has been imposed on the union. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Local 12, URW v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
For discussions of this duty, see Cox, The Ditty of Fair Representation, 2
VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Rosen, The Law and Discriminationin Employnent, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1965) ; Sovern, The National La6or Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 563 (1962).
Although Title VII is the latest and most comprehensive governmental
action for the elimination of racial discrimination, the above mentioned
methods should continue to be used to supplement it. M. SOVERN, LEGAL
RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205-13 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as SovERN].
'S0VERIN 101.
'Employers covered by the Act with some exceptions include all employers "engaging in an industry affecting commerce" who have twenty-five
or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
" Id. at § 2000e-2(a) (2).
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by the act11 may not deny membership to a worker or act to deprive
him of or limit his employment opportunities or "otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment" because of his race, religion, sex or national origin.12 In
addition, labor organizations cannot lawfully "cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual" in violation
of the duties imposed on the employer by Title VII. 3 Finally,
employers and labor organizations may not discriminate in programs
14
of apprenticeship or retraining.

The court apparently assumed that any racial discrimination in
employment, unless specifically condoned by the Act, would violate
Title VII, since it failed to analyze the Act's provisions as they
related to the particular facts of the case. Thus, the basic inquiry
was whether racial discrimination did in fact exist. In resolving
this question, the court closely scrutinized the plight of Negroes
hired during the period when Phillip Morris maintained its discriminatory hiring policy. It noted that the Negroes, to be eligible
to compete for the better jobs, first had to transfer to either the
fabrication or warehouse and shipping department. But to transfer
they had to either compete with Negroes of greater seniority in the
prefabrication department or transfer with a loss of departmental
seniority. Upon transfer, they were at the bottom of the seniority
roster in the new department, regardless of their overall plant
seniority. In case of lay-off, they were the first to go, although
they could return to the old department with seniority accumulated
while working there. Further, the Negroes, while waiting for an
opportunity to transfer, continued to be paid less than the white
employees in other departments. On the other hand, white employees
of equal ability and equal or less company-wide tenure would already
be in the department to which the Negroes were attempting to transfer. Furthermore, the whites' departmental seniority would be
greater than or at least equal to the seniority which the Negroes
could acquire if and when they were allowed to transfer. This
situation led the court to conclude that, although the restrictive
" Labor organizations covered by the Act, in general, include all unions

which represent or seek to represent employees of covered employers, and
which have twenty-five or more members. Id. at §§ 2000e(d)-(e).
"2Id.at §§ 2000e-2(c) (1)-(2).

lId.
at § 2000e-2(c) (3).
1
,Id. at § 2000e-2(d).
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Act of 1964 represents "the first time the Congress of the United
States has declared racial discrimination in private employment unlawful."' Following the pattern established by state fair employment
practice laws, Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice"
for any employer covered by the Act :'
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... 9
Nor may an employer, on such grounds, "limit, segregate, or classify
his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee.. . ."'0 Labor organizations covered
are to undertake not merely to refrain from discrimination; in addition, they
are to promise to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment without regard
to their race, creed, color or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11246, 3
C.F.R. 167-68 (Supp. 1965). To process complaints, each President created
a Committee on Fair Employment Practices or, as it was called under President Kennedy, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
Many states attempted to eliminate racial discrimination in employment
by enacting state fair employment practice laws. In 1945 New York, the
first of thirty-six states to pass such a statute, established a commission
and directed it "to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment ...
because of race, creed, color, or national origin ...

."

Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y.

Sess. Laws 125. Further, the statute specified a number of "unlawful employment practices." Ch. 118 [1945] N.Y. Sess. Laws 131.
The National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act have also
offered assistance in the elimination of racial discrimination in employment.
Since the statutes provide for the representative union to be the exclusive
representative of the employees, a duty of fair representation has been imposed on the union. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944); Steele
v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Local 12, URW v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
For discussions of this duty, see Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2
VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957); Rosen, The Law and Discriminationin Employnent, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1965) ; Sovern, The National Labor Relations
Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLum. L. REv. 563 (1962).
Although Title VII is the latest and most comprehensive governmental
action for the elimination of racial discrimination, the above mentioned
methods should continue to be used to supplement it. M. SOVERN, LEGAL
RESTRAINTS oN RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 205-13 (1966)

[hereinafter cited as SOVERN].
7

SOVERN 101.

'Employers covered by the Act with some exceptions include all employers "engaging in an industry affecting commerce" who have twenty-five
or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
Id. at § 2000e-2(a) (2).
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by the act 1 may not deny membership to a worker or act to deprive
him of or limit his employment opportunities or "otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment" because of his race, religion, sex or national origin.1 2 In
addition, labor organizations cannot lawfully "cause or attempt to
cause an employer to discriminate against an individual" in violation
of the duties imposed on the employer by Title VII.'8 Finally,
employers and labor organizations may not discriminate in programs
of apprenticeship or retraining.' 4
The court apparently assumed that any racial discrimination in
employment, unless specifically condoned by the Act, would violate
Title VII, since it failed to analyze the Act's provisions as they
related to the particular facts of the case. Thus, the basic inquiry
was whether racial discrimination did in fact exist. In resolving
this question, the court closely scrutinized the plight of Negroes
hired during the period when Phillip Morris maintained its discriminatory hiring policy. It noted that the Negroes, to be eligible
to compete for the better jobs, first had to transfer to either the
fabrication or warehouse and shipping department. But to transfer
they had to either compete with Negroes of greater seniority in the
prefabrication department or transfer with a loss of departmental
seniority. Upon transfer, they were at the bottom of the seniority
roster in the new department, regardless of their overall plant
seniority. In case of lay-off, they were the first to go, although
they could return to the old department with seniority accumulated
while working there. Further, the Negroes, while waiting for an
opportunity to transfer, continued to be paid less than the white
employees in other departments. On the other hand, white employees
of equal ability and equal or less company-wide tenure would already
be in the department to which the Negroes were attempting to transfer. Furthermore, the whites' departmental seniority would be
greater than or at least equal to the seniority which the Negroes
could acquire if and when they were allowed to transfer. This
situation led the court to conclude that, although the restrictive
" Labor organizations covered by the Act, in general, include all unions

which represent or seek to represent employees of covered employers, and
which have twenty-five or more members. Id.at §§ 2000e(d)-(e).
'Id.at 88 2000e-2(c)(1)-(2).
3
1d.
I at § 2000e-2(c) (3).
"Id.at § 2000e-2(d).
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transfer provisions were now being administered on a nondiscriminatory basis and Phillip Morris was no longer discriminating in
its hiring in any department as of 1966, the restrictive transfer
provisions continued to perpetuate the past discrimination and
amounted to present discrimination in violation of Title VII. 5
NLRB v. Local 267, IBEW, 6 which was litigated under the

National Labor Relations Act, supports the premise that past discrimination can not be perpetrated by continued use of an employment practice even though it is not itself discriminatory on its face.
There the union had maintained a hiring hall and in the past had
preferred union members to nonmembers for work referrals. Further, priority in referral had been and continued to be based
upon past employment. The court reasoned that, although section
8(f) (4) of the NLRA specifically sanctioned priority based on
experience, the subsection did not sanction "the use of seemingly
17
objective criteria as a guise for achieving illegal discrimination."'
The congressional hearings and debates do not lend substantial
support to either the court's viewpoint or a contrary position.:,
Congress never discussed departmental seniority, which was involved in Quarles. But the legislators did state that Title VII would
not affect established employment seniority rights, i.e., since the
Act was "prospective and not retrospective,"' 9 it would not require
subsequently hired Negroes to be preferred on the basis of race over
previously hired whites. 20 In fact, section 703(j)21 specifically
barred this "reverse discrimination." At any rate, the court appears
correct in concluding that congressional debate did not significantly
weaken its position.
279 F. Supp. at 518, 19.

'a357
F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1966).
17
Id. at 57.

" See,

BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CML RIGHTS Act of 1964
(1964); Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,and the Incumbent Negro,
80 HARV. L. Rv. 1260 (1967). The court acknowledged that it relied
heavily on this note.
"o110 CONG. Rxc. 6992 (daily ed. April 8, 1964).
It should be noted that, although a finding of discrimination would not
cause the Act to apply retroactively, the court's remedy could still be retroactive. For a discussion of this and the remedy in Quarles, see note 29 infra.
"0QuarIes does not require any change of employment seniority. It only
requires that Negro employees transferring to other departments compete
with white employees on the basis of their length of time in the company's
employment, i.e., on the basis of employment seniority, rather than on the
basis of their length of time in that department.

242 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964).
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Although the congressional discussion alone is not very instructive as to what effect Title VII was intended to have on pre-existing
deparimental seniority rights, a proviso to section 703 which was
added as an amendment has some bearing on this determination.
In particular, section 703(h) 22 states that, notwithstanding other
provisions of Title VII, an employer may:
apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority... system ... provided that such differences are not the

result of an intention to discriminate because of race .... 23
It has been suggested that this proviso, read in light of the congressional discussion, "reflects a congressional consensus favoring
the protection of all seniority rights existing before Title VII's
effective date."'24 But, however one reads the proviso,

it does not seem possible to interpret it as providing a blanket
exemption for all differences in treatment resulting from seniority
arrangements set up before Title VII came into force. The
proviso does not expressly refer to such preexisting systems, but
to all "bona fide" systems. A "bona fide" seniority system seems
to be one which can be explained or justified on nonracial
grounds.2 5
Whitfield v. United Steelworkers,26 decided prior to passage of
Title VII, is the only case either before or after the passage of
Title VII in which there were similar facts. Phillip Morris and
Local 203 relied heavily on Whitfield, which held that there was no
discrimination even though the Negro employees with greater
seniority had to go to the bottom when they transferred departments.2 7 However, the court in Quarles distinguished Whitfield
on the grounds that the skills obtained in the departmental pro"This was one of a series of amendments negotiated to gain the support
of a group of Senators headed by Senator Dirksen against the filibuster
conducted by southern opponents of the Civil Rights Act. Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. &Com. L. REv. 431, 449 (1966).
2342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
"2 Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 at 1272; accord, Note, The Civil Rights Act of
1964: Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions, 41 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 58,
78 (1966).
2; Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Iocumbent Negro,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1260 at 1272.
28263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
7Id. at 551.
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gression were necessary for advancement to higher level jobs.28 In
Quarles, the only skills required, if any, were those that each employee, whether white or Negro, had to acquire on the particular job
or through training just prior to taking the job.
Under Title VII, the court must find that "the respondent has
intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice"
before it can enjoin the practice and "order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate .... -2' The court concluded that *Phillip
Morris and Local 203 had intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices by discriminating on the grounds of race without discussing what was necessary to constitute the requisite intent.
The court did state that the defendants' pre-Title VII hiring practices were intentionally discriminatory and this conclusion appears
to be justified by the evidence."0 However, surely the court did
not intend that this should suffice as the neccessary intent, because
such an interpretation would seem susceptible to the objection of
retroactivity. In fact, it appears difficult to allege realistically that
the condemned practices by themselves were intentionally dis8279 F. Supp. at 518.

" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).

In fashioning a remedy which would award the complainants "affirmative

relief," the court had two basic choices which have been referred to as the
"rightful place" remedy and the "freedom now" remedy. 80

HA-Rv. L. REv.

at 1268. The "rightful place" remedy
would allow an incumbent Negro to bid for openings in "white" jobs
comparable to those held by whites of equal tenure, on the basis of his

full length of service with the employer. If he met the existing ability
requirements for such a job, he would be entitled to fill it, without
regard to the seniority expectations of junior white employees. The
"rightful place" approach requires an adjustment in competitive standing with regard to future job movements arising in the ordinary
course of an employer's business.
Id. In contrast, the "freedom now" remedy would displace whites for Negroes who would have had the job if there had not been originally a discriminatory hiring policy. The court, after considering the merits of the
efficiencies obtained through the company's present departmental organization
and the economic losses to the Negro employees, awarded a variation of the
"rightful place" remedy. Any lesser relief, e.g., allowing Negroes to transfer
to entry level positions in the other departments when vacancies occurred,
would have continued to subordinate the Negroes to the white employees.
The "freedom now" approach insofar as it would reverse job awards made
before Title VII became law "seems vulnerable to the charge that it is
retroactive," although this is only one of many reasons why this remedy
does not seem viable.
For an example of a pre-Title VII remedy similar to that in Quarls,
see Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
o279 F. Supp. 518.
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criminatory. It was never contended that the restrictive transfer
policies were conjured up to defeat the intent of Title VII, and,
in fact, this arrangement had been in effect previously. Further,
the court recognized that the departmental system in combination
with the restrictive transfer system had offered the company many
legitimate benefits. 3 However, in support of the court's decision,
it seems that discriminatory intent can be inferred from the employer's continued use of its restrictive transfer system, since the
employer must have known that the practical effect would be to discriminate against senior Negro employees in the prefabrication de2

partment.1

Although Quarles appears to be consistent with the overall intent of Title VIIy3

in the absence of clarifying congressional

amendment, the continued use of Title VII for the elimination of
present differences in seniority caused by prior racial discrimination
in hiring will raise three problems-whether such differences are
in fact discriminatory; what is required to establish the requisite
intent; and what effect qualifications of skill and ability have on
the issues of intent and discrimination.
It seems that an argument equally meritorious to that of the
court in Quarles can be made to the effect that, if an employer has
discontinued his racially discriminatory practices, there is no present discrimination although vestiges of the old system remain in the
form of differences in seniority. 4 Further, assuming no present
intent can be found, it can be argued that Quarles applies the act
retroactively.
Convincingly showing the necessary intent is the second major
obstacle in upholding the Quarles interpretation. If a court requires
a demonstration of a particular state of mind, the burden of proof
could be almost insurmountable. On the other hand, if the court
reasons that the parties intended the natural and probable consequences of their actions, the problem will be less significant8 5
Finally, although qualification requirements for promotion were
81

1Id. at 513.
'See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination by
Labor
Unions, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58, 77 (1966).
3
" BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at
160 (1964).
" This was the position of the defendants in Quarles.
CoSee Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. IND. &
Cob. L. REV. 473, 479-80 (1966).
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not in issue in Quarles, they will be an important factor in many
future cases.8 6 The easiest situation is where an employer's qualification requirements are only a facade. In such instances, upon a
showing of sufficient evidence, the court will probably consider this
only as evidence of the company's intention to discriminate. Another situation is like that in Quarles where the company maintains
a training program to qualify employees for higher level positions.
Title VII specifically states that such training programs will be administered without discrimination.37 The most difficult type case
arose in Whitfield, where the qualification requirements were legitimate and the white employees obtained the skills by progression
through the department. 8 The court in Quarles implied that Title
VII would not damage the Whitfield finding of no discrimination. 9
However, it can be contended that, although the Negro employees
would have to go to the bottom of the department to obtain the
necessary skills, they should not lose their seniority as they did in
Whitfield. This would allow the Negroes to progress as quickly
as they grasped the required skills for advancement and as soon as
vacancies for which they were qualified came open. In Whitfield,
the court emphasized the good faith of the union in fairly representing all the employees.4" Under Title VII, it appears that the elimination of seniority rights upon transfer, whether the employee has to
obtain skills or not, would continue to perpetuate the past discrimination and, therefore, under Quarles should be in violation of the Act.
Although employers and unions may be faced with practical
problems in complying with Title VII as interpreted in Quarles,
Congress expressed its intention to eliminate racial discrimination
in employment and, because of the magnitude of the evil to be
eliminated, did not provide for any balancing of interests. Quarles
is consistent with this general purpose of Title VII, but the court
could have augmented the significance of its decision by analyzing
the pertinent provisions of the Act and pointing out which facts
demonstrated a violation of which provisions.
WILLIAm H. LEwis, JR.
8 Id.

at 476-8.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1964).

"263 F.2d at 550.

°279 F. Supp. at 518.
,4263 F.2d at 551.
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Constitutional Law-Ads on Busses
In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District' the California Supreme Court enjoined a metropolitan transit district from
refusing to accept for display on its busses an advertisement critical
of the war in Vietnam. The transit district is a public body which
operates busses in several California counties. It sells advertising
space above the passengers seats. The district had a policy of accepting only two classes of advertising: (1) advertisements for the sale
of goods and services and (2) advertisements for candidates and
ballot proposals at the time of a duly called election. The Women
for Peace at Berkeley tried to put an advertisement on the district's
busses at the standard rate. It read:
Mankind must put an end to war or war will put an end to
mankind.
President John F. Kennedy
Write to President Johnson: Negotiate Vietnam
Women For Peace
P.O. Box 944, Berkeley
In keeping with its policy the district refused the advertisement. 2
The California Supreme Court found that the district's policy restricting advertisements was a violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments.3 Transit advertising, the court found, is "an acceptable and effective means of communication." By accepting advertisements the district had opened a forum for the expression of ideas:
"A regulation which permits those who offer goods and services for
sale and those who wish to express ideas relating to elections access
to such forum while denying it to those who wish to express other
ideas and beliefs, protected by the first amendment, cannot be upheld." 4 The dissent denied that the district had opened a forum for
the expression of ideas.
Recognizing the importance of a place where the citizen has a
-- Cal. 2d-, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967). For another
recent case with similar facts and result see Kissinger v. New York City
Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2 Cal. 2d at - 434 P.2d at 984, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 432. The advertising
on the busses was handled by an advertising agency which leased the space
from3 the district and then sub-leased it. Id.
Id. at -, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
'Id. at -- 434 P.2d at 990, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
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right to communicate, the courts have created 5 the public forum,' a
place where the citizen has access to the attention of his fellows:
Traditionally our public streets, meeting halls, parks and similar
places have been recognized as locations in which this sacred
right may be exercised, not only because such places, being
dedicated to public use, are held in trust for all citizens, but also
because they are usually locations where the ears of 7large numbers of fellow citizens can most effectively be reached.
The existence of a forum, or something like it, is a necessary precondition to an uninhibited, free trade in ideas. Before the public can choose among competing ideas, it must be exposed to them.'
Forums have been created in streets, 9 parks, 10 railway and bus
terminals," and in public (usually school) auditoriums.' 2 The
forum is always created on public property or on private property
which (under the rubric of state action) is treated as if it were
public.13

How the forum comes into existence and the extent to

which the state may regulate it may vary with the type of property
involved.
'In Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897), the Supreme Court
held that since the legislature could absolutely prohibit first amendment activities in streets and parks, it could require a license. Id. at 48. Later the
Supreme Court reversed itself holding that such places had been used for
assembly from time immemorial. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Time immemorial, as Mr.
Chief Justice Traynor has noted, dates from 1939. In re Hoffman, - Cal.
2d -,

-,

434 P.2d 352, 355, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1967).

'For a discussion of the public forum with particular emphasis on
"speech plus" see H. Kalvin, The Concept of the Public Forumn.: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SuPREME CT. REv. 1.
'Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
8 Of course, distributing leaflets and holding meetings in school auditoriums are limited as means of getting different points of view before the
public. Jerome A. Barron has criticized the Supreme Court for indifference
to creating opportunities for expression. To protect an idea after it has
come to the fore, he insists, is not enough. Barron, Access to the Press, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967). "The test of a community's opportunities for
free expression rests .

.

. in an abundance of opportunities to secure ex-

pression in media with the largest impact." Id. at 1653.
'E.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
10
E.g., Niemotoko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
11
E.g., Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"E.g, Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963); Danskin
v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
"Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); In re Hoffman, - Cal. 2d
-, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
The Supreme Court has also
created a limited right of access to persons at their doors. Martin v. Struthers, 319 N.C. 141 (1943) ; Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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The doctrine of the public forum had its solid beginning in the
case of Schneider v. State.4 In that case the Supreme Court struck
down municipal ordinances which flatly prohibited the distribution
of leaflets in city streets. The object of the ordinances was to prevent littering. The Court found them a violation of the first amendment. Streets are "the natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion."' 5 The purpose of preventing
littering was not sufficient to justify such an abridgement of freedom of speech. 6 Later cases suggested that while the state could
regulate such distribution in the interest of traffic flow, it could not
bar it altogether. 17 In cases involving the right to distribute literature on the street, two factors are important. No voluntary act by
the state was required to create a public forum on the street. And
while the state could regulate the forum, it could not close it at will.
At the other extreme is the public forum in school auditoriums.
Dicta in court opinions suggest that the forum is created by the
voluntary decision of the state to open the doors of the school to the
expression of ideas, 8 by allowing one group with a particular point
of view to use the school auditorium after school. These dicta insist
that "the state need not open the doors of a school building as a
forum and may at any time close them," 9 if it closes them to all.
Another group of cases deals with the right to distribute leaflets in
terminals.2" These cases, based perhaps on a somewhat more restrictive reading of Schneider and its progeny, hold that regulations may
be adopted to insure traffic flow, safety, etc. But, as expressed in one
case,
U.S. 147 (1939).
Id. at 163.
16 Id. at 162.
'Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Jaminson v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413 (1943). Schneider also recognized the right of the state to regulate
the streets to assure the movement of people and property. 308 U.S. 147,
160.
8 Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545, 171
P.2d 885, 891 (1946); East Meadow Concerts Ass'n v. Board of Educ.,
18 N.Y.2d 129, 133, 219 N.E.2d 172, 174, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (1966).
" Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 547, 171
18308
15

P.2d. 885, 892 (1946). Cases cited note 18 mtpra. Doubt has been expressed

about the assertion that the state is under no duty to open up its facilities
after school. Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup.

Ct. 21962).

Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. N.Y. 1967; In re
Hoffman, - Cal. 2d -, 434 P.2d. 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
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In the absence of proof that the proposed activities ... would
obstruct or hamper the Terminal for transportation purposes,
the Port Authority may not ban such activities altogether. In
balancing the citizen's right to communicate ideas and views
against public responsibility to maintain a free flow of traffid,
the exercise of constitutional rights will be favored unless it is
shown that the prohibition is essential under the circumstances
21
to insure the operation of the Terminal for its primary purposes.
Since it seems difficult to prove that an absolute ban on the distribution of leaflets is essential to ensure the operation of a terminal for
its main purpose, the result may be that the state cannot prohibit
such distribution.
The court in Wirta relied heavily on cases involving public
school auditoriums. 22 These cases, as indicated above, suggest that
school auditoriums need not be opened up to the public after school
hours. But once the privilege of using the auditorium is made available to some in the community it cannot be denied to others for
reasons that are inconsistent with the first amendment. 23 Such a
denial is seen as censorship prohibited by the first amendment. Once
" Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Cf.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
No case seems to require that facilities be constructed so that citizens
will have a place to exercise their first amendment rights. Rather, opening
up a forum refers to requiring the state to allow a citizen to use a facility
for the exercise of first amendment rights although others have not been
allowed before to use it for that purpose.
" Cases cited notes 18 and 19 supra. The school cases are direct descendants of cases involving streets and parks. See Danskin v. San Diego
Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). When Danskin
was decided a line of Supreme Court cases had struck down ordinances
and practices which gave city officials unlimited discretion in licensing
parades and in restricting use of parks. See, e.g., Largent v. Texas, 318
U.S. 418 (1943); cf. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1940). The
reason given is that city officials must not be allowed to censor unpopular
causes by controlling access to the public forum. Largent v. Texas, 318
U.S. 418, 422 (1943).
When city officials have (under such ordinances) attempted to pick
and choose among potential users, their action has been held a violation of
the first amendment. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). In
many of these cases an attack is available under both the equal protection
clause and under the first and fourteenth amendments. Nienotko used both.
Id. at 273. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
.Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885 (1946). Some have interpreted these decisions as based on the equal
protection clause. Van Alystyne, Political Speakers at State Universities,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 338 (1963). While equal protection might have
provided an adequate basis, they were decided on first amendment grounds.
In cases of discriminatory denial of equal access to a public forum equal
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the state opens a forum "it cannot demand tickets of admission in
the form of convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable." 24
Therefore, absent a showing of a clear and present danger, it cannot
open its schools to political discussion but exclude those topics considered "subversive" 2 or "controversial." 2 6 This line of cases has
been summarized by Judge Markel in Buckley v. Meng:
The principle of these cases is the simple one that what the state
cannot do directly it may not do indirectly. Since there is no
power in the state to stifle minority opinion directly by forbidding its expression, it may not accomplish this same purpose
by allowing its facilities to be used by proponents of majority
opinion while denying them to dissenters. 27
Following the principle of the school cases, 28 the court found the
advertising policy of the transit district deficient in two respects.
First, by accepting only election advertisements the district was
choosing between classes of ideas entitled to constitutional protection, allowing the expression of ". . . only those selected, and banning all others." "Thus," the court stated, "the district's regulation
exercises a most pervasive form of censorship."2 Second, the court
insisted that commercial advertising is not speech protected by the
protection and the first amendment often overlap. See Mr. Justice Black's
concurring opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 580-81 (1963);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
2,Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 547, 171
P.2d25 885, 892 (1946).

!d.
" East Meadow Concerts Assn. v. Board of Educ., 18 N.Y.2d 129, 219
N.E.2d 172, 272 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1966), on remand 26 A.D.2d 819, 273
N.Y.S.2d 736 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 19 N.Y.2d 605, 225 N.E.2d 888, 278
N.Y.S.2d
393 (1967).
"7Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467 at -, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 at 934 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
The court in Wirta recognized the difference between the school cases
and the case presented by the advertising policy of the transit district. "The
vice is not that the district has preferred one point of view over another
but that it chooses between classes of ideas entitled to constitutional protection, sanctioning the expression of only those selected, and banning all
others. Thus the district's regulation exercises a most pervasive form of
28

censorship."

-

Cal. 2d at -,

434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at

-.

To

bolster its conclusion the court in Wirta cited the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Black in Cox v.Louisiana. In Cox, Negro demonstrators were convicted of blocking public passageways in violation of a statute which prohibited such blockage but excluded labor unions from its operation. Mr.
Justice Black found the statute "censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 379 U.S. at
580-81.
2Cal. 2d at -,
434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
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first amendment.30 On this premise the court found that the policy
of accepting commercial messages in preference to protected speech
violated the first amendment. The argument seems to be that since
the state can prohibit commercial messages and cannot prohibit
pure speech, it cannot restrict its advertising slots to purely commercial advertisements."1
The court in Wirta seems to have held that the advertising policy
of the district had voluntarily opened its bus advertising slots as
a forum for the expression of ideas. Once the characterization is
accepted the result follows: to refuse the advertisement of the
" On this point the majority and the dissent were in agreement. The

conclusion seems essentially correct. Speech whose sole object is the sale

of goods and services can be prohibited altogether. See note 31 infra. However if the speech is the type covered by the first amendment, that protection
is not withdrawn simply because it is published in the form of an advertisement. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). The Supreme Court found that the
advertisement in the New York Times case was not a "commercial" advertisement because, "it communicated information, expressed opinion, recited
grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf
of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest
public concern." 376 U.S. at 266. The Court has recently reiterated that
it does not view "purely" commercial advertising as first amendment speech,
though only by way of analogy. "Material sold solely to produce sexual
arousal, like commercial advertising, does not escape regulation because it
has been dressed up as speech.. . ." Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 474 n. 17 (1966). The example of commercial expression dressed up
as "speech" suggested by the Court was Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). Cf. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 381 (1967). The Court has had
some difficulties in borderline cases such as Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951). There Justice Black joined by Justice Douglas dissented on
the ground that the ordinance interfered with the exercise of first amendment rights. Still, Justice Black reaffirmed his faith in the commercial
non-commercial dichotomy: "Of course I believe that the present ordinance
could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant' who goes from door to door
'selling pots.'" 341 U.S. at 650. Comment, Freedom of Expression in a
Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. Rav. 1191 (1965).
-

Cal. 2d -,

434 P.2d at 986, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 434. The court

said:
Thus, although a city may not prohibit public distribution of handbills
expressing protected ideas (Schneider v. State (1939)) ... it may ban
commercial advertising in the form of handbills (Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942))

. . . A distributor of notices for a religious meeting

may not be barred from soliciting homeowners by an ordinance against
ringing doorbells to distribute advertisements (Martin v. City of
Struthers (1943))

. . . , but door to door solicitation for the sale of

magazines may be banned (Breard v. City of Alexandria, La.
(1951))

....

In the case at bar, the policy of the district reverses

these acceptable priorities and perversely gives preference to commercial advertising over nonmercantile messages.
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Women for Peace violates the first amendment. But the question
which the opinion of the court leaves in some confusion is just how
and why the advertising slots have become a forum for the expression of ideas. On this point the court says:
The second elementary factor we recognize is that the determination of the district to accept advertising on its motor coaches
serves as its considered conclusion that this form of communication will not interfere with its primary function of providing
transportation. Thus, we avoid the considerations applicable to
ascertaining whether public Property must be made available
as a forum for the exercise of First Amendments rights. (See
In re Hoffman (Cal. 1967) 64 Cal. Rptr. 97,434 P.2d 353). Here
that affirmative determination has been made by the district ...
Our problem, therefore, is reduced to a situation in which
a governmental agency has refused to accept an advertisement
expressing ideas admittedly protected by the First Amendment
for display in forum which the agency has deemed suitable for
the expression of ideas through the medium of paid advertisements.... We conclude that defendants, having opened a forum

for the expression of ideas by providing facilities for advertisements on its busses, cannot for reasons of administrative convenience decline to accept advertisements expressing opinions
and beliefs within the ambit of First Amendment protection.3s 2
The court then proceeds to quote Danskin v. Unified School District
as "directly in point."' 33 The quotation includes that portion of the
Danskin opinion which stresses that the state has no duty to make
public school buildings available for public meetings.
There are two possible models the court could be using on the
question of opening a forum-the school cases34 and the terminal
cases.3 5 By the school cases the citizen has no right to use school
facilities unless the state volunteers them by a general policy or by
practices allowing groups to use them."" In the terminal cases the
court requires that property be made available for the exercise of
first amendment rights unless the state can show such use would
interfere with the primary function of the terminal. 7 There is language in Wirta which suggests that the court might be following
either model.
32 -

33Id.

Cal. 2d at -, 434 P.2d at 985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433.

" Cases cited note 18 supra.
" Cases cited note 20 supra.
"Cases cited note 18 supra.
Cases cited note 20 supra.

'*
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The school cases have the advantage of making it appear that the
state rather than the court has chosen to open the forum. But it is
difficult to make the school cases fit the facts in Wirta. Clearly
there was no transit district policy (similar to the statute in Danskin)"5 opening bus advertising to political, economic, and social discussion. Of course the acceptance of election advertisements alone
could be seen as "volunteering a forum." But there are problems
with this line of argument. If the existence of a forum on the bus
depends solely on the presence of election advertisements, then
the analogy to the school cases" suggests that the forum is open
only when the state decides to open it, that is, when the political
advertisements are accepted at election time. During this time the
district could not discriminate between election advertisements and
other protected speech. Using the theory that the district had "volunteered a forum" and relying only upon the acceptance of political
advertisements to prove it, the result might have been a much narrower forum than that the court found, a forum opened at the pleasure of the state for one month or so a year at election time. A second possible argument based on the school cases would be that the
acceptance of commercial advertisements volunteered a forum. But it
is difficult to show that the district decided to provide a place for the
expression of first amendment ideas by a policy which restricted its
advertising to ideas outside the protection of the first amendment."
In the school cases the finding that the school volunteered a forum
seems to have been based on the acceptance of ideas within the orbit
of the first amendment.4
In spite of some indications to the contrary, it seems that the
court in Wirta was following the rule of the terminal cases. But in
doing so, the court avoided any direct admission that the court's decision, rather than some action of the transit district, opened the
forum. The result is a hybrid. The majority's emphasis on a voluntary decision to open a forum makes it seem that the court is relying
on the school cases. But the reasons given for finding a forum
"Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885 (1946). The statute required the governing boards of school districts
to allow groups formed for political, educational, economic and other purposes to use the schools for meetings.
" Cases cited note 18 supra.
The only exception to the generalization is that election advertisements were accepted at certain times.
" See cases cited note 18 supra.
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(based on primary function 42 and the existence of the facility 8 ) are
taken from the terminal cases. Instead of confusing the basis of its
decision with the assertion that the district had "opened a forum,"
the court in Wirta should have admitted that it was requiring the
district to provide a forum.
In any event the rule of the terminal cases seems a sounder
basis for decision than the rule of the school cases. The conclusion
that the state need not make public school auditoriums available after
school hours unless it lets some groups use them (and that it can
withdraw them at will) is of questionable validity anyway." Of
course, there is no requirement that the state provide a facility so
that it can be used as a forum. It need not build a high school auditorium so that local groups can use it after school, or a bus terminal
so that leaflets can be distributed. Nor need it provide a system for
placing advertising on its busses. However, once a facility exists
which is an appropriate place for the exercise of first amendment
rights different questions are raised. Judicial inquiry should not end
with the discovery that in the memory of man no local groups have
been allowed to use the local public school auditorium. Rather
groups which want to use the schools after hours should be allowed
to do so unless that would place an intolerable burden on school
facilities and interfere with the primary function of the school."
That is the rule of the terminal cases. The same rule should be applied to advertising slots on busses. By establishing a system for
" The court treated the district's decision to accept advertisement as
proof that the acceptance of other advertisements would not interfere with
the primary function of the busses. The court treats the decision to accept
any advertisements as a decision that advertising will not interfere with the
primary function of the bus and hence as a decision to open a forum. Since
there would be no interference with primary function the conclusion based

on the terminal cases is clear: the advertising slots must be provided as a
forum. In addition to the primary function test there is probably also a
requirement that the place be an appropriate one for the exercise of first
amendment rights (or at least that it not be inappropriate). Compare Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) with Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966) and Wolin v. Port Authority, 268 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. N.Y.
1967).
" The court's argument in Wirta that the district had opened a forum
"by providing facilities for advertisements," - Cal. 2d at -, 434 P.2d at
985, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 433, on its busses also suggests reliance on the terminal
cases. For, under the dicta of the school cases, merely providing a facility,
such as a school auditorium, is not enough.
"Van Alystyne, Political Speakers at State Universities, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 328, 338 (1962).
"' Id. at 339. Cases rited note 20 supra,
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accepting commercial advertisements (like building a terminal or
school auditorium) the district has provided a facility that could
reasonably be used for the expression of first amendment rights. It
need not establish the facility. Once it does, however, it should
not be allowed to reject advertisements protected by the first amendment and for which space is available unless it can show that to
accept them would intolerably burden the busses and interfere with
their primary purpose for providing transportation.
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS

Constitutional Law-Chronic Alcoholism
and the Eighth Amendment in North Carolina
A man gets up in the morning and the first thing he does is to
"take a drink." From that point on throughout the day he is constantly "taking a drink." By mid-afternoon or early evening, he is
picked up by the police for public drunkenness. Far from being his
first "offense," this series of events has happened to him many times
before-sometimes ending with arrest and sometimes not. This
man is a chronic alcoholic; he suffers from a disease and has no
control over his behavior.' Should he be punished as a "public
drunk" or is it "cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth
amendment to do so? Recently several courts across the nation
have faced this question and reached conflicting results. The following is a brief attempt to highlight these decisions and some
future problems raised therein.
The first such case was Driver v. Hinnant.2 Defendant had
been found guilty of a violation of a North Carolina statute making it a misdemeanor for "any person ... [to] be found drunk or
intoxicated on the public highway, or at any public place or meeting," 3 and sentenced to two year's imprisonment. Driver had been
convicted of the same offense over 200 times previously. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion
that the sentences were authorized by the statute and therefore that
See authorities collected in Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764 n. 6
(4th Cir. 1966).
-356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). See also, 44 N.C.L. Rav. 818 (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (1953). As will be shown and discussed,
infra, this statute underwent significant amendment in 1967,
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conviction thereunder was not cruel and unusual punishment.4 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina denied a writ of Habeas Corpus, 5 but on appeal the Fourth
Circuit held that the conviction was unconstitutional as cruel and
unusual punishment." The court said that chronic alcoholism "is
now almost universally accepted medically as a disease," 7 the symptoms of which may appear as "disorder or behavior."" Since this
includes unwilled and ungovernable appearances in public by the
victim, no judgement of criminal conviction can be based thereon.
It is cruel and unusual punishment to brand him a criminal, irrespective of consequent detention or fine, for those acts "which are
compulsive as symptomatic of the disease."'
The Driver case was followed soon thereafter by the District
of Columbia Circuit in Easter v. District of Columbia.10 Easter had
been found guilty of being "drunk and intoxicated" on a Washington
street in violation of D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-128(a) (1961)-the
court ruling that chronic alcoholism was not a defense. He was
given a 90 day suspended sentence.'1 Hearing the appeal en banc,
the Court of Appeals held that chronic alcoholism is not itself a
crime and is a defense to a charge of public intoxication in Washington, D.C.'" Furthermore, since "it is the fact of criminal con'State v. Driver, 262 N.C. 92, 136 S.E.2d 208 (1964).
'Driver v. Hinnant, 243 F. Supp. 95, 96 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
6356 F.2d at 765.
7Id. at 764.
aId.
'Id. The Fourth Circuit felt that the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), sustained,
if not commanded, the view they enforced. In that case it was held that
drug addiction was an illness and a statute punishing such an involuntarily
assumed "status" was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment. Id. at 667. See 27 LA. L. REv. 340, 346-47 (1967)
where the foregoing conclusion is challenged as misplaced reliance. See
also 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 145 (1967) where it is pointed out that Driver
extends the immunity from criminal prosecution from statia-a passive
state of being, to acts symptomatic of the disease-overt action. That is,
the North Carolina statute punished an involuntary symptom of a status,
public intoxication.
10361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11
1d. at 51.
Id. While the entire court felt that Congress in passing the Rehabilitation of Alcoholics Act Ch. 472, 61 Stat. 744, c. 472 (1947), D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-501 to -514 (1967), intended that alcoholics not be punished
for public drunkenness and therefore commanded the result reached, four
of the eight judges also felt the result was constitutionally commanded, citing
Driver as authority. 361 F.2d at 55.
"
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viction that is critical," 13 it was immaterial that the sentence had
been suspended.' 4
Although the Driver and Easter cases are perhaps indicative of a
trend in judicial thought, more recent state court pronouncements
have maintained the position that such a conviction is not cruel and
unusual punishment. In People v. Hoy, 5 the Michigan court said:
"[W]hile we are aware that some courts have recently held it is
cruel and unusual punishment to sentence to prison a chronic alcoholic on a charge of drunk and disorderliness, such decisions are
not controlling precedent for this court and we decline to adopt
them. . ,1 One of the reasons given for this position was insufficient persuasion in the record that defendant was a chronic alcoholic. Therefore, since Driver and Easter did not hold that the
punishment for public drunkenness was cruel and unusual, but rather
that the conviction and punishment of a chronic alcoholic was unconstitutional, this Michigan case may not be a true test of the
Driver-Easter principle." However, in Budd v. California8 the
record involved was similar to that in Driver and Easter. There
was testimony that Budd had been an alcoholic for over thirty
years and that he had lost control over the use of intoxicating
beverages. The trial court made no finding as to whether defendant was a chronic alcoholic, saying that such a finding was not
pertinent. He was thus convicted under CAL. PENAL STAT. §
647(f) (Supp. 1967) providing in part that any person "found in
any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . .
in such a condition that he is -unable to exercise care for his own
safety or that of others" is guilty of a misdemeanor. Budd then
challenged the conviction and imprisonment as cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment by seeking a writ of
Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. The writ was
denied and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to
review the California Supreme Court action. 9 The possibility of
final constitutional determination by the Supreme Court on this
question was thus temporarily eliminated. However, another op361 F.2d at 55.
"Id.

143 N.W.2d 577 (Mich. App. 1966).
143 N.W.2d at 578.
" See 11 ST. Louis U. L.J. 250, 257 (1967).
21 Cert. deinied, 385 U.S. 909 (1966).
2"

10Id.
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portunity for the Supreme Court to rule on the question has been
presented in Powell v. Texas, now awaiting decision-oral argument having been heard. 0
Regardless of the state of this issue in other jurisdictions, it is
a settled question in North Carolina. The Fourth Circuit's decision in Driver is binding here unless and until the Supreme Court
reaches a different result. Furthermore, the North Carolina General Assembly in 1967 amended its "public drunkenness" statute.2 1
As far as relevant here, that amendment reads:
(c) Chronic alcoholism shall be an affirmative defense to the
charge of public drunkenness. For the purpose of this section,
chronic alcoholism shall be as defined in article 7A of chapter
122. When the defense of chronic alcoholism is shown to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact, and a judgment by reason of
chronic alcoholism is entered, the court may follow the treatment
procedures outlined in article 7A of chapter 122.22
20

Powell v. Texas, 36 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. March 12, 1968). Counsel for appellant argued only that the chronic alcoholic cannot be convicted, expressly refusing to question the right of a police officer to
arrest the chronic alcoholic, place him in jail, and have him subjected to
trial. Amici curiae argument against constitutionality agreed with appellant's counsel with the one qualification that, when a police officer is
familiar with the chronic alcoholic, questions concerning probable cause
for arrest may arise. Counsel for the state of Texas attempted to impress
upon the court the "revolutionary implications" of holding that the conviction is unconstitutional. Appellee suggests that if a chronic alcoholic
cannot be convicted of public intoxication, he will not be amenable to other
criminal laws either. He concluded his argument by explaining that if a
chronic alcoholic cannot be sent to jail, the court must either allow him to
remain on the streets or subject him to involuntary civil commitment. The
latter is neither wholly effective nor wholly constitutional, he argues, while
the former would endanger the alcoholic's health and life and would be
more
21 cruel than sending him to jail.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-335 (Supp. 1967).
2
Id. As defined in article 7A of chapter 122, a chronic alcoholic is
any person found by any court to have the illness or condition known as
chronic alcoholism. Chronic alcoholism is the chronic and habitual use of
alcoholic beverages to the extent of losing the power of self-control with
respect to the use of such beverages. Any court having jurisdiction over
a chronic alcoholic may provide for treatment through any one or more
of the following actions: (1) order the clerk of the superior court to
commence judicial hospitalization as per article 7 of chapter 122, (2) direct,
in cooperation with a family member or other responsible person, the making
and following of plans for treatment in a private facility or program approved by the North Carolina Department of Mental Health, (3) refer him
to a private physician or psychiatrist or to a hospital diagnostic center or
to a private or social welfare organization, (4) request such as the local
department of public welfare to work with the chronic alcoholic and make
reports as to his treatment or condition as requested, (5) make or approve
any other appriate plan and require for as long as appropriate to treatment
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Though obviously under some compulsion to bring the statute in
line with the Fourth Circuit's ruling, this amendment demonstrates
a praiseworthy understanding of the plight in which the chronic
alcoholic has traditionally found himself.
The North Carolina Supreme Court also is to be commended
23 Prior to the
for its application of this statute in State v. Pardon.
passage of the above amendment, the defendant was arrested and
charged with his fourteenth offense of public drunkenness within
twelve months. Having pleaded guilty, he was examined in the superior court for the purpose of determining sentence. Though the
examination and investigation revealed him to be a chronic alcoholic, 24 the court, seeing no alternative, sentenced him to eight

months in jail.
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court remanded for a
new trial in light of the intervening statute. The court said that
since judgment is not final as long as the appeal is pending, "the
appellate court must dispose of the case under the law in force
when its decision is given, even although to do so requires the reversal of a judgment which was right when rendered." 2'5 The
court reasoned that the rule prohibiting ex post facto legislation only
prevents aggravation of punishment, not all changes. Therefore
it is not an invalid ex post facto application of the amendment to
allow defendant the defense of chronic alcoholism at this stage.
The legislature may always remove a burden imposed upon citizens
for state purposes.2 6 Thus defendant was granted a new trial and
an opportunity to prove the affirmative defense of chronic alcoholism.
Though North Carolina is now firmly committed to the more
enlightened approach, the trial advocate's problems with the eighth
amendment are just beginning. Numerous questions arise consubmission of periodic reports as to his treatment or condition, in the courts
discretion. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122- 65.6 to -65.9 (Supp. 1967).
-'272 N.C. 72, 157 S.E.2d 698 (1967).
-"He had been convicted of public drunkenness over fifty times; he bad
been in institutions for alcoholics in Missouri and Kentucky; he had a record
of traffic violations, larceny, vagrancy, gambling, trespass, forgery and other
offenses. At the time arrested he was a patient at the Veterans Hospital
in Durham but was home on a "weekend pass." That hospital refused to
readmit him after this conviction. Id.
2 Id. at 76, 157 S.E.2d at 701, citing Gulf, Col. & S. F. Ry. v. Dennis,

224 U.S. 503, 506 (1912).

20 Id. at 76, 157 S.E.2d at 701.
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cerning the application and possible extensions of the Fourth Circuit's rationale. Must the defense be raised by counsel or may
the judge raise it on his own motion ?7 The vagueness of the limiting factor of the Driver case, i.e., "acts symptomatic of the disease,"
may be susceptible to unlimited interpretations."8 What is the effect
of the court's 9 likening the movements of an alcoholic to those of
an imbecile or person in a delirium fever ? It has been said that an
alcoholic's presence in public is not a willful act and thus evil intent and consciousness of wrong-doing, indispensible elements of a
crime, are missing. This raises the question whether chronic alcoholism may be extended as a defense to crimes in general and,
if so, when, to what crimes and to what extent. 1 Once the chronic
alcoholic is protected from criminal prosecution, it becomes a problem as to what treatment or handling is both possible and desirable,
"See, e.g., Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling the Chronic Court Offender: The Challenge of the Courts, 19 S.C.L. REv. 305, 309-11 (1967).
"See, e.g., Starrs, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional
Criminal Law Theory, 19 S.C.L. REV. 349, 354 (1967); 1966 Dux LJ.
545, 554-55 (1966) ; 27 LA. L. REv. 340, 346 (1967) ; 12 S.D.L. REv. at 146
(1967), See also argument of appellee, note 20 supra.
29

356 F.2d at 764; 361 F.2d at 54.

See, e.g., Deddens, Volitional Fault and the Intoxicated Criminal Offender, 36 U. CIN. L. REv. 258, 281-85 (1967); 20 Agiu. L. REv. 365, 367
(1966); Note, 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 147 (1967).
" See, e.g., Deddens, supra note 30; Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling
the Chronic Court Offender: The Challenge of the Courts, 19 S.C.L. REv.
305, 306, 330-31 (1967); Hutt, Recent Forensic Developments in the Field
of Alcoholism, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 343, 345-47, 350 (1967); Slovenko,
Alcoholism and the Criminal Law, 6 WAsHBuRN LJ. 269, 279-81 (1967);
Starrs, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism and Traditional Criminal Law
Theory, 19 S.C.L. REv. 349, 356-69 (1967) ; Tao, Drunkenness and Criminal
Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 530, 539-540, 544-45 (1967) ; 20 ARK. L. REV. 365,
368-70 (1966); 16 DEPAUL L. REv. 493 (1967); 1966 DuKE L.J. 545, 55556; 52 IowA L. REV. 492, 495-97 (1966); 27 LA. L. REV. 340, 344-46
(1967); 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 147-48 (1967). It is also interesting to note
that "chronic alcoholic" as defined by the court may well come within the
traditional definition of "involuntary drunk." Since drunkenness is presumed to be voluntary unless some special circumstance is established to
remove it from that category, "involuntary drunkenness" is most easily
defined in the negative. If the intoxicating character of the liquor or drug
is not understood or known to be present or if the liquor or drug is taken
under duress or medical advice, the resulting condition is usually said to be
involuntary. This characterization is not all-inclusive. There are instances
where a person has become intoxicated without doing so intentionally or
recklessly, and though the above factors were missing, it was held to be
involuntary. A state of involuntary intoxication establishes that the derangement is without culpability and hence is dealt with as if it were the result
of mental disease or defect. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 782-87 (1957).
20
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i.e., compulsory or voluntary, where, how long, etc." Should a
court be allowed discretion whether to treat such alcoholics civily
or criminally ?' 3 More general considerations which the General
Assembly, the courts and counsel for chronic alcoholics must face
involve the psychology of an alcoholic34 and the use of alcohol and
its relation to crime generally.3" These questions will have to be met
and solved through legislative action and the adversary system and
it is hoped the articles here cited will be of some help to the legislator and trial advocate in this process.
SAm

G. GRzIMEs

Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech in the Military
On graduation from college Henry Howe was commissioned
as a Second Lieutenant in the U. S. Army Reserve. After being on
active duty about one year he found himself assigned to Fort Bliss
in El Paso, Texas. While he was stationed there, on November 6,
1965, he participated in a demonstration opposing the war in Vietnam. The degree of his protest as well as the fact of his involvement
caused him to be brought before a general court-martial, resulting in
an end to his short military career and his imprisonment for one
year.'
The demonstration was planned and organized by a group of
students and professors from El Paso State College as a protest
"against American policy." The marchers had requested permission from the city council to conduct a side-walk demonstration
82 See, e.g., Deddens, supranote 30; Hutt, Modern Trends in Handling
the
Chronic Court Offender: The Challenge of the Courts, 19 S.C.L. REv. 305,
312-23 (1967); Hutt, Recent Forensic Developments in the Field of Alcoholism, 8 Wm. & MARy L. IREv. 342, 351-58 (1967). Murtagh, Arrests for
Public Intoxication, 35 FoaRRAm L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1966); Myerson and
Mayer, Origins, Treatment and Destiny of Skid Row Men, 19 S.C.L. REv.
332 (1967); Slovenko, supra note 31, at 281-84; Swarty, Compulsory Legal
Measures and the Concept of Illness, 19 S.C.L. Rtv. 372 (1967); Tao, supra
note 31, at 543, 545-47; 16 DE PAUL L. REv. 493, 495 (1967); 1966 DuKE
L.J. 545, 557-61; 52 IowA L. REv. 492, 497-99, 508-10 (1966); 27 LA. L.
REv. 340, 344 (1967); 18 S.C.L. REv. 504, 506-08 (1966); 12 S.D.L. Rtv.
142, 148-50 (1967).
"See, e.g., 12 S.D.L. REv. 142, 150 (1967).
" See, e.g., Murtagh, supra note 32, at 9-10; 18 S.C.L. REv. 504, 505
(1966).
See, e.g., Slovenko, supra note 31, at 271-72.
Court-Martial 413739.
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in San Jacinto Plaza. Permission was initially denied, but on the
advice of the City Attorney who said that there were constitutional
implications in the refusal, the council reversed its decision. For
two weeks prior to the march it had been the subject of a controversy which was intensively reported in all the local news media.
One result of this publicity was a spontaneous counter-demonstration. The marchers were met by a crowd of about 2,000 whose
attitude is best symbolized by those who wore "Win in Vietnam"
stickers pasted to their foreheads and by the American Legionaires
who passed out small United States flags. The group itself consisted of twelve demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Let's get
out of Vietnam," "Get out of Vietnam," "Peace in Vietnam," and
"Would Jesus carry a draft card."2 Lt. Howe was not a member
of the group that planned the demonstration, only joining the march
as it began. As the marchers started moving, he fell in at the rear,
displaying a sign which previously he had been carrying rolled in
his hand. As he walked he reversed the sign occasionally so both
sides could be seen. The front of the sign read, "Let's have more
than a choice between petty ignorant Fascists in 1968."' The re'4
verse exhorted, "End Johnson's Fascist aggression in Vietnam."
Lt. Howe was not in uniform at the time of his participation in
the demonstration.'
The Lieutenant was convicted by a general court-martial' of
violations of articles 88 and 133 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 7 entitled "Contempt Towards Officials"' and "Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman" 9 respectively. He was sen2 United States v. Howe,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 168, 37 C.M.R. 429, 432
(1967).
'Id.
'Id.
'United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555, 556 (1966).
'This is one of the types of courts-martial which are classified in order of
formality and power to try and punish offenses. The three classifications are,
from least to most comprehensive: summary, special and general courtsmartial.
, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1966). [hereinafter
cited as U.C.M.J.].

'U.S.C. § 888 (1964).
'10 U.S.C. § 933 (1964). Although this article seems to tread dangerously

close to the line of unconstitutionality for vagueness, as was argued to the
court, a discussion of it is outside the scope of this note. Violations of this
article are rarely, if ever, prosecuted except in concert with another article
as was done in Hozve,
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tenced to dismissal" and confinement at hard labor for two years1
with total forfeitures. After the case went through the normal
automatic review process, Lt. Howe's petition to the United States
Court of Military Appeals to review his conviction was denied.
A petition for reconsideration of the refusal to grant discretionary
review was also denied. The court handed down a lengthy opinion,
in United States v. Howe,' 2 giving the reasons for denial of the
latter petition.
The unanimous opinion of the court lists seven arguments"3 pre1

oEquivalent to a dishonorable discharge.
The sentence was reduced by the convening authority (the officer in
Command with the authority to convene a court marital and first reviewing
authority) to one year. Lt. Howe was released under commandant's parole
three months and two days after his trial.
1 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967). It should be pointed out
that under Article 76 of the U.C.M.J. this is Lt. Howe's last direct appeal.
10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964). This article provides that after the review procedures required by the U.C.M.J. are completed, "Orders publishing the
proceedings of courts-marital and all action taken pursuant to such proceedings shall be binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of
the United States... ." Id. The result is that the Supreme Court does not
exercise supervision over the military judicial system, and its doctrines and
interpretations are not binding on the military as they are on civilian courts.
Thus the product of the military judicial system can only be attacked collaterally in a habeas corpus proceeding and then only on limited grounds.
See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
13 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 169, 37 C.M.R. at 433. The arguments listed are
these:
1. The charges against appellant violate the First Amendment to the
to the Constitution.
2. Articles 88 and 133 are so vague and uncertain that they violate the
Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
3. The charge under Article 133 fails to state an offense.
4. The law officer erred to the substantial prejudice of the appellant
in failing to instruct, sua sponte, that if the court-martial found the
allegedly contemptuous words to have been uttered in the course of
a political discussion, then it had to find that appellant intended
them to be personally disrespectful.
5. Appellant was substantially prejudiced by the law officer's ruling
that the maximum sentence for the charged offenses included confinement at hard labor for three years.
6. The law officer erred to the substantial prejudice of the appellant
by instructing the court-martial, over defense objections, that in determining whether the words uttered by appellant were contemptuous of the President the court-martial "should apply the test
of how the words were understood and what they were taken to
mean by the persons who saw them, or some of them."
7. The appellant was prejudiced in his appeal before the board of
review by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Hagopian's participation in the
oral argument and decision of the instant case.
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sented to it for consideration, three of which are relevant here.14
These three points were directed at the validity of the prosecution
under article 88 of the U.C.M.J.15 Entitled "Contempt Towards
Officials," the Article reads as follows:
Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against
the President, the Vice President, Congress, the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary
of the Treasury, or the Governor, or legislature of any State,
Territory, Commonwealth, or possession in which he is on duty
or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 16
The major issue in Howe was the validity of article 88 under the
first amendment. Also assigned as error was the ruling by the law
officer that, if the court-martial board found the words to have been
uttered in the course of a political discussion, then it must find that
Lt. Howe intended them to be personally disrespectful.17 Another
ground urged was based on the test the court-martial was to use in
the determination of whether the words were contemptuous. The
standard used was, "How the words were understood and what they
18
were taken to mean by persons who saw them, or some of them."
Over half of the opinion is devoted to the constitutional issues
raised by these charges. The court's holding that article 88 does
not violate the first amendment is supported by two arguments. The
first consists of an historical exposition of the article and its antecedents going back to the period preceding the founding of the Republic. This chronicle points out that a predecessor to this statute
constituted a contemporary construction of the Constitution, i.e.,
a similar law was passed when many of the framers of the first
amendment were still in Congress.
The fundamental basis for the court's decision, however, is found
in a comparatively short paragraph which states:
The evil which Article 88 of the Uniform Code, supra, seeks to
avoid is the impairment of discipline and the promotion of
insubordination by an officer of the military service in using

1

See arguments 1, 4, and 6, note 13 supra.
10 U.S.C. § 888 (1964).

1T

d.

The discussion in the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 1951, 1 167 specifically exempts political speech from the operation of Article 88. See U.S.
DEP'T oF DEFFNsE, MANUAL FOR COURT MARTIAL 1951, 1 167 (1951).

" United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 169, 37 C.M.R. 429, 433
(1967).
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contemptuous words towards the Chief of State and the Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Forces of the United
States. 19
Taking judicial notice of the conflict in Vietnam and the demands
it is placing on our armed forces, the court goes on to say, "That in
the present times and circumstances such conduct by an officer constitutes a clear and present danger to discipline within our armed
services, under the precedents established by the Supreme Court,
seems to require no argument."20
The other two assignments of error were also rejected by the
court. The argument questioning the standard to be applied in determining contemptuousness failed as immaterial since the words
were "obviously contemptuous per se."2 1 Similarly, the court refused to confer a privilege for political discussion, stating that intent
was not an element of the article.22
The thesis of this note is that New York Times Company v.
Sullivan,23 a case mentioned only briefly by the court in Howe, should
control the general problem of military free speech there encountered; and that the "clear and present danger" test 24 -which may
have no validity at all after the Times case 25-was too loosely used
in the area of seditious libel, to which it should have no relevancy.2
The opinion in Times gave an unequivocal answer as to the status
of seditious libel under the Constitution. In ruling the Sedition Act
of 17987 unconstitutional and thereby eliminating the concept of
seditious libel from the vocabulary of the law the Supreme Court
created an important test for interpretation of the first amendment.28 The Times case declared as unconstitutional the use by government of any form of seditious libel to suppress speech. Since
article 88 as here interpreted by the Court of Military Appeals is
1
Id. at 173, 37 C.M.R. at 437.
0
d. at 174, 37 C.M.R. at 437.
21 Id. at 181, 37 C.M.R. at 445.
22
Id. at 180, 37 C.M.R. at 444.
22376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2
See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
" Kalven, The New York Times Case, 1964 SUPREME CoURT REVIEW
191 20(1964).
See note 78 infra, and accompanying text
"Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
2
Kalven, supra note 25. Professor Kalven may be one of the few commentators who sees these implications in Times. The Times case arose in
tort and is, of course, open to a strict interpretation limiting it to that field.
But see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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capable of being applied as a seditious libel statute, it may have
been unconstitutionally applied in the Howe case, because the standards set out in Times were arguably not met. All of this, of course,
is based on the assumption that the first amendment applies to the
military, a question which the court never squarely faced.
Although the Times case arguably was not aimed solely at seditious libel,2" its impact on that aspect of the first amendment is
significant and can best be understood by defining seditious libel
and outlining two theories relating to its status that emerged prior
to the Times case. To define seditious libel is difficult, and perhaps
the best definition is one that has been pieced together from actual
prosecutions.
The crime consisted of criticizing government: its form, constitution, officers, laws, symbols, conduct, policies, and so on. In
effect, any comment about government which could be construed
to have the bad tendency of lowering it in the public esteem or
of disturbing the peace was seditious libel, subjecting the speaker
or writer to criminal prosecution. 0
Prior to the Times opinion at least two theories emerged as to
the status of seditious libel at the time of ratification of the first
amendment. One argument, generally accepted by the courts since
Justice Holmes wrote his opinion in Schenck v. United States,"'
argues that the amendment nullified the common law of sedition. A
revisionist view contends that the authors of the amendment left the
common law crime of seditious libel in force.3 2 The conflict between
these two theories is largely academic, however, when viewed in the
light of Times. There the court acknowledged the existence of the
two schools of thought, but held that the Sedition Act of 179833 was
unconstitutional:
Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the
attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history ....

These views reflect a broad consensus that the act, be-

:'See note 28 supra.
*L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH
TORY: LEGACY OF SuPPREssIoN

AND PRESs IN EARLY AMERICAN His-

10 (1960). Since the trial of John Peter

Zenger, truth has been recognized as a defense. This can be of dubious
value since the jury must pass on the truth or falsity of sometimes unpopular ideas.
81249 U.S. 47 (1919).
2 3L. LEvY, supra note 30.

Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
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cause of the restraint imposed upon criticism of government and
public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment. 34
Thus the Times case, which addressed itself at least in part to
the question of seditious libel, was perhaps a significant breakthrough in the interpretation of the first amendment. It has been
noted that, "The exciting possibilities in the court's opinion derive
from its emphases on seditious libel and the Sedition Act of 1798
as the key to the meaning of the First Amendment."3 6 By this
opinion, it is argued, the court has marked out the central meaning of
the first amendment. As a result, Professor Kalven feels that the
court has implicitly abandoned some of the tests used earlier, notably
the "clear and present danger" test. Hence it is possible that the
court in Howe has applied outdated law. A clear statement of
policy regarding the attitude toward seditious libel appears in
Times:
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound
national committment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. 36
Times, in voicing previous dissatisfaction with the court's handling
of first amendment problems, 3 7 seems to represent a shift toward
absolutist theories in the area of political speech.3
The proposition supported by Times as to seditious libel in
civil suits is reaffirmed and extended to criminal prosecutions by
Garrison v. Louisiana." In that case public statements by New
Orleans District Attorney, Jim Garrison, attributed a huge backlog
of cases in the criminal district court to excessive vacations by the
judges. He further accused these judges of hampering enforcement
of vice laws by their refusal to authorize expenses for necessary
investigations. These assertions caused his conviction under the
Louisiana Criminal Defamation Statute.4 0 The Supreme Court
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
" Kalven, supra note 25, at 204.
" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
"7See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
" See generaUy A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960); Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
"379 U.S. 64 (1964).
"LA.

REV. STAT.

§ 14:47 (1950).
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reversed, holding that this was a type of seditious libel prosecution
held unconstitutional in Times. 41 The court said,
The reasons which led us so to hold in New York Times ...
apply with no less force merely because the remedy is criminal.
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression compel
42
application of the same standard to the criminal remedy.
It remains to be seen, of course, whether the language of article
88 enables it to be applied as a seditious libel statute in a manner
proscribed by Times. A brief description of the article and its history is necessary. The statute has its origins in the Articles of War
of Gustavus Adolphus,4" the form of the offense being disrespect
towards the Royal Person or Family. The British Articles of War
of 1765 contained a similar provision. 4 In 1776 the American
Articles of War added the clause in a modified form to suit the
needs of the democracy. It was an offense to be disrespectful towards
"the authority of the United States in Congress assembled or the
legislature of any of the United States. ' 41 Periodically, until 1950,
additions were made to the list of persons and institutions protected.
Professor Morgan of Harvard Law School, who headed the committee which drafted the U.C.M.J., tried to have the article stricken
from the new code but failed.4 6
In 1956 Article 88 was amended by Congress. Though a very
minor change of phraseology, this revision had the effect of narrowing the scope of the statute. The phrase "Secretary of a military
department" was substituted for "Secretary of a department." The
effect was to exclude some of the officials who have absolutely no
relation to the military. This may have been a recognition of the
overinclusiveness of this statute, in that formerly more officials were
4'

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964).

"Id. at 74.
"J. SNEDEKER, MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE 751
(1953).
"Id.
"Id. at 752.
"Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 4080 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate

Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 330 (1949). Those who
fought to retain the provision had their arguments summed up well by
Senator Saltonstall: "I hate to see a fellow called out on a Saturday night
and say everything against his government, and then on Monday morning he
appears in uniform with a great smile on his face and squared-up shoulders." Id. at 332.
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covered them were necessary to achieve the purpose of the article.'
The elements of the offense under article 88 are those obvious in
the statement of the statutory language. 48 The accused must have
been a commissioned officer and must have used contemptuous words
towards an official or institution specified in the article. He must,
at the time of the offense, have had a wrongful intent.4 9 Guidance
50
for use of article 88 is included in the Manual For Courts Martial.
The discussion lists exceptions to the statute and matters in aggravation. Criticism of protected officials or groups in the course of a
political discussion is excluded from the operation of the statute.
This exemption applies even though the words are emphatically
expressed, unless they are personally contemptuous. Giving broad
circulation to a written publication, or the utterance of such language in the presence of military inferiors, both serve to aggravate
the offense. Further, truth or falsity may be immaterial, since the
gist of the offense is the contemptuous and malicious quality of the
words employed.51
A comparison of article 88 of the U.C.M.J. and the Sedition
Act of 1798, declared unconstitutional by Times, points out the similarity of the two statutes. After condemning conspiracy against the
laws, institutions or officers of the United States, the Sedition Act,
in section two, prohibits seditious libel:
And be it further enacted, that if any person shall write, print,
utter or publish or shall cause to be written, printed, or published, or shall knowingly and willfully assist or aid in writing,
printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States with the intent to defame said
government, or either house of said congress, or the said President or to bring them, or either of them into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them or either or any of them, the
hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite against them or any of
them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to
'" See note 19 supra and accompanying text. The article may still be
overinclusive by virtue of the state officials retained.
,8 See note 17, supra, and accompanying text.
J. SNEDEKER, spra note 43, at 752.
J'
U.S. DEP'T OF DEiENSE, MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTIAL 1951,
167
(1951). Manual published to implement the U.C.M.J.

a'Id.
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excite any unlawful combination therein, for opposing or resisting
any law of the United States or any act of the President done in
pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the
constitution of the United States or to resist, oppose, or defeat any
such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of
any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any
court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
dollars, and by im2
prisonment not exceeding two years.5
Section three of the Act allows truth as a defense without elaborating its value and makes truth a jury question. The fourth and
final section provides for the expiration of the act on March 3,
1801.
The language of this act53 should be compared with that of
article 88 punishing contemptuous words against the President,
Congress and various other officials and institutions of government. The phrase "any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous
words . . . ,," has the same ring as "or to bring them or either of
them into contempt or disrepute."" In both cases the wording seems
to be the same in purpose and effect.
The proposition that Times precludes the application of article
88 to Lt. Howe, however, depends ultimately on whether the first
amendment applies to the military. Even if applicable, the first
amendment need not be an absolute as to the military, nor must it
apply in the same measure as it does to civilians. There are compelling reasons for limiting some types of speech in the military.
The most frequently raised, and the most justified, is the need to
protect national security. Material and information vital to the
"2Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
5aSee also the Espionage Act, as amended in May 1918, ch. 75, § 1, 40
Stat. 553 which continues this type of suppression-now with the excuse
of wartime necessity:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully, utter,
print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive
language about the form of government of the United States, or the
Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of
the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the Uniform
of the Army or Navy of the United States, or any language intended
to bring [these] . . . into contempt, scorn, or contumely or disrepute
Id. *•.. shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.
5110 U.S.C. § 888 (1964).
"Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
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national defense must be protected from disclosure. This necessarily requires that speech which would divulge such information be
suppressed. The need to maintain discipline, and the position of
the military in policy formulation, are the less clear-cut areas where
some regulation is required. The military must have discipline to
carry out its function; it must be able to command unquestioning
obedience at the proper time. How much of a limitation on speech is
required to insure this response is the problem at the core of the
Howe decision. Certainly the army is justified in prosecuting a
soldier who curses his company commander. On the other hand,
the soldier who merely complains about army life should not be prosecuted. As usual, the line where speech limitation becomes questionable lies somewhere between these extremes.
In the area of national policy formulation there are at least two
facets to the problem. The officer who speaks to influence decisions
on policy matters by either his military or civilian superiors or in
violation of a determination already made forms one aspect of the
difficulty. The other is the officer whose words are taken by his
listeners to be reflective of policy despite his assertions to the contrary. Some regulation is required in this area to avoid jeopardizing
civilian control of the military. However, there should be proof
of specific necessity before basic freedoms are limited."6
There is some indication, from both case authority and the Constitution itself, that constitutional protections are intended to cover
the military. Even in the Howe decision some support for this
proposition can be found. The opinion is primarily devoted to the
constitutional issues raised-on the assumption that the first amendment applies to the military.17 Moreover, the court bases its holding,
at least in part, on the clear and present danger test,5" an unnecessary
gesture if the first amendment is inapplicable to the military.
" As Chief Justice Warren has said, "a most extraordinary showing
of military necessity in defense of the Nation has been required for the
Court to conclude that the challenged actions in fact squared with the injunctions of the Constitution." Warren, The BiU of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 197 (1962).
" An analogous situation may be seen in cases involving state governmental action and the first amendment, where the court no longer feels
compelled to say that the first amendment is made applicable to the states
by the fourteenth. Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925),
with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
8 See note 20 supra, and accompanying text.
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The fifth amendment guarantee of indictment by grand jury
specifically excludes the military from its coverage. 9 That none
of the other amendments contain such an exclusion would indicate
that amendments not so qualified do apply to the armed services.00
In the second 61 and third62 amendments the framers indicate a distrust of standing armies and an intention that military requirements
should be fulfilled by citizen soldiers whose rights would be as nearly
equal to those of their civilian counterparts as possible. Further, there
is no reason to assume that the grant of power to Congress, "To
make rules for the government and regulation of the Land and
Naval forces,"0 3 permits it to exceed the limitations of the Bill
of Rights. This combination of powers and limitations was emphasized in a speech by Justice Black. "It seems obvious to me that
Congress in exercising its general powers, is expressly forbidden
to use means prohibited by the Bill of Rights."6 4 Another possible
argument is that the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
which is applicable to the military, includes the right not to have freedom of speech abridged.
Case law, either military or civilian, applying the first amendment to the armed forces is rare. A military decision on point is
United States v. Voorhees,6 in which an army officer was accused
of submitting a manuscript to a publisher without prior clearance of
the contents, a violation of army regulations. This case, in which
all three judges filed opinions, only brushed the constitutional issue.
By straining the interpretation of the regulation's phrase "policy
and proprietary considerations" to be the equivalent of security
considerations, the court was able to bring the regulation within
acceptable limitations on speech. The opinion did make a point of
expressing the court's position on the first amendment rights of the
military: "I think I should make it clear that in my opinion every
individual in the military is entitled to the same constitutional rights,
privileges and guarantees as every other American citizen, except
"U.S.

CONST. amend. V.

(OCf. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), extending this exclusion to
the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
'2 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
:. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
'Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 875 (1960).
"4 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 16 C.M.R. 83 (1953).
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where specifically denied or limited by the Constitution itself." '
The majority and the dissenting opinions found a common ground
on this point, with the dissent pointing out: "Even as to service personnel, I deem applicable to a partial-even to a substantial--extent
the doctrine of the Supreme Court that the rights deriving from
the first amendment are to be jealously safeguarded by the judiciary
this regardless of whether they may be said to enjoy a 'preferred

position.'

"67

Civilian courts have generally declined to interfere in the administration of justice within the military itself. This partially explains the dearth of cases applying the Constitution to members of
the armed forces. The civilian courts have enforced the due process
rights of the military, however. Burns v. Wilson" stands as the
leading case on civilian review of court-martial proceedings. This
review is limited to collateral attack on very restricted grounds. The
court emphasized the application of constitutional principles: "The
military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibilities
as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of his
Constitutional Rights." 9 United States v. Hiatt,79 an earlier Third
Circuit opinion still cited by courts with approval, also supports the
due process rights of the military. "We think that this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due process clause of the fifth amendment applies to a defendant in criminal proceedings in a federal
military court as well as in a federal civil court."71 Thus at a
minimum the due process rights of the military are protected by the
Constitution, and although military due process does not embody
quite the same privileges,72 it does have a constitutional basis.
Whatever the status of the military under the Bill of Rights,
it would seem invalid, once the application of a specific right has
been accepted, to limit the scope of that right indiscriminately and
without a compelling reason for the precise limitation involved.
This occurred in the Howe case when the court made its only significant reference to Times: "[T]he search for the outer limits of
00 Id. at 531, 16 C.M.R. at 105.
67 Id. at 545, 16 C.M.R. at 119.
"346 U.S. 137 (1953).
"Id. at 142.
141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).
'Id. at 666.
" W. Aycocic & S. WUErEL, MILITARY LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE
OF MILITARY JUSTICE 187 (1955).
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that right [freedom of speech] ... has, in the main, been restricted
to the civilian and not the military community. '7 3 Such a blind,
sweeping restriction of the application of the Times case seems unwarranted; some compelling justification must be advanced in any
given situation.
Indeed, there are policy reasons why protection should be extended to the military. The first amendment, more than any other,
stands as an end in itself. Many provisions of the Bill of Rights
are designed to insure an accused a fair trial, but few taken alone
could be called as definitive of a democratic society as the first amendment. Suppression of speech will tend to discourage critical thought
and debate on public issues. It follows that an ambivalent feeling
toward current affairs will prevail among people not allowed to express their opinions. This has grave implications in an age where a
military career requires increasing political astuteness and sophistication. This can only have the effect of encouraging mediocrity in
the military. Conscription points up another argument. Although
officers are not directly effected by the draft, many officers would not
have volunteered had they not been faced with the draft as an alternative. Thus, an argument that an officer is in service by choice
and has waived his rights may not be as strong as it might
seem. Still another consideration is the number of people affected. In a time of high mobilization the size of the military
can run to several millions. Thus a large segment of the population
is potentially deprived of its first amendment rights. A final point
is the effect of the loss of these rights on the exercise of the franchise. Without being able to participate in the political process in
an active way the right to vote can, for some, appear an empty formality.
There are several arguments against military free speech. The
maintenance of civilian control of the armed forces by keeping the
military out of politics is one. This has special appeal in an hemi74
sphere where military involvement in government is a fact of life.
" United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 177, 37 C.M.R. 429, 441

(1967).

" These arguments raise questions about the degree of civilian control

necessary to effectuate the purposes of that control. This dominance seems
to have been, if anything, increasing since the creation of the Department of
Defense in 1947. Secretary Robert S. McNamara represented this trend,
being the strongest Secretary of Defense to date. The Court of Military
Appeals refused to make an exception in Lt. Howe's case because of the
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This argument is based on a form of discipline, i.e., the need for the
military to be subservient to civilian control. It is true that there
cannot be a double standard of discipline, one for wartime and another in peace. It is also a fact that unquestioning obedience is a
pre-eminent requirement for the military to be an effective instrument. This is particularly high-lighted by the fact that the military
is a tool of national policy and not a maker of that policy. What
effect does a law like article 88 have in effectuating these goals of
civilian control ?7 To justify this statute the question must be
answered convincingly.
These arguments for application of the first amendment to the
military establishment, when joined with Times' invalidation of the
concept of seditious libel and the similarity between this concept
and article 88 of the U.C.M.J., permit the contention that article 88
was unconstitutionally applied in the Howe case. This is not to say
that the article is unconstitutional per se, but rather that standards
laid down in the Times opinion must be satisfied to avoid the label
of seditious libel which will be equated with unconstitutionality.
The rule announced by the Times case, "prohibits a public official
from recovering for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."7 6 The argument that there
might be a separate standard in criminal cases is rebutted by Garrison v. Louisiana.
When measured by the Times standard, Lt. Howe's actions appear to fall within the scope of the first amendment protection defined by that case. The statements undoubtedly refer to a public
official, the President. They are critical of official conduct, the
Vietnam conflict. In a determination of actual malice the real question here posed under the Times test is whether advocacy of a
implications it might have for "the man on the white horse." United States
v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 175, 37 C.M.R. 429, 439 (1967). This seems
to be less than justified, given the strength of the concept of civilian control
of the military.
"'The Navy has traditionally used less formal means to accomplish its
objectives in this area. A recent example can be found in the case of Capt.
Richard Alexander, U.S.N., who was reassigned from command of the
battleship New Jersey as a result of his public statements. New York Times,
Jan. 9, 1968, at 1, Col. 2.
"' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
77 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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legitimately held political belief, no matter what its basis, is to be
equated with knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. In any
case, the test for malice is a subjective one and not the objective
standard applied by the court.
There are, of course, counter-arguments which may be advanced
under the Times standard. It is arguable that Lt. Howe's acts were
personally contemptuous of the President rather than critical of his
official conduct. There is some basis for the contention that the
term "Fascist" is of such a nature as not to be applied except knowingly or at least recklessly as to its falsehood.
In addition to the court's failure to apply the Times test in Howe,
it arguably misapplies the "clear and present danger" test to justify
its holding. Aside from questions raised about the current soundness
of the test and about the present status of the test in the courts,"8 it
is doubtful that the facts of this case meet the standards intended by
its authors. Justices Holmes and Brandeis eschewed what has become known as the "bad tendency" test"0 and insisted that the danger
of a substantive evil which Congress has a right to prevent be both
clear and immediate.8 0 In Howe the court did not even feel compelled to justify its use of the "clear and present danger" test. The
danger cited by the court is prejudice to the good order and discipline
of the military."1 It would appear that civilians engaged in similar
protests present only slightly less of an evil. This is especially true
since Lt. Howe was virtually indistinguishable from a civilian. However, if this type of statute were applied to civilians it would be
clearly unconstitutional.
It may be said that this type of restriction involves a minimal
loss of freedom of speech, and that the contemptuous language contemplated by the article is not a necessary adjunct to meaningful
political activity. The principle, however, remains the same. These
rights have always been jealously guarded and even minor encroachments have been corrected because of their implications of increasingly large sacrifices of freedom. Therefore, Lt. Howe's conviction
should have been reversed due to the unconstitutional application of
article 88. "It is anomalous that one who enters the armed forces is
78

Kalven, supra note 25, at 214.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
"'But see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
" See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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performing his greatest role as a citizen and yet is reduced to a
status where he can no longer enjoy the rights which protect his
civilian counterpart.

'2
1

THOMAS

C. NoRD

Corporations-Reserved Powers and Fundamental Corporate
Changes-Protection of Minority Stockholders' Interests

In the recent decision of Brundage v. The New Jersey Zinc Company,' the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a corporate merger
approved by two-thirds of the stockholders of the corporation. The
merger was effected pursuant to a state statute which was enacted
subsequent to New Jersey Zinc's incorporation, 3 but which nevertheless was applicable to New Jersey Zinc under the statutory reservation of powers of the state. This reservation, subjecting corporate
charters to "alteration, suspension and repeal" in the discretion
of the legislature, 4 was contained in the corporation act under which
New Jersey Zinc was chartered. In allowing less than all of the
stockholders to validate this fundamental corporate change, the court
disavowed the longstanding precedent of Zabriskie v. Hackensack
& New York Railroad Company.5
In Zabriskie, a railroad sought to extend its line beyond that allowed in its original charter under the authority of a legislative enactment amending the charter to allow the extension. The court
held that this action could not be taken even though only a single
stockholder dissented, since the reserved powers could not be used
to validate corporate changes affecting the stockholders' interest
without unanimous consent. It applied the reasoning of the English
case of Natusch v. Irving,' which held that a joint stock company
formed to sell life insurance could not undertake to sell marine insurance-an activity which was unlawful when the company was
formed, but which Parliamentary statute subsequently made law"2Pearl, The Applicability of the Bill of Rights to a Court Martial Proceedings, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 561, 565 (1960).
148

'N.J.

N.J. 450, 226 A.2d 585 (1967).
STAT. ANN. § 14:12-1 (Supp. 1967).

'The New Jersey Zinc Co. received its charter in 1880.
"Ch. 67 [1875] N.J. Laws (now N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14-1 (1937)).
'13 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867).
'47 Eng. Rep. 1196 (Ch. 1824).
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ful-without unanimous stockholder consent. Zabriskie recognized
that the concurring opinion of Justice Story in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward7 had stated that although the corporate
charter constituted a contract between the state and the corporation,
a reservation of powers by the state would preclude state action
from constituting an impairment of this contract in violation of
article I, section 10 of the Constitution. It held, however, that the
subsequent adoption of the statutory reservation by New Jersey
was not meant to change the Natusch situation where fundamental
corporate changes directly affected the stockholders' contractual
rights in addition to those rights of the corporation in its contract
with the state.9
Zabriskie thus interpreted the reservation of powers as applying
only to the amendments relating to the contract between the corporation and the state. The reservation was not considered to apply to
or be a constituent part of the corporation's contract with its stockholders or of the stockholders' contract inter se. Any legislative enactments in exercise of the reserved powers which affected these
latter contractual obligations without unanimous approval were considered invalid.' °
The Brundage decision, noting the changed nature and role of
the corporation today in contrast to that found in the Zabriskie
period, accepts the more modern view that "each successive legislative authorization becomes a part of the stockholder's contract because of the implied consent that this should be so, by virtue of the
state's power to amend and repeal, which power existed at the birth
of the corporation."" The authorization might be a direct amendment imposed on the corporate charter or a grant of power enabling
'17
U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
8
Id. at 712 (concurring opinion).
' See Durfee v. Old Colony & F.R. R.R., 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 230 (1862),
where the contractual arrangements between the stockholders and the corporation and between the stockholders inter se are examined.
" The court reasoned as follows:
It was a reservation to the State, for the benefit of the public, to
be exercised by the state only. The state was making what had been
decided to be a contract, and it reserved the power of change, by
altering, modifying, or repealing the contract. Neither the words nor
the circumstances nor apparent objects .. .can, by any construction,
extend it to giving a power to one part of the corporators as against
the other, which they did not have before.
18 N.J. Eq. 178, 185 (Ch. 1867).
1
N. LATT I, CORPORATIONS 51 (1959).
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a certain percentage of stockholders to enact such amendment.
Unanimity is not required.
12
Prior to Brundage, there was a series of New Jersey decisions
anticipating Zabriskie's demise, which ignored the limitations of
Zabriskie whenever there was a substantial "public interest" in the
legislative enactments involved. By virtue of the "public interest"
doctrine the infringement on the stockholder's interest increasingly
expanded in scope, culminating in A. P. Smith Manufacturing
Company v. Barlow3l which stated that the retrospective application
of a charitable contribution statute to a corporate charter was a valid
exercise of the state's reserved powers, despite its obvious effect on
the stockholders' contractual rights.
A parallel line of cases' 4 in New Jersey had voided certain corporate actions which had been authorized by "reserve power" postincorporation statutes because they deprived minority share interests
of their "vested rights." In these cases, the "public interest" was
held not to justify the legislative authorization of destruction or
change of these "vested rights." The decisions have never adequately defined this concept but generally a "vested right" has been
considered a present property interest, the destruction of which constitutes an impairment of the contractual rights of the stockholder
under article 1, section 10 of the Constitution, or a taking of property without compensation which is a violation of the "due process"
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 15
Most of the courts which have held the reservation of powers
".See In re Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949) ; Bingham
v. Say. Inv. & Trust Co., 101 N.J. Eq. 413, 138 A. 659 (Ch. 1927), aff'd,
102 N.J. Eq. 302, 140 A. 321 (E. & A. 1928); Grausman v. Porto RicanAm. Tobacco Co., 95 N.J. Eq. 155, 121 A. 985 (Ch. 1923), aff'd. on other
grounds, 95 N.J. Eq. 223, 122 A. 815 (E. & A. 1928); Murray v. Beattie
Mfg. Co., 79 N.J. Eq. 604, 82 A. 1038 (E. & A. 1912); Berger v. United
States
Steel Corp., 63 N.J. Eq. 809, 53 A. 68 (E. & A. 1902).
18 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
14
See Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A.2d 215
(1944); Buckley v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A.2d 820
(1940); Longsdale Sec. Corp. v. Int'l Mercantile Marine Corp., 101 N.J.
Eq. 554, 139 A. 50 (Ch. 1927). But see Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 1
N.J. Super. 519, 64 A.2d 644 (1949). For cases in other jurisdictions, see
Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 180 A. 584 (1935); Breslav v.
New York & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291
N.Y.S. 932 (1936), aff'd per curiam, 273 N.Y. 593, 7 N.E.2d 708 (1937).
" See Keller v. Wilson & Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 180 A. 584 (1935) where
the court makes the flat statement that the destruction of a vested right
of a stockholder could violate both the due process and the contract clause.
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to be applicable to the stockholders' contract have abandoned the
vested rights concept.1 6 They recognize the inherent inconsistency
in holding that the reservation is a part of the stockholder's contract
and constitutes his consent that it be subject to change by the legislature, while at the same time holding that his interests have become
"vested" under the same contract and unchangeable by legislative
enactment.1 7 Once it is recognized that the stockholders' relationship with the corporation is contractual and the provisions of the
charter are incorporated into this contract, it is illogical to contend
that a right or interest "vests" when legislation in exercise of the
reserved powers expressly becomes a part of the charter, except in
cases where an actual legal debt has been created such as a declared
dividend.
A few courts, however, have applied the vested rights concept to
corporate actions where a pre-incorporation statute is involved.18
These courts generally fail to discern the distinction between the
use of the concept when there is a reservation of powers problem,
i.e., a post-incorporation statute, and when there is a pre-incorporation statute which authorizes the corporate action.
With the confusion in applying this term to corporate amendments, it is not surprising that the vested rights doctrine has often
been used by the courts as a mere label to affix to the stockholders'
interest when the equities of the transaction were in his favor. The
established practice of the New Jersey equity courts1" of scrutinizing
all fundamental corporate changes to insure essential "fairness"
would seem to be a more direct and proper means of protecting
the minority stockholder's interest. The whole tenor of Brundage
points to the need of discarding outmoded concepts in this area of
corporate law, and it is probable that the "vested rights," as well as
the "public interest," terminology is rendered obsolete by this
opinion.
Although the court in Brundage expressly accepts the broader
"See McNulty v. W. & J. S. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S. 2d 253
(Sup. Ct. 1945), for the landmark opinion repudiating the "vested rights"
concept.
"'See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 649 (1946); Becht, CorporateCharter Amendments: Stock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50 COLUm.

L. Rzv. 900, 925 (1950).

"sSee Consolidated Film Indus., Inc. v. Johnson, 22 Del. Ch. 407, 197
A. 489 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
"See H. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 657 (1946), where it is pointed
out that New Jersey is one of a few states that reviews the question of
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view on the reservation of powers, it curiously qualifies its disavowal of Zabriskie:

Its notions [Zabriskie] as to unanimity may have had some force
in the days when commerce was conducted largely through individuals and small partnerships or closely held corporations;
they have no force in today's society of large corporate enter20
prises ... with their stockholders spread throughout the nation.

The language implies that Zabriskie doctrine will still be applicable
in the close corporation context.2 ' There are several reasons, however, why a contrary interpretation is more realistic. 2 2 First,
Brundage requires that the application of the reserved powers to
tripartite nature of contractual obligations be recognized regardless
of the size of the corporation. Whenever a corporation is recognized as a legal entity, the court must be consistent in its interpretation of the contractual incidents involved unless it is willing to
adopt the fiction that a close corporation is qualitatively different
from the large public corporation and not of the same genus.
Also, if the Brundage reasoning is not applied to the close corporation, this would create practical problems for the court in defining
"fairness" of amendments whenever there is substantial prejudice, though
short of fraud.
20 48 N.J. at 469, 226 A.2d at 595.
" The failure of the New Jersey legislature to enact specific provisions
dealing with the special problems of the close corporation lends support to this
position. Present New Jersey statutory and case law invalidate charter provisions allowing (1) high voting and quorum requirements at stockholder
meetings, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:10-9 (quorum requirement); Clausen v.
Leary, 113 N.J. Eq. 324 (Ch. 1933) (voting requirement); but see Katcher
v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28 (Ch. Div. 1953); (2) stockholders' agreements
restricting the actions and discretion of directors, or allowing management
of the corporation like a partnership, see, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J.
Eq. 592 (E. & A. 1910) ; and (3) dissolution provisions in case of deadlock.
Yet, the enforceability of these types of provisions would seem to be imperative in the close corporation context to insure that the individual stockholder is protected from corporate action detrimental to his interest in the
absence of the unamity requirements of Zabriskie. Certainly in those states
which do have close corporation provisions, the need for a restricted view
of reserved powers or for the "vested rights" doctrine is diminished considerably. In the 1967 Preliminary Draft made by the Commissioners appointed to revise the New Jersey Business Corporation Act, all these provisions were recommended for inclusion: § 14A:5-9, to -12 (high quorum
and voting requirements for stockholder meetings); § 14A :5-21(2) (stockholder agreements restricting the normal powers and discretion of directors);
and § 12-5 (dissolution).
" See the New Jersey Business Corporation Act (Preliminary Draft
1967) § 14A :1-5 where the Commissioners in the Comment interpret Brndage as unqualifiedly overruling Zabriskie,
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the close corporation and in determining the nature of the "public
interest" in legislation relating to it.
The opinion itself supports a broader reading since the section
qualifying the disavowal of Zabriskie can be construed to be dictum;
and, significantly, the next full paragraph in the opinion summarizes
the court's position without qualification:
The power reserved .. .should be liberally construed as part

and parcel of the tripartite arrangement between the State, the
corporation, and the stockholders, and thus viewed, as permitting
reasonable 23corporate charter amendments having legitimate business ends.
There are, however, several problems in interpreting this statement. "Reasonable corporate amendments" would seem to refer to
those amendments which satisfy the basic requirements of "fairness," but the terms "fairness" and "reasonableness" are not necessarily compatible. The "reasonableness" of an action usually refers to the intent of the majority and whether they acted in good
faith; whereas "fairness" logically concerns the intrinsic character
and effect of the transaction. Also, there is the question of whether
the phrase "legitimate business ends" embodies substantive requirements such that the "public interest" and "vested rights" concepts
might still be applicable. Most likely this is just a general statement that any amendment furthering business needs is valid; and
"legitimate" probably means that an amendment must not violate
public policy.
A significant factor in determining whether the Brundage reasoning will be applied to all corporations, regardless of size, is the tradition of the New Jersey equity courts of requiring "fairness" in
any fundamental corporate change. The Brundage opinion stresses
the importance of the independent determination of "good faith"
and "fair treatment"24 required in the merger transaction, and this
type of safeguard can easily be enforced in the close corporation
context to protect the minority interests.
The reasoning employed in Brundage is, of course, not limited
to the merger, consolidation, or reorganization area. Undoubtedly,
such fundamental changes as the elimination of accrued dividends,
the issuance of prior preferred to eliminate accrued dividends in23 48

N.J. at 470, 226 A.2d at 595.
2,48 N.J. at 470, 226 A,2d at 596.
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directly, and the compulsory amendment altering liquidation preferences-which have been held invalid in prior New Jersey cases"
-will be re-examined under the broad interpretation of reserved
powers in Brundage.2"
Although the court leaves many questions unanswered in Brundage, its overall significance in the development of corporate law
is threefold: (1) it represents an increasing awareness by the courts
that the needs of the modern corporate require both legislative flexibility in enabling corporations to adjust to changing economic conditions and the compromising of minority interests in favor of a
more democratic process within the corporation; (2) it possibly
represents a shift in the means employed to protect the minority
interests-from the random application of such nebulous concepts
as "vested rights" and from the harsh requirement of unanimity,
to the direct imposition of equitable limitations on majority shareholder action; and (3) it should provide the impetus for the remaining states which hold to a more restricted view of the reserved
powers to reconsider their position in light of modern corporate
needs.
NEILL G. McBRYDE

Credit Transactions-Knowledge and Priority Under Uniform
Commercial Code Sections 9.3o1(1) (a) and 9-31Z(5)
In Bloom v. Hilty- the plaintiff sold and delivered to Charles
Hilty a quantity of gas drilling pipe. At the time of the sale it
was orally agreed that title to the pipe would remain in the plaintiff
until the full purchase price was paid. Subsequently Hilty executed
a chattel mortgage to the defendant covering the pipe sold to Hilty
by the plaintiff. At the time the mortgage was executed the defendant knew of the plaintiff's claim of an interest in the pipe. The defendant duly perfected his security interest by filing a financing
statement. The plaintiff did not perfect his interest.
In holding that the defendant's interest was entitled to priority
"'See H. BALLENTINE and G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONs LAWS
9 (1938); Gibson, How Fixed Are Class Shareholder's Rights, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 283, 294 (1958); Lattin, 4 Primer on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 W. REs. L. REv. 3, 26 (1949).
'427 Pa. 463, 234 A,2d 860 (1967).
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over that of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied Uniform Commercial Code sections 9-301 (1) (a) and 9-312
(5) (b). The former section provides that "an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of persons entitled to priority
under section 9-312." Under section 9-312(5) (b) where one of
two conflicting interests is perfected,2 the first to perfect is given
priority. The court held that lack of knowledge of a prior unperfected security interest was not a requirement for priority under
these sections.' Thus the defendant's knowledge of the prior interest
at the time his interest attached was insignificant. The court
reasoned that since neither section explicitly makes lack of knowledge a prerequisite for its operation, knowledge is irrelevant. Moreover, the comments to section 9-312(5) support the view that lack
4
of knowledge is not required.
The court's position is clearly correct. The argument that knowledge is a factor would not have been advanced were it not for preCode law. Prior to the Code's adoption most states made knowledge
a factor in determining priorities with the usual result that a perfected junior interest was subordinated to an unperfected prior interest of which the holder of the junior interest had knowledge.'
Except for the two sections under consideration (9-301 (1) (a) and
9-312(5)) the Code has either expressly adopted or rejected this
position in its priority sections." Thus, it has been suggested that the
'This section does not apply where both interests are perfected by filing.
§ 9-312(5) (a) covers this situation.
'Accord, In Re Gunderson, 4 UCC REPORTING SERV. 358 (S.D. Ill. 1967);

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

1 P. CooGAN, G. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER Trn
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 177 n.23 (1967); 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY
INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 34.2, at 902 (1965) [hereinafter cited

as GILMORE] ; Felsenfeld, Knowledge as a Factor in Determining Priorities
under The Uniform Commercial Code, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 246, 247 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Felsenfeld]; Smith, Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Perfection and Priorities,The Uniform Commercial Code in North

Carolina: A Synnposium, 44 N.C.L. REv. 753, 793 n.179 (1966).

'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(5), comment 4, examples (1) ("it
makes no difference whether or not A knew of B's interest when he made his
advance"), (2) ("it makes no difference whether or not he knows of the
other interest at the time he perfects his own"), (3) ("A has priority
whether or not he knows of B's interest when he files"), (4) ("it makes
no difference whether or not A knows of B's intervening advance when he
makes his second advance").
1 GILMo1 § 21.2, at 584; Felsenfeld, supra note 3, at 249.

'The pre-Code position is adopted by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-

301(1)(b); 9-301(1)(c); 9-301(1)(d); 9-307(2); 9-308. It is rejected
by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 9-307(1); 9-308; 9-312(2); 9-312(3).
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requirement of lack of knowledge may have been inadvertently
omitted from these two sections and that it should be supplied by analogy.7 However plausible this argument may seem, there is little question that the lack of knowledge requirement was deliberately omitted.
By the explicit use of knowledge in the other sections of the Code the
drafters indicated their awareness of its significance.8 Other evidence of this intent is found in the manner in which the pre-Code
position was changed. Prior to 1956, Code section 9-301 (1) (b)
provided that a subsequent party with knowledge would not take
priority.' This section was replaced in the present Code by the
two sections under consideration, neither of which require lack of
knowledge. In light of these events knowledge should not be implied by analogy to the other Code sections.1 0
It has been suggested that the good faith requirement of section
1-203 may supply the knowledge factor." This court rejected that
contention. It correctly concluded "that some leading on or other
basis for estoppel would seem necessary to deprive one of priority
given him by statute."'" The obvious meaning of section 9-312(5)
is that good faith in the lack of knowledge sense is not to be a limitation. Once it is concluded that knowledge was deliberately omitted
as a factor under this section it naturally follows that a secured
party can act in good faith even though he has knowledge of the
prior unperfected security interest.
The Hilty decision is also illustrative of the difficulties encoun2 GILMoRE § 34.2, at 901.
Felsenfeld at 249.
'2 GrIMORE § 34.2, at 898.
" It seems that the Code is in accord with prior North Carolina law.
Before the Code's adoption the first security interest to be registered prevailed, Commercial Inv. Trust v. Albemarle Motor Co., 193 N.C. 663, 177
S.E. 874 (1927). Furthermore, notice or actual knowledge on the part of
the prior interest on the part of lien creditors or purchasers for value [Included in this classification is the chattel mortgagee, Odom v. Clark, 146
N.C. 544, 60 S.E. 513 (1908)], would not take the place of actual registration. Bank v. Cox, 171 N.C. 76, 87 S.E. 967 (1916) ; Piano Co. v. Spruill &
Bro., 150 N.C. 168, 63 S.E. 723 (1909).
"' Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: PrioritiesAmong
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. Rav. 838, 858 n.80
(1959). For a general discussion of good faith see Farnsworth, Good Faith
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Coinrnercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 666 (1963); Comment, Good Faith Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 U. PiTT. L. Rxv. 754 (1962).
12427 Pa. 463, 464, 234 A.2d 860, 864 (1967). This same result was
suggested in 1 P. COOGAN, G. HOGAN, AND D. VAGTS, SEcURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 177 n.26 (1967).
8
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tered in applying the Code. The court without mentioning the point
assumed that the plaintiff's oral reservation of title created an enforceable security interest.'1 It seems that Code section 2-401 (1)
was the basis for this assumption. This section provides that "any
retention or reservation by the seller of title (property) in goods
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation
of a security interest."' 4 Under section 2-401 (2) the seller, to
reserve title once the debtor has lawfully obtained possession of the
property, must enter an explicit agreement with the debtor. To create a security interest under the Sales Article the provisions of the
Secured Transactions Article must be fully met.15 Section 9-203
(1) (b) provides that once the debtor has possession of the goods a
security interest is not enforceable against either the debtor or third
persons unless "the debtor has signed a security agreement which
contains a description of the collateral ...."' Since the only agreement in Hilty was oral, the plaintiff's security interest was unenforceableY Thus the court needlessly dealt with the problem of priority under sections 9-301 (1) (a) and 9-312(5) as they are applicable only where conflicting security interests in the same collateral exist.
One of the primary purposes of the Code is "to make uniform
the [commercial] law among the various jurisdictions."'
This
end can be attained only if the decisions of one jurisdiction are fol-

"8
In the course of its opinion the court often referred to a lease-purchase
agreement made between the plaintiff and -ilty. As this agreement was
executed subsequent to the execution and perfection of the defendant's security
interest it should have no effect on the priorities between the conflicting
interests.
" The vendor's interest would be a purchase money security interest.
Evan's Prod. Co. v. Jorgensen, - Ore. -, 421 P.2d 978 (1966); UNIrORMI
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107. It should be noted that the rights, obligations
and remedies of a party under the Secured Transactions Article are not
affected by the location of title. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-202.
"8UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(1) (a). This section provides
that The Secured Transactions Article applies to all transactions which
are intended to create a security interest. "Security interest" is defined
by Code section 1-201 (37). The definition specifically includes those interests
which arise under section 2-401.
" An exception to this rule exists where the security interest arises solely
under the Sales Article. If in such a case the debtor is neither in, nor
lawfully obtains, possession of the goods no written agreement is necessary.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-113 (a).
"'Evan's Prod. Co. v. Jorgensen,

-

Ore. -, 421 P.2d 978 (1966);

Grantham
v. Paul, 203 Pa. Super. 158, 199 A.2d 519 (1964).
8
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102(2)(c).
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lowed by other jurisdictions. This case is illustrative of one of the
main obstacles to the achievement of that purpose. The court's
reasoning was faulty. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to assume
that other courts will perpetuate a mistake for the sake of conformity. As a result, the uniformity of the Code will be further
disrupted unless the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refuses to
recognize this decision, insofar as it relates to the creation of a security interest, as precedent.
JOHN M. MASSEY

Damages-Rightful Recovery for Wrongful DeathThe Income Tax Factor
Most problems involving the income tax concern a resolution of
whether or not the tax is applicable. There is, however, a problem
that arises because the tax is unquestionably not applicable. Under
the Internal Revenue Code, damage awards for personal injury and
wrongful death are tax exempt.' The recipient of such an award is
allowed to exclude it from his gross income for income tax purposes. Because of this, the court in Brooks v. United States' held
that the amount of damages to be given to the widow and children
of a South Carolina decedent, whose wrongful death was caused
by an agent of the federal government, should be computed so as to
give recognition to this tax saving. This was done by using a net
earnings instead of a gross earnings figure as the measure of future
earnings lost as a result of decedent's death. This position taken by
the court is in the minority in the United States.3
The question of whether to take cognizance of the tax-exempt
status of the award when computing damages is an important one."
"The increase in the amount of damage verdicts .

.

. and the high

level of income taxes makes the question immediate." 4 It seems
'The Internal Revenue Code expressly exempts from gross income

"the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on
account of personal injuries or sickness." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
104(a) (2). Wrongful death damages are also non-taxable. Rev. Rul.
54-19, 1954-1 Cum. BuLt. 179. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-141(b) (5)

(iv) (Supp. 1967).

'273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967).
'See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1395-96 (1959).
'Note, Income Taxation and Damages for Personal Injuries, 50 Ky. L.J.

601, 601 (1962).
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natural, therefore, to expect defense attorneys to make attempts to
inject the issue of income tax saving into a case wherever appropriate. 5 Even though such awards have been tax-exempt since 1918,0
however, the issue is seldom raised, and many jurisdictions, including North Carolina, have never resolved the issue.' In Brooks, the
court was in a position free "to follow the commands of reasonable
justice ....,,8
because the South Carolina court had not decided the
issue and neither had the circuit court.'
There are logical and seemingly compelling reasons why the
Brooks court took the position it did. The soundness of the court's
position should become apparent when one considers several important factors. First, the fundamental principle or theory of
damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the
injury caused. 10 The object is to restore the injured party (meaning
the beneficiaries under the applicable statute in the case of wrongful
death") to the position he would have occupied had there been no
injury (or death). On the other hand, it is never contemplated that
Bums, A Compensation Award for PersonalInjury or Wrongful Death
Is Tax Exempt: Should We Tell The Juryf, 14 DE PAuL L. R.Ev. 320, 321

(1965).

' Rev. Act of 1918, § 213(b) (6), 40 Stat. 1066 (now INT. REV. CODE Of
1954, § 104(a) (2)).

'While North Carolina has not decided this question, the measure of

damages used in wrongful death cases could accommodate a deduction of
income taxes from gross expected future earnings. In Journigan v. Little
River Ice Co., 233 N.C. 180, 184-85, 63 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1951), the court
stated the rule as to the appropriate measure of damages to be
the present worth of the net pecuniary value of the life of the deceased to be ascertained by deducting the probable cost of his own
living and usual or ordinary expenses from his probable gross income
which might be expected to be derived from his own exertions during
his life expectancy

... [t]he

end of it all being ...to enable the jury

fairly to arrive at the net income from which the deceased might
reasonably be expected to earn from his own exertions, had his death
not ensued .... (emphasis added).
8273 F. Supp. at 632.

For a collection of the state and federal court decisions which have
resolved the issue, see Annot., note 3 supra.
10

C. McCoRmIcrK, DA-MAGES § 137 (1935)

[hereinafter cited as Mc-

CORMICK]; James, Damagesin Accident Cases,41 CORNELL L.Q. 582 (1956).
" Under the wrongful death statutes of most states the widow and family
are the designated beneficiaries. However, in six states, including Nortl
Carolina, the estate of the decedent is the beneficiary and the action can
be brought only by the personal representative. The widow and family
receive the proceeds in the latter states through distribution of the estate
according to the intestate succession statutes, whether or not the decedent
died intestate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173, -174 (1949); Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina,44 N.C.L. REv. 402 (1966).
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the injured party should be put in a better position than he would
be in had the wrong not been done. The basic idea is, therefore, compensation, not punishment of the defendant or profit to the plaintiff.12
Second, an important element of damages in personal injury
and especially wrongful death cases is the amount of future earnings that will now be lost as a result of the injury or death.'" In the
case of a personal injury, future earning capacity may or may not be
impaired by the injury. If it is, the wrongdoer will be required to
compensate the injured party to the extent of this impairment.
However, in the case of wrongful death, future earning capacity is
totally destroyed, and consequently, this loss of future earnings is
4
the primary, if not the sole, element of damages recoverable.'
Third, "[i]f plaintiff gets in tax-free damages, an amount on
which he would have had to pay taxes if he had gotten it as wages,
the plaintiff is getting more than he lost."' 5 That is, if plaintiff's
recovery is based on lost earnings before taxes which would have
been taxable had there been no injury or death'" and is tax-free,
plaintiff is being over-compensated by the award. This violates the
guiding principle that plaintiff is to be made whole, but is not to
profit.
Even though "reasonable justice" and the logical application of
the underlying principle of damages would seem to require otherSome states allow recovery of punitive damages where the defendant's
"=
act is willful or amounts to gross negligence. MCCORMICI §§ 79, 103. As
early as 1872, the North Carolina court said, in referring to the measure

of damages under the wrongful death statute, that "our statute . . . does

not contemplate solatiwm for the plaintiff nor punishment for the defendant.
It is therefore in the nature of pecuniary demand, the only question being;
how much the plaintiff lost by the death of the injured person ?" [sic] Collier
v. Arrington, 61 N.C. 356, 358 (1872). This language is still quoted with
approval today. See, e.g., Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 398, 146 S.E.2d
425, 3428 (1966).
McCoRMcic § 96.
Wrongful death actions in the United States are wholly statutory

creations and the statutes generally provide the measure of damages. The
North Carolina statute provides for such damages as are "a fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from such death." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 28-174 (1950). The basic item of damages under any such
statute is the loss of future earnings caused by the death.
52 F. HARPER & F. JATAES, TORTS § 25.12 at 1326 (1956).
"' "If the income, or a portion thereof, of the person injured or killed
was exempt from liability for income tax, there would be no basis for
deducting income tax on such exempt income in fixing damages for the
destruction of such income." Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393, 1398 (1959). An
example of such tax exempt income is interest received on government
bonds, certain federal pensions, etc.
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wise, the view of most American courts is that the income tax
consequences should not be taken to consideration in computing
damage award. 17 A possible reason is a feeling on the part of the
courts that to allow the damages to be reduced by the income tax
payable on future earnings would be to confer some type of benefit
on the wrongdoer by reducing the damages he has to pay. This is a
distorted view of the problem, however. The question, in reality, is
not one of reducing any damages the defendant has to pay, but one
of accurate assessment of the plaintiff's injury. "No one would
suggest that the defendant should be compelled to pay damages over
and above that which the plaintiff has actually suffered by reason
of the defendant's wrongdoing.

18

Although this feeling might be the real basis for the majority position, there are several reasons explicitly advanced by
the courts following the majority view. The primary reason is that
future income tax liability is too conjectural."0 Uncertainties exist
as to what decedent's future tax liability would be because of the
possibility of changes in the tax rates, allowable exemptions and
deductions, etc. But, in computing damages, the generally accepted
rule is for the jury or the court to make an estimate, if there is a
reasonable basis for computation, even though the result is only approximate.2 0 It would seem better to make a fair estimate of the
future tax liability and reach a reasonably just result, than to ignore
the tax liability completely and reach a result certainly wrong. In
addition, it is no more conjectural to estimate the amount of income

" See Annot., note 3 supra. In England, which has an income tax
provision similar to section 104(a) (2), the House of Lords overruled a
long line of precedent and held that this tax exemption should be considered
in computing damage awards. British Transport Comm'n v. Gourley, [1956]
A.C. 185. For a discussion of the English cases, see Jolowiez, Damages
and Income Tax, 1959 CAmB. L.J. 86.
18

60 W. VA. L. REv. 378, 381 (1958).

19

Phoenix Indem. Co. v. Givens, 263 F.2d 858, 863 n.4 (5th Cir. 1959);
Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1944); Rouse v. New
App. 139, 110 N.E.2d 266 (1953); Smith
York Cent. & St. L. Ry., 349 Ill.
v. Penn R.R., 99 N.E.2d 501, 504 (Ohio App. 1950); Dixie Feed & Seed
Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 376 S.W.2d 745 (1963), appeal dismissed,
379 U.S. 15, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878 (1964).
"25 C.J.S. Davmges § 26(c), at 678-80 (1966). The courts requiring
use of net earnings after taxes, as the appropriate measure of future earnings lost, use estimates and do not require computation of the tax liability
with mathematical precision. See, e.g., O'Conner v. United States, 269 F.2d
578, 585 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d
918, 926 (1957).
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taxes that decedent would have paid on his future earnings than it
is to estimate the amount of future earnings he would have made,
how long he would have lived, and other elements of his overall
earning potential that must be and are estimated in computing such
2
a damage award.

1

Another reason often cited is that by making such awards tax
exempt, it was Congress's intent to confer a benefit on injured
persons; to base the future earnings element of a damage award on
net earnings after taxes would be to subvert that intent.22 But Congress clearly did not intend to confer a benefit by making such
awards tax exempt. As the legislative history indicates,23 Congress
made the exemption because it doubted whether tort damages were
"income" within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. Such
damages are more accurately characterized as a reparation of capital
than as income. The "Congressional intent" argument appears to
be but another example of attributing a non-existent intent to a
legislature to reach an already-decided-upon result."2 4 Even if it
were Congress's intent to confer a benefit by exempting the award,
exempting the award once obtained from inclusion in gross
income does not necessarily have anything to do with an intention
that the amount of tax that the plaintiff was paying prior to the
injury should or should not be considered by the jury in arriving
at the amount of the award. It merely says that once the proper
measure of damages has been used to arrive at the award, it
will not be included in gross income ... .25
'26
A third reason often cited is the "collateral source doctrine.
This doctrine states that compensation received from a source wholly
independent of the wrongdoer will not lessen the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer. The validity of the doctrine is questionable in light of the principle that plaintiff is entitled to compensation

"1Burns, supra note 5, at 324; Moffa v. Perkins Trucking Co., 200 F.

Supp. 183, 188 (D. Conn. 1961).
" Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 151-52, 125 N.E.2d 77, 86
(1955); Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 52 Tenn. App. 619, 376 S.W.2d
745, 749 (1963), appeal di.nissed, 379 U.S. 15, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 878
(1964); 9 VAND. L. Rav. 543, 549-50 (1956).
2" Nordstrom, Income Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST.
L.J. 212, 222 (1958). See also Cutler, Taxation of the Proceeds of Litigation, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 470 (1957); Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1920).
"4Nordstrom, supra note 24, at 223.
2
r Id.at 222.
2 69 HARv. L. REv. 1495, 1496 (1956) ; 35 N.C.L. Rav. 401, 404 (1957).
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only to the extent necessary to make him "whole. 2' 7 But, even if
one accepts the validity of the doctrine, it would appear to have no
application to the instant problem. The two usual applications of the
doctrine are where funds are paid to an insured injured party, or to
the designated beneficiary in the case of death, by an insurance company, and where the injured party, or survivors in the case of death,
receives a gift from a third person. An example of the latter is
where a physician renders services as a gratuity. There is no analogy
between receiving a tax exemption and receiving insurance proceeds.
In the latter the insured has contracted and paid premiums in order
to receive the insurance proceeds if the contingency insured against
occurs.2 The reason for including within the doctrine the situation
where one receives collateral compensation as a gratuity is because
it is thought that if the value of the gift were deducted from a damage award, it would frustrate the intent of the donor to confer a
benefit. But that situation is not analogus to the instant problem
since, as was noted above, it was not an intention to confer a benefit which prompted the tax exempt status of damage awards.2
A fourth reason advanced in some cases is that to allow presentation of evidence as to tax matters would unduly complicate the trial
and cause difficulties in trial administration. It is not denied that
to undertake tax computations would add an element of complexity
to the trial; however, tax experts could be used to assist the court.
"Taxes are complicated, but are they any more complicated than annuity and mortality tables, reduction to present worth or any of a
hundred problems that courts and juries solve every day? ' ' 81 Besides,
the greater burden is borne by the defense attorney who must produce and present the evidence. It would seem a better solution to let
him, instead of the court, decide whether the possible savings to be
82
had are worth the additional effort required.
" See 77 HAiRv. L. REv. 741 (1964).
" Feldman, Personal Injury Awards: Shoidd Tax Exempt Status Be
Ignored?, 7 ARIz. L. REv. 272, 275 (1966).
2 See note 24, supra, and accompanying text.
30 Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 135 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Iowa
1955); Mitchell v. Emblade, 80 Ariz. 398, 298 P.2d 1034 (1956); Highshew
v. Kushto, 235 Ind. 505, 134 N.E.2d 555 (1956); Pfister v. Cleveland, 96
Ohio App. 185, 113 N.E.2d 366 (1953), appeal dismissed, 159 Ohio St. 580,
112 N.E.2d 657 (1953).
"' Morris & Nordstrom, Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal Income Tax Law, 46 A.B.A.J. 274, 328 (1960).
" 22OHIo ST. L.J. 225, 228-29 (1961).
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Some courts refuse consideration of the tax consequences with
no discussion of the problem and no real reason given for their
holdding.3 3 Others hold that the question should be left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge,3 4 and still others consider the tax factor
when reviewing a damage award to determine if it is excessive.35
The Second Circuit, as noted by the court in Brooks," has adopted
a flexible rule whereby the future earnings element of a damage
award is reduced by the future tax liability where the earnings
in question are in an upper income tax bracket, but no reduction is
made where the earnings fall into a lower bracket.3 7 This approach
has now been approved and adopted by the Seventh Circuit.3 8 The
reasoning behind the approach is apparently that the taxes which
would be payable when the earnings are in a lower bracket would be
so small that the significance of deducting them would be lost in the
rounding and estimating processes used in computing a damage
award of this nature. While this may be true in the case of a very
small annual income, there would seem to be few cases in which
the tax is so insignificant, since a minimum of 14 per cent of an individual's gross earnings is paid in income taxes.
There appears to be a trend developing, at least in the federal
courts, towards requiring a reduction for income taxes. The Brooks
decision is recent evidence of it.3" Although the court in Brooks
" See, e.g., Boston & Me. R.R. v. Talbert, 360 F.2d 286, 291 (1st Cir.
1966).

" See, e.g., United States v. Sommers, 351 F.2d 354, 360 (10th Cir.
1965).
" See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926, 927 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
c' 273 F. Supp. at 631.
T
Petition of Marina Mercanto Nicaraguense, S.A., 364 F.2d 118 (2d
Cir. 1966) (annual income of 11,500 dollars; held that deduction here was error) ; Leroy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965) (annual income of 16,000 dollars; held that
deduction was appropriate); Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen, S.A., 333
F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964) (annual income of 6,200 dollars; no deduction allowed); Montellier v. United States, 315 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1963) (annual income of 11-12,000 dollars-held that at this level it was discretionary with the
trial court); McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 34
(2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) (annual income of 4,800
dollars-held that no deduction was proper).
" Cox v. Northwest Airlines, 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967) (annual
income of 15-20,000 dollars; held that deduction was required).
" For other evidence see Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981
(D. Hawaii 1965); Nollenberger v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 734
(S.D. Cal. 1963), petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951, vWdified on
other grounds, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964); Moffa v. Perkins Trucking
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clearly limited its holding to wrongful death cases, 40 the same reasons
would seem to exist for application of the holding in personal injury cases in which an element of damages recoverable relates to
lost future earnings. But, the reasons are much more compelling in
the case of wrongful death because there the damage award is
primarily, if not entirely, based on loss of future earnings.
The Brooks decision represents a commendable effort to render
"reasonable justice" in spite of many practical problems of tax computation and in the face of the prevailing line of authority. It is
hoped that the decision will prompt courts which have not resolved
the issue to follow suit when the issue is presented, and prompt
others to revaluate their current stand.
PATRICK H. POPE

Damages-The Not So Blessed "Blessed Event"
"[T]he birth of a child may be something less than the 'blessed
event.'

. .

."1

said a California Court of Appeals in Custodio v.

Bauer. The context out of which the case arose is not unique but
the attitude of the court differed from similar cases where the courts
adhered to more traditional concepts of the family structure.
Plaintiff in Custodio underwent a salpingectomy, a female
sterilization operation,' after she and her husband decided to limit
their family for health and economic 4 reasons. After the operation
Co., 200 F. Supp. 183 (D. Conn. 1961); Meehan v. Central R.R. Co., 181

F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
•273 F. Supp. at 632.
'Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rept. 463, 475 (Ct. App. 1967).
2 Id. at 475.
Couples wishing to prevent conception through sterilization usually
have the operation performed on the husband for the reason that a male
sterilization (vasectomy) is a relatively simple procedure that can be performed with a local anesthetic in a doctor's office. A salpingectomy on the
other hand is classified as major surgery and carries with it a certain risk
of death, although the operation is simplified if performed immediately after
child-bearing. However, recanalization, the process whereby the body
naturally overcomes the effects of sterilization, occurs more frequently after
a vasectomy than a salpingectomy. Because recanalization would be a valid
defense to a cause of action based on negligence or malpractice when a
pregnancy results after a sterilization operation, the plaintiff would have
an easier time overcoming the defense in an unsuccessful salpingectomy.
'The apparent economic motivation of the Custodios was implicit in
the court's opinion.
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she became pregnant with her tenth child. Mrs. Custodio and her
husband sued on the basis of negligence, malpractice, fraud and
deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. In addition to other damages plaintiffs prayed for special damages in the
sum of 50,000 dollars for the expense of rearing the child.5 Defendants demurred, inter alia, on the grounds that: (1) Pregnancy,
birth of child, and cost and expense of delivery and rearing are not
legally cognizable; (2) breach of duty was not the proximate cause
of the pregnancy. The trial court sustained the general demurrer
whereupon the plaintiff appealed successfully to the court of appeals which overruled the demurrer and remanded the case for
trial. This note will consider the legal problems concerning the
50,000 dollar claim for the support and rearing expenses of the unwanted child.
Courts have consistently denied recovery for the cost of rearing
a child' on the theory that a child's birth is a "blessed event" and
that the happiness derived from rearing a child far outweighs the
financial liability. 7 The court in Cwstodio thought it premature to
discuss such questions because the issue would become moot if the
plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of proof.' However, in dis'From the plaintiff's complaint: "That the birth of plaintiff's child will
require of the plaintiff, additional costs and expenses to properly care for
and raise the said child to the age of maturity, that said cost is estimated to
be in the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) over said period of
time, which constitutes additional special damages to this plaintiff."
' However, several courts have avoided the issue by disposing of the
case by other means, or addressing themselves to other issues. See, e.g.,
Doerr v. Villate, 14 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
" Consider for instance the language in Christensen v. Thornby, 192
Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), where the court denied recovery to a
couple who had a child after a vasectomy (motivated by concern for the
wife's health), but where the child and mother survived nicely. The court
said: "The purpose of the operation was to save the wife from the hazards
to her life which were incident to childbirth. It was not the alleged purpose to save the expense incident to pregnancy and delivery. The wife has
survived. Instead of losing his wife, the plaintiff has been blessed with the
fatherhood of another child. The expenses alleged are incident to the bearing
of a child, and their avoidance is remote from the avowed purpose of the
operation. As well inight the plaintiff charge defendant with the cost of
nurture and education of the child during its minority." Id. at 126, 255
N.W. at 622 (emphasis added). See also Doerr v. Villate, 14 IIl. App. 2d
332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530
(1947); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. Lycoming Co.
1957), criticized in 19 U. Pirr. L. Ruv. 802 (1958); Ball v. Mudge, 64
Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
' Determination of principles of public policy which are claimed to
render certain consequences of proved wrongful acts and omissions
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cussing "criteria" for the remand of the case the court left little
doubt which way it would decide the issue should the danger of
mootness pass. The court noted that despite precedent denying
recovery, the same precedent demonstrated that birth is not always
a "blessed event." The court then stated the crux of its predispositions by saying, "With fear being echoed that Malthus was indeed
right, there is some trend of change in social ethics with respect to
the family establishment."'
Clearly there are many unwanted children born in wedlock.
The ever increasing use of and demand for birth control devices evidences this fact. The truism that most couples will naturally love
and care for the unwanted child does not alter the fact that it is unwanted or that they would have been happier without it.1" These
family planning motivations distinguish Clustodio from earlier
cases denying recovery for unwanted child support in which sole
considerations of health motivated the sterilization.'1 In Clestodio
the plaintiffs apparently wished to limit the family for economic
reasons as well.12 It may be argued that the damages should be
commensurate with the injuries anticipated. Thus if a couple has a
sterilization operation for reasons of health and due to the doctor's
malpractice the woman bears another child which injures or kills
her, a right of action is maintainable against the doctor.13 Simnoncompensable may best await the proof of the elements of damage
claimed by the plaintiffs. The failure to prove an actionable wrong,
or the failure to show injuries of the nature alleged, would render
further pursuit of the subject moot.
59 Cal. Rept. at 468.
Indeed, the court took one paragraph to state the above (i.e., that it was
premature to decide), and then spent four pages discussing "criteria"-or,
in other words, what it would have decided if it were time to decide.
59 Cal. Rept. at 477.
"0One commentator has said:
Moreover the fact that the parents love this child and feel responsible
for its welfare once it has been born does not mean that they would
not have been generally happier without it or that its birth constitutes
a "blessed event" in every way. An inability to provide for and educate their previously born children as they anticipated or to maintain
a higher standard of living once contemplated may be a constant
source of sorrow for which the joy derived from the newest child
compensates only inadequately.
113 U. PA. L. Rnv. 415, 435-36 n.79 (1965).
" See, e.g., Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620
(1934) ; Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
1 See supra note 4.
Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); West v. Underwood, 132 N.J.L. 325, 40 A.2d 610 (1945).
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ilarly if a couple's motive is not only that of health but also of
economic considerations, and the unwanted child increases the economic burden, then a right of action for child support should also
be maintainable against the doctor. Ideally one should be able to
contract for what one wants, and to recover for the foreseeable
consequences of someone else's negligence. The shock and frustration of having an unexpected and unwanted child may have
psychological repercussions on the parents. Indeed it could be
said that to some extent the dignity of the human person is violated by upsetting a couple's rights to choose its family's size. 4
It follows that relieving the economic burden of the unwanted
child would assuage the unhappy situation which the couple sought
to avoid and would have avoided but for the negligence or misrepresentation of the doctor. Yet an eventual decision allowing such
recovery for unwanted child support would seem to embrace more
fundamental issues.' 5
Courts have long recognized that considerations other than the
Cf. 46 N.C.L. Rnv. 205, 208-212 (1967).
One "fundamental issue," however, seems to be well settled-that
voluntary sterilization is not against public policy. Indeed compulsory
sterilization was held to be constitutional for mentally deficient persons in
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); but cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942). In one of the earliest cases resembling Custodio, Christensen
v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), the court decided that
such operations were not against public policy, and the courts have consistently held this position where the legislature has not held to the contrary. Two states have afforded statutory protection for doctors performing
voluntary sterilization operations. See N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 90-271 to -75
(Supp. 1967); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-423 to -26. See also a proposed statutory code in 113 U. PA. L. REv. 415, 442-43 (1965). Only in those states
where there is a legislative restriction on sterilization (see CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 53-33 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-10 to -12 (1961)) would
the courts be unwilling to allow recovery. While these statutory restrictions
may have constitutional problems in light of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), these states could still deny recovery in a tort or contract
suit arising out of a sterilization operation even though they could not constitutionally prohibit the act itself. (For an argument that voluntary
sterilization should be against public policy even in the absence of statutory
dictates, see Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery, 14 RocKY MT. L. REv. 233, 278 (1942)). But judicial acceptance of
voluntary sterilization does not solve the problem of recovery. "It is submitted . . . that acceptance of sterilization and whether or not damages

should be awarded for the birth of a child following such an operation are
entirely different questions and different policy considerations underlie
each." 9 UTAH L. Rxv. 808, 810 n.6 (1965). Acquiescence by the courts in
one method of birth control is quite a different thing from judicially stamping a human as unwanted.
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standard of living affect the well-being of the child. 16 One such
consideration in unwanted child support cases is that either by necessity or accident the child may become aware of the litigation and
develop into an "emotional bastard."'1 7 Of course the child, especially as he grows older, may by conjecture develop suspicions that
he was unwanted. However, a child is less likely to become an "emotional bastard" when he may have some vague notion that his parents'
family planing scheme went astray, than when he discovers that he
is a 50,000 dollar judicially declared burden.' This being the case,
would the 50,000 dollar demanded by Custodio compensate for the
mental anguish the child may suffer upon making the discovery?
If not, should a married couple be allowed to claim that their child
is unwanted ?"0
Even if it would be permissible to claim that the child is unwanted, a recovery for support of the unwanted child presents some
interesting contrasts when juxtaposed with the measure of damages
in wrongful death actions. When a parent sues for the wrongful
death of a child, the damages are computed by subtracting the cost
of his support from the value of the enjoyment, affection and services that would have been derived from the child had he lived.
Recovery is possible because the courts have assumed that the latter
is a greater sum than the former.2" If the latter figure becomes less
when the child is unwanted, it may be argued that a couple who re10 Most notably, of course, the rights of the natural parents.
See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Nelson v. Whaley, 246 Minn. 535, 75 N.W.2d 786 (1956).
17For a -well stated argument for this position, see 9 UTAH L. REv. 808,
811-12 (1965).
" The Custodio court, however, did not make this distinction. The court
dismissed the "emotional bastard" argument by saying:
The emotional injury to the child can be no greater than that to be
found in many families where "planned parenthood" has not followed
the blueprint ....
One cannot categorically say whether the tenth
arrival in the Custodio family will be more emotionally upset if he
arrives in an environment where each of the other members of the
family must contribute to his support, or whether he will have a
happier and more well-adjusted life if he brings with him the wherewithal to make it possible.
59 Cal.
Rept. at 477.
9
Thus, just as a married couple may not normally testify to nonaccess in order to show the illegitimacy of their child, it might be
argued that the plaintiffs * . should not be allowed to claim ... that a
child born of their marriage was unwanted, burdensome, and caused
by a doctor's negligence or breach of warranty.
9 UTAH L. REv. 808, 813 (1965).
"°See, e.g. Thompson v. Town of Ft. Branch, 204 Ind. 152, 178 N.E.
440 (1931).
.
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covered for the support of an unwanted child should not be allowed
to recover for the wrongful death of the same child, or at least
should not be permitted to claim more than nominal damages. In
addition, if a child is only slightly unwanted it is possible that the
two figures may be equal and the couple would be unable to claim
damages in either unwanted child support or wrongful death as
each off-sets the other. Indeed, would not judicial acceptance of the
proposition that the life of a child may sometimes be more a burden
than a blessing require investigation into every wrongful death action
to discover whether it was truly a tragic event or the happy relief of
an unwanted burden? Should a couple suing for wrongful death of
their child be forced to go through the agonizing and preposterous
proof that they loved the child more than the going rate in unwanted
child support actions? Or for that matter should the courts tolerate
couples in unwanted child support cases attempting to prove how
little they love the child in order to maximize the recovery? More
is involved than a mere legal anomaly. The contradiction between
recovery in wrongful death and unwanted child support embraces
two irreconcilable concepts of the dignity and value of human life.
These concepts highlight the question of whether the courts
should venture into this delicate area of family structure. Judicial
cognizance of the fact that a child is unwanted, however well qualified and limited, could cause a subtle weakening in the family structure by lay misinterpretation of the purpose and meaning of the
court's opinion. In short, the issue may be too subjective2 ' to be
handled properly by even the most adept court. As expressed by
one writer: "There are some wrongs which must be suffered and
the law cannot provide a remedy for them. To attempt to do so may
'22
do more social damage than if the law leaves them alone."
But regardless of whether the "Blessed Eventors" or the "NonBlessed Eventors" win the debate, courts should treat this type of
recovery as sui generis. Decisions and considerations concerning
certain analogous topics such as "wrongful life" should have only
limited bearing. The "wrongful life" cases involve a suit by an
1Even the prerequisite decision that voluntary sterilization is not against
public policy (see note 15, supra) would not be accepted by a large number of people. Many religions, especially Roman Catholic, take the position
that sterilization for any purpose is against the natural law and morally
wrong. See 31 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1170, 1181-82 (1956).
,Ploscowe, An Action for "Wrongful Life," 38 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1078,

1080 (1963).
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illegitimate against those responsible for his birth for the recovery
of damages inflicted by the fact of being illegitimate (e.g., suit by
the bastard son against his father) .2s The court in Citstodio tended
to commingle the "wrongful life" cases. As the court said: "The
ramifications of this case also embrace the subject of 'wrongful
life.' "24 The defendant also raised the issue of "wrongful life" on
petition for rehearing, arguing that the "wrongful life" cases, which
generally have been unsuccessful, established that the fact of life
itself could not be a ground for recovery. Yet the principles and
policies involved in "wrongful life" and unwanted child support
have more differences than similarities. The desired deterrent
effect 5 in "wrongful life" actions (i.e., curbing extramarital sexual
activity2 6 or lessening carelessness on the part of guardians of non
sui juris women27 ) is quite different from that in unwanted child
support (i.e., discouraging doctors from being negligent in performing sterilization operations). Moreover a court that disallows recovery in unwanted child support because of the fear that the child may
become an "emotional bastard" or that such a recovery would be disruptive of the family structure would not be inconsistent in allowing "wrongful life" recovery to a real bastard who obviously knows
"The term "wrongful life" was coined by the court in Zepeda v.

Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.

945 (1964). In Zepeda, a bastard son sued his father for damages received
by the stigma of going through life as an illegitimate. The court, while
acknowledging a wrong, refused recovery because the ramifications of the
decision would be so far reaching that such an innovation, it was felt by the
court, should be pursued by the legislature. However, in Williams v. State,
46 Misc. 2824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965) the New York court did
not exercise such judicial restraint. In that case there was a suit by a bastard
child against a state-run mental hospital for negligence in allowing an inmate to rape the child's mother. However, this decision was later reversed
in a pithy two-paragraph opinion, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966). For extensive
comment on these cases see 28 ALBANY L. REV. 174 (1964); 49 IOWA L. REV.
1005 (1964); 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1078 (1963); 25 OHo ST. L.J. 145 (1964);
18 STAN. L. REv. 530 (1966); 112 U. PA. L. REv. 780 (1964).
2"59 Cal. Rept. at 476 n.11 (1967).
"See W. PRossER, ToRTs 23 (3d ed. 1964).

" Itis questionable whether one who gives into his lusts in spite of possible claims of child support in paternity suits, theological condemnation,
social stigma, personal frustration and guilt, possible criminal penalties, and
the danger of venereal disease, is likely to be deterred because of a possible
"wrongful life" action.
7
Mental institutions could probably not avoid such incidents as occurred
in Willianm without interfering with the vital group therapy treatment.
The likely result, if suits multiplied, would be the dispensing of birth control
pills to the female inmates.
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that he was unwanted and who was never a part of a traditional
"family structure." Nonetheless it seems more likely that a court
will grant recovery in unwanted child support while denying it in
"wrongful life." This is because unwanted child support does not
entail the crippling problem present in "wrongful life" actions.
The difficulty of granting recovery in "wrongful life" is an internal paradox peculiar to the action. It is not a situation where
the child would have been legitimate but for the actions of defendant which made him illegitimate, but rather the child is illegitimate
where but for the actions of the defendant he would not have been
at all. The defendant, however wrong or negligent he may have
been, did bestow the gift of life upon the child.2 8 Unless the illegitimate child is a thanatomaniac he has no cause to complain.2 9
The situation in Custodio is quite different. Here the plaintiff is not
questioning the value of his own life but that of another person to
whom he has legal and moral responsibilities. One can not be burdened with one's own existence but one can be burdened with someone else's existence. Recovery should be denied in "wrongful life"
because the value of a person's life to himself is almost infinite (limited only by the concept of an afterlife), while the disadvantages of
life whether they be illegitimacy, poverty, or physical or mental 30
deformity are always somewhat less than infinite, and thus there can
never be any net damage.3 But the value of someone's else's life
"8As one writer summarized, referring to the Williams case:
She, as the genetic product of a particular man and woman, both institutionalized for mental care, either had to be born illegitimate onot at all. When a court recognizes a cause of action under these
circumstances, is it acknowledging no life as the preferred alternative? If so, is it also giving its approval to abortion in cases where
the disadvantages of being born are thought by the court to outweigh the advantages? ....
Or is the court adhering to traditional
views that life under any circumstances is a positive benefit, but
that the bastard nevertheless should recover damages for purposes
of deterring the defendant's conduct?
18 STAN. L. REV. 530, 533 (1966).
29 Cf. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 920 (1939).
"Anyone who was ever moved by John Steinbeck's OF MICE AND MEN
would testify to the dignity of life, however retarded in intelligence.
" The New York court in reversing the Williams decision (see note 23
supra) took a somewhat different tack, saying that the damages, if any,
would be impossible to measure:
In essence, and regardless of the verbiage of the claim above quoted,
the damages asserted rest upon the very fact of conception and would
have to comprehend the infirmities inherent in claimant's situation as
against the alternative of a void, if nonbirth and nonexistence may be
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is not limitless to another person.32 The burdens which the other
person imposes may well outweigh the benefits he might bestow.A3
It does not necessarily follow from the above that recovery should
be allowed in Custodio. It is merely to stress that the difficult ironies
in the "wrongful life" cases are not present in this case. It is for
this reason that the court would do well to keep the "wrongful life"
cases on the periphery of the decision making process. Recovery in
Custodio and other unwanted child support cases would not be internally paradoxical. Recovery would depend on whether, in judicial
opinion, the subjective fear of undermining family life and psychologically harming the child is outweighed by the objective financial damage to the plaintiff. It is this question that the court must
consider if it receives the case again on appeal.
RiCHARD

J.

BRYAN

Domestic Relations-Custody-Evidence-Has the Polar Star
Been Obscured by Statute in North Carolina?
"[T]he welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court is to be guided. . . ." This oft quoted2 phrase
appears to be the guiding precept for the North Carolina courts in
custody cases except where it collides with the conflicting policy of
judicial economy.'
expressed; and could not, without incursion into the metaphysical, be
measured against the hypothesis of a child or imagined entity in some
way identifiable with claimant but of normal and lawful parentage and
possessed of normal or average advantages.

269 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (1966).

an extreme example: The value of the life of someone at',To use
tacking an innocent victim with a knife would be de minimis from the view-

point of the innocent victim.
"One commentary glossed over this distinction. Referring to Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), an unwanted child support
case, and Zepeda, the writer said:
In both... the claim is essentially that life could be damaging. Viewed
in this light, the claims seem contrary to a concept, fundamental to our
legal system, that life is inherently valuable. The practical importance
of all ramifications of this concept may be doubted in view of the current population explosion. However, it is only realistic to consider that
it would seem extraordinary for a court to declare that life under any
adverse condition or to any person could be damaging.
9 UTAH L. Rav. 808, 814 n.37 (1965).

In re Lewis, 88 N.C. 31, 34 (1883).
R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 224 (1963).

*"Should we accept the contentions of the defendant and forbid the use
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In Guwtafson v. Gustafson4 Judge Mintz awarded custody of a
minor child to the mother after a preliminary hearing at which
ex parte affidavits were submitted to establish her mental stability.
The defendant husband's requests to cross examine the affiants and
to examine the physicians who treated Mrs. Gustafson for the illness
allegedly caused by the defendant's conduct were refused. The
supreme court' found that Judge Mintz did not abuse his discretion
in disallowing the cross examination of the affiants, and further
stated that he was not authorized under the proviso to the physicianpatient privilege statute to compel the disclosures sought by the
defendant since he was not a "presiding judge of a Superior Court
in term."' The court in the instant case appears to have foreclosed
the "polar star" in future cases by stating that the judge conducting
the preliminary hearing does not have the power to compel disclosure under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953) even though the
proper administration of justice requires it.
Custody was granted to the plaintiff approximately six months
after her return from a two year rest in a mental institution. Plaintiff twice attempted to take her own life while at the institution.
In light of the above facts, the welfare of the child dictates a full
investigation into the fitness of the mother before awarding custody
to her. It is impossible to perceive how the welfare of the child has
been enhanced by snatching her away from a home where she has
spent two years, especially in light of the fact that the defendant's
fitness is unchallenged 8 and the plaintiff's is so questionable. The
of affidavits and require the presence, examination and cross examination of
each of the witnesses at preliminary and temporary hearings and motions
pending trial, it would cause serious and unnecessary delay." Gustafson v.
Gustafson, 272 N.C. 452, 455, 158 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1967).
'272 N.C. 452, 158 S.E.2d 619 (1967).
5 Id., 158 S.E.2d 619 (1967).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953): Communications between physician
and patient.-No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery,
shall be required to disclose any information which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which
information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient
as a physician, or to do any act for him as a surgeon: Provided, that
the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure,
if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of
justice.
rd.
, The words "presiding judge of a superior court" refer to the superior
court judge who presides at the trial. Lockwood v. McCaskilI, 261 N.C. 754,
136 S.E.2d 67 (1964).
8 "From the record it appears that both the plaintiff and the defendant
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disruptive effect of a change of custody on a child's world should
alone prevent a court from shifting custody where both parties
appear to be fit guardians.'
The court in the instant case appears to be more concerned with
establishing that the procedures employed for determining custody
did not work an injustice upon the defendant than with providing
for the welfare of the child."0 The court stressed the temporary
nature of the custody award. Theoretically, at least, the defendant
has not been seriously deprived of any of his rights since after the
trial of the case on the merits, the custody question will be considered
de novo. 11 But practically he has been denied the companionship of
his child for an indeterminate period of time-the length of which
depends upon the congestion of the local calendar. Also, this period
of time spent with the mother is bound to influence the malleable
child's feelings and preference as to her choice of a permanent
guardian. The North Carolina Court has stated that "[the wishes
of a child of sufficient age to exercise discretion in choosing a custodian is entitled to considerable weight when the contest is between
parents, but is not controlling."' 2 Often, in close cases where both
parents are fit guardians, the judge at the de movo hearing will be
reluctant to cast the child's world into chaos by changing the custody
order. In the above situation it is possible that the original defeated
party has had his rights foreclosed at the abbreviated preliminary
custody hearing.
In order to remedy the above mentioned ills, a certain amount
are of good character and that the court could well have adjudged that
both were fit and suitable persons to have custody of this child." 272 N.C.
452, 458, 158 S.E.2d 619, 623 (1967).
g"[W]here young children have been placed in one home.., for a substantial period of time and the situation seems satisfactory, there is a reluctance to uproot the children from familiar surroundings and place them
in a strange home with a parent who hardly knows them." 24 Am. Jur. 2d.
Divorce and Separation § 820 (1966).
"0"The ultimate right of cross examination will be afforded the parties
at the trial of the cause, and this is within the purview of the Court's decision
in Stanback v. Stanback (citations omitted)." 272 N.C. 452, 455, 158 S.E.2d
619, 621 (1967). "It must be recalled that at the trial of the case affidavits
will not be admissible and that the witnesses must appear in person. Therefore
the fact that in this hearing for a temporary purpose the plaintiff used affidavits of physicians who treated her does not bring into play the proviso of
G.S. 8-54." Id. at 457, 158 S.E.2d at 622.
Stanback v. Stanback, 270 N.C. 497, 155 S.E.2d 221 (1967).
1
'James v. Pretlow, 242 N.C. 102, 105, 86 S.E.2d 759, 761 (1955).
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economy' 3

of judicial
will have to be sacrificed in the interest of
justice and the welfare of children. It will be necessary to grant a
full judicial hearing in the first instance on the custody question.
At present, the presiding judge has the authority to make these! hearings as broad or as narrow as he, in his discretion, deems necessary.
This power is nugatory when mental or emotional stability is the
critical issue since the judge does not have the authority to compel
disclosure from treating physicians under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53
(1953). A statutory amendment will be necessary to extend the
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953) proviso power to a judge presiding
at custody hearings. 14
The legislature will be required to amend N.C. GEN. STAT.

§

8-53 (1953) in order to avoid the inconsistency and embarassment
of having, in effect, two different physician-patient privilege statutes
-one absolute, and one qualified. The privilege in the newly created
district courts would be absolute since the district court judges do
not possess the power to compel disclosure under the present statute.' 5
This factor gains added significance since the district court has
exclusive jurisdiction over custody matters. 6 The legislature need
only take a short, but prudent, step to extend the proviso power to
judges presiding at custody hearings. The rationale behind the pro"sMuch of the evidence presented at the custody hearing will be duplicated
at the trial on the merits.
" The court has construed the proviso power to be limited to "the presiding judge of a Superior Court in term." A superior court judge in chambers has been denied the proviso power. Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84
S.E.2d 297 (1954) .
1 The only possible method of avoiding this result would be for the
courts to construe N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-291(6) (Supp. 1967) as a catch-all
phrase granting the proviso power to district court judges. The language

of this section does not appear broad enough for such a construction:
To issue all process and orders necessary or proper in the exercise of
his powers and authority, and to effectuate his lawful judgments and
decrees.
Id.
It is doubtful that the court will adopt such a liberal construction of this
section in order to grant the proviso power to district court judges in
light of the court's marked reluctance to construe liberally the proviso power

in the past. See Sims v. Insurance Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962);
Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954).
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-244 (Supp. 1967): Domestic Relations.The district court division is the proper division, without regard to
the amount in controversy, for the trial of civil actions and proceedings for annulment, divorce, alimony, child support, and child custody.
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viso,' 7 the unique character of custody proceedings,"8 and the lack
of a strong foundation for the physician-patient privilege 0 all strongly favor this step. It is in fact necessary to return the "polar star"
to its rightful position. 0
WILLIAM

J.

DOCKERY

Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physician's Opinion
Based on Patient's Statements
In Todd v. Watts,' plaintiff sought damages for persistent headaches and backaches allegedly resulting from injuries she had sustained in an automobile collision. Her evidence showed a collision,
and that she had been thrown forward, striking her head on the
windshield, her knees on the dashboard and wrenching her back.
An orthopedic surgeon who had treated plaintiff testified in her
behalf. He first related the history of the complaints, as told by
the plaintiff on her first visit to him for treatment. This testimony
included reference to the accident and a recitation that she told him
"she was thrown forward when the collision occurred, striking her
head and forehead against the front windshield glass, breaking the
glass and abrading her forehead. She told me... she also wrenched
and contused both knees and her low back." 2 There was no objection
to this testimony, although on request of defense counsel its use
was limited to corroborating the testimony previously given by the
plaintiff.' The doctor then was asked to give certain opinions as
17 The proviso was inserted by the legislature to prevent the privilege from
serving as a bar to justice.
"sAs noted above, time may be a controlling factor in this type of litigation. Also, it may be extremely important to the welfare of the child that the
initial determination be correct.
" See Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Jitstice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale L.J.
607 (1943).
" The question of whether to remove a child from the custody of its
natural mother is one over which judges have agonized from time immemorial. See In re Two Mothers, 1 Kings 3:11-28, decided by King Solomon, evidently the first 'reported'case. Klein v.Klein, 204 So. 2d 239 (Fla.
Ct. App.1967), aff'd per curiam, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1580 (1967).
1269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967). For a previous discussion of this
case, see Brandis, Evidence, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 45 N.C.L.
REv. 934, 949-51 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Brandis].
2269 N.C. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451-52 (dissenting opinion).
'Id. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451. This seems consistent with North Caro-
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to the permanency and cause of plaintiff's continuing pains. Over
objection, he was permitted: (1) to give his diagnosis, which included reference to both the accident and the resultant injuries;
(2) to answer that, in his opinion, plaintiff would suffer "some
continuing lumbo-sacral strain and persistent headaches as a result
of her auto accident;" and (3) to answer that a congenital spine
defect found in plaintiff could have been aggravated by an injury
received in the accident. 4 The jury awarded damages to the plaintiff.
The North Carolina Supreme Court awarded a new trial (Chief
Justice Parker dissenting), solely because of error in admitting
this testimony.
The majority held that allowing the physician to express an
opinion based on matter beyond his personal knowledge and not
properly grounded upon a hypothetical question was error. The
dissenting Chief Justice relied on the earlier case of Penland v.
Bird Coal Company' (which the majority did not mention). That
case held a treating physician's opinion to be admissible although
based wholly or in part on statements of the patient and allowed
the physician to testify to the statements in order to show the basis
6
for his opinion, even when not admissible as substantive evidence.
As a result of the majority holding, the viability of the Penland
rule is open to serious question.
In considering the effect of Todd on the Penland decision, certain
related problems should be distinguished. As a practical matter, a
doctor might be called upon to testify to what his patient told him
for one of two reasons. First, the testimony might be sought as7
substantive evidence, i.e., to prove the truth of the matter stated.
This is clearly hearsay8 and, to be admissible, it must fall under

lina's liberal use of the "corroboration" rule to allow testimony otherwise excludable as hearsay. See, e.g., Bowman v. Blankenship, 165 N.C. 519, 81

S.E. 746 (1914). The rule is discussed in D. STANSRURY, THE NORTH CAROA LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 50-52 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANS-

LI

BURY].

'269 N.C. at 419-20, 152 S.E.2d at 450-51.
246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).

Id. at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436.

"See, e.g., Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712

(1958).

8 "[W]henever the assertion of any person, other than that of the witness
himself in his present testimony, is offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, the evidence so offered is hearsay." STANSBURY § 138, at 336.
See also C. McCoRmICK, L&w OF EVIDENCE § 225 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as MCCORMICK].
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one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.0 Second, the
doctor might base his opinion on his patient's statements and repeat
the statements only to show the grounds for his opinion. 10 In the
former instance, due to a high degree of trustworthiness," most
courts allow a witness (physician or layman) to testify to a person's
statements of present pain and suffering as substantive evidence. 2
Admitting a patient's statements to his treating physician of past
symptoms seems equally trustworthy,' 8 and courts are beginning
to adopt this view. 14 If the patient's statements concern the supposed
cause of his injuries or illness, they are usually not admissible to
prove the occurrence of the causal event.'
Although some courts fail to recognize it,'" the hearsay problems
'Professor Wigmore described the requirements for allowing hearsay
testimony as being (1) necessity, and (2) a circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1421, 1422 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
0
See, e.g., Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298 (Me. 1966).
1 See WIGMOE §§ 1421-22, 1718.
" See Biles v. Holmes, 33 N.C. 16 (1850) (statements to physician);
Salinas v. Casualty Co. of California, 323 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
(statements to layman). Many North Carolina cases recognizing this exception to the hearsay rule are collected in Note, 13 N.C.L. REv. 228 (1935).
" "A patient has an equal motive to speak the truth; what he has felt
in the past is as apt to be important in his treatment as what he feels at the
moment." Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 540 (2d Cir. 1940) (L.
Hand, J.). For obvious reasons, statements of past symptoms to a layman
would not be imbued with a similar motive for truth, and thus the hearsay
exception as applied to laymen does not extend beyond declarations of present
pain and suffering. See WIGMORE § 1722. Note further that the reasons for
the hearsay exception are not so readily applicable when the physician is
consulted only to qualify him to testify. See note 20 infra.
"'Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940) ; accord, Peterson v. Richfield Plaza, 252 Minn. 215, 89 N.W.2d 712 (1958) (overruling
prior inconsistent cases). North Carolina has approached, if not adopted,
this exception. See Moore v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N.C. 711, 175 S.E. 96
(1934), noted in 13 N.C.L. Rlv. 228 (1935).
' Roosa v. Loan Co., 132 Mass. 439 (1882); Pinter v. Parsekian, 92
N.J. Super. 392, 223 A.2d 635 (Super. Ct. 1966); WIGMORE § 1722. But cf.
Hillman v. Utah Power & Light Co., 56 Idaho 67, 51 P.2d 703 (1935);
Greenfarb v. Arre, 62 N.J. Super. 420, 163 A.2d 173 (Super. Ct. 1960)
(patient deceased, no other testimony as to cause available), petition for
cert.0denied, 33 N.J. 454, 165 A.2d 233 (1960) ; MCCORMICK § 266.
" See Paulk v. Thomas, 115 Ga. App. 436, 154 S.E.2d 872 (1967);
Schears v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1962); Reid v. Yellow
Cab Co., 131 Ore. 27, 279 P. 635 (1929). In Reid, a concurring justice
pointed out: "The prevailing opinion fails to recognize the distinction between receiving in evidence the communications of a patient to his physician
as proof of the truth of the matter stated and admitting them for the purpose of showing the basis of the physician's judgment." Id. at 35-36, 279
P. at 638 (discussing the distinction).
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set out above are not involved when the treating physician gives
his opinion grounded on the patient's subjective statements and
relates this history only to show the basis for the opinion.1 Testimony is not generally objectionable as hearsay if introduced for
any reason other than to prove the truth of the matter stated.18
Absent these hearsay considerations, there seems no logical basis
for differentiating between opinions based on patient's statements
of present pain and suffering, past symptoms or cause. Courts not
applying hearsay rules to physician opinion testimony usually do
not make these distinctions. 9 Finally, the above rules which allow
admission of patient's statements, either as substantive evidence
or as basis for opinion, usually do not extend to statements made
by the plaintiff to a non-treating physician 0 or to statements made
to the treating physician by a third party (rather than the patient).21
This note is confined to the Todd context of statements made by a
patient to a treatingphysician and referred to by the physician during
the trial only as indicating basis for opinion.
As pointed out by the dissenting Chief Justice in Todd, the general rule is that a treating physician may base his opinion on state"'"In such an instance the patient's statements are not regarded as
hearsay; the statements are introduced without regard for the truthfulness
of the fact stated, but merely as observed facts forming part of the physician's data." Gonzales v. Hodson, 420 P.2d 813, 816 (Idaho 1966). Instructions that the statements are to be considered only in explanation of the
physician's opinion should counteract any tendency of the jury to use the
evidence as proof of the facts stated. Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298 (Me.
1966).
z$ STANSBURY § 141.
"0See WIG'oRE § 688.

"'Most courts exclude patient's statements as substantive evidence when
the physician was consulted to qualify him to testify, even when the statements are of present pain and suffering. McCoRmIcK § 267; WIGMORE
§ 1721. Distinctions between treating and non-treating physicians also are
made when the patient's statements are used only as grounds for the physician's opinion. Troj v. Smith, 199 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1967) (distinction between treating and diagnosing physician); Rossello v. Friedel, 243 Md.
234, 220 A.2d 537 (1966); Cooper v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 163 N.C. 150,
79 S.E. 418 (1913) (dictum). Contra, Waldrop v. Driver-Miller Plumbing
& Heating Corp., 61 N.M. 412, 301 P.2d 521 (1956); see Ray, Testimony
of Physicians as to Plaintiff's Injuries, 26 TuL. L. REv. 60, 67-69 (1951).
"1Seawell v. Brame, 258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1962) (opinion based
on facts related by patient's wife and others); WIGMORx § 688(4). But see
State Realty Co. v. Ligon, 218 Ala. 541, 119 So. 672 (1929) (opinion
based on report of another doctor); Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md.
546, 39 A.2d 546 (1944) (doctor's opinion based on history given by injured
child's mother). See generally Comment, The Admissibility of Expert Medical Testimony Based in Part Upon Information Received From Third Persons, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 193 (1962).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

ments made to him by his patient for purposes of treatment 22 and,
in doing so, may testify to these statements insofar as they show
the grounds for his opinion.23 Courts adopting this rule have not
disapproved the well established device of the hypothetical question
as a proper method of extracting opinion testimony.24 It seems
rather that asking the doctor to repeat what he has learned of the
case history from his patient and then asking his opinion thereon is
a permissible alternative to the hypothetical question method. To
be logically consistent with a fundamental concept of expert opinion
testimony,25 it would still seem necessary for the facts contained
in the statements to be introduced at some point as substantive
evidence, since a jury cannot be expected to evaluate an opinion,
whether elicited by a hypothetical question or otherwise, without
first being able to determine the validity of its factual basis. 20 Thus
it appears that this rule functions much like the hypothetical question. "[T]he only difference is that in the former instance the
witness supplies both the premise and the answer, whereas in the
latter [opinion based on hypothetical question] he supplies only the
27
one."
Despite the similarity between the two methods of admitting
doctors' opinion testimony, the rule allowing a physician to base
his opinion on his patient's subjective statements, and in doing so
to indicate these statements as his premise, seems a desirable one
to maintain. It frees litigants, courts and juries from the mazes
"People v. Wilson, 25 Cal. 2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944); Brown v.
Blauvelt, 152 Conn. 272, 205 A.2d 773 (1964) (dictum); Electro-Motive Div.,

General Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 32 I1. 2d 35, 203 N.E.2d 408

(1965); State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 P.2d 865 (1959). Numerous
authorities for this rule are cited in 31 Am. Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion

Evidence § 108 (1967); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1957); Annot., 65 A.L.R.
1217 (1930).

,3Lowery v. Jones, 219 Ala. 201, 121 So. 704 (1929) ; Wise v. Monteros,
93 Ariz. 124, 379 P.2d 116 (1963) ; Simpson v. Heiderich, 4 Ariz. App. 232,
419 P.2d 362 (1966) ; Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298 (Me. 1966). See also
authorities cited note 22 supra; WIGMORE §§ 655, 1720(1). Annotations collecting cases on this rule can be found in Annot., 130 A.L.R. 977 (1941); 80
A.L.R. 1527 (1932); 67 A.L.R. 10 (1930).
24See People v. Wilson, 25 Cal. 2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944) (example of
use of both devices in same testimony).
" Cf. WIGMORE § 672.
"Peters v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 107 F.2d 9 (3d Cir.
1939).
"'Reid v. Yellow Cab. Co., 131 Ore. 27, 37, 279 P. 635, 638 (1929) (concurring opinion). For example, the doctor might be asked for his opinion
"based on these things the patient told you, to which you have testified."
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and misuses of the hypothetical question.2" Since it is in step with
the common practices of medical science, there seems no compelling
reason to place judicial mistrust on medical opinion based on the
same subjective statements the physician frequently must consider
for purposes of treatment. 9 North Carolina had clearly adopted
this rule in Penland v. Bird Coal Company. ° The Todd decision

places the future of this rule in confusion and doubt.
The effect of Todd on the Penland rule is purely conjectural, since
the majority chose neither to discuss nor cite the earlier case."1 There
are, however, several possible interpretations. First, it may be argued that Penland has been distinguished and limited to its factual
context.3 2 This possibility stems from the fact that the medical
opinions in these cases are grounded on slightly different types of
statements by the patients. In Penland, a Workmen's Compensation
case,33 plaintiff sought payment for disability suffered from a fall
while at work. His physician repeated what the patient had told
him-a case history of a broken rib, punctured lung, and subsequent
weakness and easy tiring-and gave an opinion as to percentage
of disability based on this history. He did not relate the opinion
hypothetical question is frequently criticized by writers. Professor
Wigmore wrote forcefully that "[i]ts abuses have become so obstructive and
nauseous that no remedy short of extirpation will suffice." WIGmoRE § 686.
See also McCoi ICix 33-34 & nn.2 & 3. The North Carolina court recognized the wide dissatisfaction with the hypothetical question in Ingram v.
McCuiston, 261 N.C. 392, 399-400, 134 S.E.2d 705, 711 (1964) (dictum) (six
page hypothetical question).
See WIGMOiRE § 688. Physicians occasionally take the opportunity to
proselytize in court for judicial acceptance of the rule allowing them to
base their opinions on the subjective statements of their patients. See Wise
v. Monteros, 93 Ariz. 124, 126, 379 P.2d 116, 117 (1963) ("'The history
of these cases .. .[is] the only way that a physician can deduce what hap8The

pened . . . ."'); Paulk v. Thomas, 115 Ga. App. 436, 441, 154 S.E.2d 872,
877 (1967) (" '[S]o I can't come in and start feeling of a man's spinehe's got to tell me something about it. . . .'").
246 N.C. 26, 31, 97 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1957).
s'Part of the confusion resulting from Todd springs from the very fact
that the majority avoided any mention of Penland. The earlier case was
clearly brought to their attention, both by the dissenting opinion and in the
plaintiff's brief. Brief for Appellee at 13.
See Brandis 950.
"The rules of evidence in hearings before administrative tribunals seem
somewhat less stringently enforced. STANSBURY § 4. Hence it might be
argued that the Todd majority considered the Penland rule valid in a hearing before the Industrial Commission, but not in a jury trial. However, the
court in Penland gave no indication that the rule was to be so limited.
Further, had the Todd majority intended to distinguish Penlandon this basis,
it seemingly would have done so expressly.
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of disability directly to the fall, but rather to the past symptoms of
the plaintiff.3 4 In Todd, however, the opinion dealt with and was
based on the patient's statements of external cause (accident and
initial injuries) .3 Due to the trustworthiness and necessity requirements of exceptions to the hearsay rule, this distinction between
statements of past symptoms and statements of external cause is
frequently made when the issue is admissibility of the patient's
statements as substantive evidence."6 Even assuming the validity
of this distinction, there seems no strong reason for applying it to
the question of admissibility of opinion.3 The problems and policies
of the hearsay rule are not involved. 3 To disallow medical opinion
based on patient's statements of supposed cause is to divest the
doctor of a normal part of his total considerations for purposes
of diagnosis and treatment.3 It simply seems unnecessary and
impractical to balance the outcome of litigation on such a tenuous
distinction.
Another possible effect of Todd is that the Penland rule has been
abandoned altogether. The Todd majority quoted a standard rule
regarding the eliciting of a physician's opinion as to cause by hypothetical question" and stated that "[a] witness is not permitted to
base an opinion on facts of which he has no knowledge, ' 41 but that
:,246 N.C. 26, 30, 97 S.E.2d 432, 435.
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
Compare authorities cited note 14 supra with authorities cited note 15
.rupra.
."See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Express efforts to exclude
medical opinion testimony as to cause when based on patient's history of the
case, including statements of supposed cause, have been rejected by many
courts. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Preston, 257 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1959);
North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Burkett, 281 P.2d 434 (Okla. 1956). See
also WIGMoPE § 688(3) ; Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1082, 1100-04 (1959) ; Annot.,
136 A.L.R. 965, 980-82 (1942).
" Cases cited note 17 supra.
" WiGmol
§ 688(3). Even when a physician would not need to consider possible causes for purposes of diagnosing or treating his patient, there
would seem no need to exclude his opinion based on his patient's statements
of supposed cause.
" , 'It is well settled in the law of evidence that a physician or surgeon
may express his opinion as to the cause of the physical condition of a person
if his opinion is based either upon facts within his personal knowledge, or
upon an assumed state of facts supported by evidence and recited in a hypothetical question."' 269 N.C. 420, 154 S.E.2d 451, quoting from Spivey v.
Newman, 232 N.C. 281, 284, 59 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1950). The court in
Spivey was dealing with the form of a hypothetical question and the physician's answer. The holding does not appear to address itself to an issue
such as the one in Todd.
'4269 N.C. 420, 152 S.E.2d 451. Authority for this proposition came
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"this... is what the doctor purported to do.... The doctor could
not assume the source of the symptoms which plaintiff reported to
him .... -42 The court further stated that "[t] he Physician's opinion
as to possible cause of these symptoms and their probable permanency, should have been elicited as the response to a properly phrased
hypothetical question.. .

."4

The references to "cause" and "source"

in this language lend weight to the aforementioned possibility that
Todd was meant to limit the Penland rule to opinions utilizing patient's statements of past symptoms. Considered together, however,
the court's observations permit an even broader interpretation: that
in no event will a physician's opinion, if not based on matter within
his personal knowledge, be admissible unless elicited by a hypothetical question. To grant such exclusive status to the hypothetical
question would in effect do away with the Penland rule.
Any final analysis of Todd must depend at least partly on the
reasons for the ruling in that case itself. A main objection of the
court in Todd to the physician's opinion seems to have been the
manner in which it was stated. As phrased by the majority, although
the physician had no personal knowledge of the plaintiff's accident
or initial injuries, "Yet he stated as a fact

. .

." that she had low

back injuries and pain and that certain results occurred in or were
caused by her automobile accident. 44 The court stated that "Whether
plaintiff had persistent headaches and continuous backaches and if
so, whether the collision caused them, were crucial questions in the
case." 45 This language is reminiscent of the rule that expert opinion
as to cause "invades the province of the jury" if stated in terms
more definite than "could" or "might." 48 The rule has been applied
in cases where improperly phrased hypothetical questions called forth
medical opinions as to cause in terms of certainty analogous to the
situation in Todd.4 7 Although severely criticized by many courts
from Robbins v. Meyers Trading Post, Inc., 251 N.C. 663, 111 S.E.2d 884

(1959), in which a witness was erroneously allowed to give his opinion as
to the probable value of a house had it been constructed "exactly like" another home, the witness having never seen the other house. Any relation
between this case and the question of admissibility of a physician's opinion
based on his patient's statements is tenuous, at best.
42 269 N.C. at 420-21, 152 S.E.2d at 451.

"Id.

"269 N.C. 420, 152 S.E.2d 451.
,5rd. at 421, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
'See STANiSBURY § 137, at 332-33.
"Stathopoulos v. Shook, 251 N.C. 33, 110 S.E.2d 452 (1959)

(injuries
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and writers4" and frequently avoided by technical distinctions, 4
this "could" or "might" rule has never been repudiated by the North
Carolina Court."0 The majority in Todd may have had this concept
in mind. If so, the ruling in the case was possibly intended to prevent prospectively similar errors in opinion testimony as to cause,
since by definition a "properly phrased hypothetical question" must
state the grounds for the opinion as assumptions and elicit that
opinion in the proper "might" or "could" incantation." If this
was the rationale behind the Todd decision, it is arguable that the
holding should be limited in future application to those situations
where the physician's opinion as to cause is sought. Even then use
of the Penland rule should be allowed unless the opinion is stated
in the objectionable terms of certainty."2 This construction of Todd
would leave the Penland rule as a functioning alternative to the
rigors of the hypothetical question. It would also permit complete
restoration of the Penland rule if the "could" or "might" rule is
ever abandoned.53
It seems that a new trial was awarded in Todd-and a practical
evidentiary rule jeopardized to an undeterminable degree-because
the plaintiff found herself on the wrong side of an exceedingly fine
line. It is highly unlikely, in light of all the surgeon's testimony, 4
that the jury considered the part held erroneous as "fact" rather
than opinion as to cause based on certain implicit assumptions. 5
"were caused by the collision"); Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E.2d
818 (1912).
'9 .E.g., Griswold v. Consolidated Prod. Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d
646 (1942). Griswold collects, quotes and discusses both text and case authority in a lengthy opinion criticizing the "invading the province of the
jury" and "could" or "might" rules.
'" STANsBu Y § 137 at 333 & n.67.
" The rule has in fact been reiterated in recent decisions. Apel v. Queen
City Coach Co., 267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966) (Higgins, J., quoting
but indicating dissatisfaction with the rule); Lockwood v. McCaskill, 262
N.C. 663, 138 S.E.2d 541 (1964), noted in 43 N.C.L. REv. 979 (1965).
"1STANSBURY

§

137.

" So long as the "could" or "might" rule remains functional, attorneys
would be wise to instruct their physician-witnesses to avoid stating opinions
as to cause in any terms other than the approved formula, even if the
opinion is to be elicited by the hypothetical question method.
" Since the court has indicated dissatisfaction with the rule, Apel v.
Queen City Coach Co., 267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566 (1966), its abandonment hopefully is in the near future.
" See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
" It is further relevant to the technicality of the decision that these implicit assumptions were largely uncontradicted. See Brandis 950-51.
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"If any error was involved, it seems hardly prejudicial enough,
standing alone, to justify a new trial, at which the questions will
explicitly state the assumptions clearly implicit in the testimony at
the first trial."'56
Pending judicial exposition of the scope of Todd's effect on
the Penland rule, attorneys should follow the Todd formula of
introducing evidence and having it incorporated into a hypothetical
question designed to elicit carefully phrased opinions of their physician-witnesses. Caution is advised, for Todd's undermining of
Penland and its spiritual affinity with criticized evidence concepts57
may wipe out verdicts presumptively grounded on medical testimony
which, though uniformly acceptable outside of court, is not twisted
into phrases suitable for the strangely dissimilar ears of jurymen.
RICHARD W. ELLIS

Evidence-Traffic Violations to Impeach a Witness
Although counsel may coach his witness to "assume a virtue, if
you have it not,"' with the witness having a criminal record, it may
be of little avail. Courts have assumed that such a witness does not
have virtue and have not hesitated to allow questions about prior
criminal convictions for impeachment purposes,2 "to reduce or discount the credibility of a witness for the purpose of inducing the
jury to give less weight to his testimony in arriving at the ultimate
facts in the case." 3
In the recent case of Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corporation,4
the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it was not error for
the trial judge to allow defense counsel on cross examination to
question plaintiff's witness concerning the following convictions:
speeding 65 miles per hour in a 55 miles per hour zone, exceeding
a safe speed, drunken driving, operating a motor vehicle while his
Id. at 951.
See note 28 supra (hypothetical question); note 48 supra ("could" or
"might" rule).
I Shakespeare, Hamlet (III iv 160); see Bander, Shakespeare and the
Law, CASE & COMMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1968 at 47.
2 3 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 926 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WxGM!ORE].

State v Nelson, 200 N.C. 69, 72, 156 S.E. 154, 156 (1930).
' 271 N.C. 276, 156 S.E.2d 265 (1967).
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license was suspended, disregarding a stop signal, public drunkenness, and allowing an unlicensed minor to operate a motor vehicle.
This holding reaffirmed the North Carolina Court's position that
convictions of all crimes, be they felonies or misdemeanors, are admissible for impeachment purposes.5 The reasoning behind this rule
and the criteria on which convictions are admitted or excluded should
be revaluated.
Underlying this rule of evidence is a syllogism similar to the following: all men convicted of a crime are bad men; all bad men are
untruthful; ergo, all men convicted of a crime are untruthful.0
The obvious fallacy in this theory is that it is an all inclusive generalization 7 which ignores the problem of relevancy. With some men
and some crimes a conviction, especially if repeated, may be indicative of the witness' lack of credibility," but such is not always
the case. A consideration of three general observations will illustrate
the danger of relying on such a fallacious theory to determine truth
at a trial.9 In the first place even a person convicted of a crime involving dishonesty may have superior powers of observation and
memory, and in the absence of a reason to falsify, his testimony may
be worth more than that of a witness with a spotless reputation
whose powers of observation are limited and whose past experiences
'Accord, State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590, 593, 197 S.E. 176, 178 (1938).
D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 112 (2d ed. 1963). [hereinafter cited as STANSBURY].

' "It is not the specific tendency of the witness to falsify but the general
bad character of the witness as evidenced by the single act of which he was
convicted that creates the basis of admissibility." Ladd, Credibility TestsCurrent Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176 (1940). [hereinafter cited as
Ladd].
"The psychologist would probably find the major and minor premises of
the syllogism blatantly false, for as Wigmore indicates, "to the psychologist,
the common law's reliance on character as an index of falsehood is crude
and childish." WIGMOE § 922, at 447.
""While truth is truth whether it comes from a polluted or pure source
when facts are in dispute the source of the conflicting testimony may cast
light in determining what the truth is." Ladd 171.
' For an analysis of problems involved in determining truth in a jury
trial see Weinstein, Some Difficulties in Devising Rules for Determining
Truth in Judicial Trials, 66 CoLum. L. REV. 223 (1966). The weakness of
the rule permitting prior criminal convictions to reduce the credibility of
a witness is emphasized in those jurisdictions such as North Carolina where

the witness' answer is conclusive and the record may not be introduced.

While asking the question to make the jury disbelieve the testimony, if the
witness blatantly lies about his prior conviction, the jury never knows. See
State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 30 S.E.2d 230 (1944) ; Coleman v. Railroad, 138
N.C. 351, 50 S.E. 690 (1905); STANSBURY § 112, at 254.
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unconsciously influence his credibility."0 Secondly, there may be
people without criminal records who have no qualms about prevaricating even under oath." Finally, the nature of the crime rather
than the seriousness of the crime is important.' As one writer has
indicated, there may be some felonies, even murder and manslaughter, which have no bearing on a man's propensity to dishonesty
or falsification; while some misdemeanors, for example petty larceny,
may well be indicia of the credibility of the witness."8
From the nature of the crime, it is apparent that traffic violations
should not be admissible to impeach a witness because they have no
bearing on his credibility.' 4 Thus, the holding in Ingle illustrates
the problem of establishing a relationship between the prior conviction and the search for truth in a trial, and the necessity of making relevancy the criterion. The immediate need in North Carolina,
" Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of a Witness,
L. REv. 239, 241-42 (1967).
1
With many telling the truth is a habit and a principle which they
adhere to always though they may indulge in drinking, swearing,
gambling, roystering, or making close bargains. With others, lying is
the habit or principle, and if elevated to be senators, or made church
members or deacons, it does not always reform them. The object of
the law is to show the character of the witness as to telling the truth.
Atwood v. Impson, 20 N.J. Eq. 150, 157 (Ch. 1869).
1 See 21 Am. JuR. 2d Criminal Law §§ 18-21 (1965) for a discussion of
the 1distinction between the terms felony and misdemeanor.
Ladd 180.
" A number of courts have excluded evidence of traffic convictions to
impeach a witness. In New York the use of traffic violations is prohibited
by statute, and in Same v. Davison, 1 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1937) the court said
that though a conviction arising out of the same occurrence was permissible
as prima facie evidence of the facts, on cross-examination of the defendant,
it should not have been permitted solely to affect credibility, accord, De
Stassio v. Jansen Dairy Corp., 279 N.Y. 501, 18 N.E. 2d 833 (1939); see
Dixie Culvert Mfg. Co. v. Richardson, 218 Ark. 427, 236 S.W.2d 713 (1951) ;
Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co., 196 Md. 36, 75 A.2d 339 (1950);
Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927); State v. Hickman, 102
Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202 (1956); Contra, Monaghan v. Keith Oil
Co., 281 Mass. 129, 183 N.E. 252 (1932); Brown v. Howard, 42 R.I. 571,
114 A. 11 (1921). See also ANNOT., 20 A.L.R.2d 1217 (1951). It is interesting to note that some courts refusing to admit evidence of traffic
violations have justified the exclusion on grounds of relevancy as in
Nesbit v. Cumberland Contracting Co. where the judge said, "prior convictions for traffic violations of the motor vehicle law seem clearly to have
no direct bearing upon veracity. . . ." 196 Md. 36, 41, 75 A.2d 339, 341
(1950). In State v. King, 224 N.C. 329, 333, 30 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1944),
Justice Seawell suggested that traffic violations not be used to impeach a
witness, and Stansbury later termed this a "wholesome suggestion." STANs52

CORNELL

BURY

§ 112, at 255.
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therefore, is to limit the felonies and misdemeanors 1 admissible to
those involving dishonesty and false statement. This formulation
is the one proposed by the Uniform Rules of Evidence 0 and has
been praised as possibly the best solution. 7
A look at the problem from the viewpoint of the jury and of the
witness will further illustrate the wisdom of making this change
in the rule. If a witness is a party to the action, it is doubtful that
the jury will ignore these convictions in deciding the verdict, especially if these prior convictions are of a similar nature. The jury
" Since the nature of the crime rather than the seriousness of the crime
should be emphasized, the use of all crimes, both felonies, and misdemeanors,
in North Carolina avoids the complications found in other jurisdictions
using a different formula to determine the types of criminal convictions
admissible. Either by legislation or judicial determination some courts allow
felonies and misdemeanors involving crinen falsi, for example forgery,
counterfeiting, and perjury, while other jurisdictions allow felonies and
misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses
§ 507 nn. 70 & 69 (1957); 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 740 (1948). For
jurisdictions following the same rule as North Carolina see Bostic v. United
States, 94 F.2d 636 (D.D.C. 1937); Black v. State, 215 Ark. 618, 222
S.W.2d 816 (1949); McMullen v. Cannon, 129 Ind. App. 11, 150 N.E.2d
765 (1958); Quigley v. Turner, 150 Mass. 108, 55 N.E.2d 765 (1889);
Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So. 2d 267 (1954); State v. McKissic,
358 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1962).
"Uniform Rule of Evidence § 21.
1 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43, at 90 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]. It should be noted here that there is another rule of evidence
relied upon in the principal case, i.e., proof of general character to impeach
a witness, which may hinder the North Carolina court in making this much
needed transition. Most courts permit only reputation for veracity to be
shown to impeach a witness and expressly refuse to allow proof of general
character. See Ladd 172. In Ingle, however, the first statement made by
the court was that "a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general
character is bad... ." 271 N.C. 276, 279, 156 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1967). Then,
quoting from State v. Sims, 213 N.C. 590, 197 S.E. 176 (1938), the court
continued: "any act of the witness which tends to impeach his character
may be inquired about or proven by cross examination." 271 N.C. at 280,
156 S.E.2d at 269. Having made this determination, the court came rather
easily to its holding that all crimes including traffic violations are admissible
to impeach a witness's character by stating:
Nor do we think that a person who has been guilty of drunken driving
or consistently violates laws designed to protect life and property on
the highway can claim an unblemished general character.
Id. at 282, 156 S.E.2d at 270. (emphasis added). Thus, by using general
character, the court avoided the issue of the relevancy of the prior criminal
convictions to ascertain the witness's credibility. It should be noted, however,
that an inconsistency between the rule for proving character to impeach
and the rule for admitting prior criminal convictions exists even in jurisdictions permitting only character for veracity to be shown to impeach a
witness. In these latter jurisdictions honesty and veracity do not seem to
be the criteria for admitting prior criminal convictions. WIGMORE § 926, at
470; § 982, at 550.
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will decide on the basis of the witness' record rather than on the
merits of the case."8 The North Carolina court felt that because
jurors are intelligent people they will be able to weigh such evidence
properly, 9 but not all authorities agree." If the witness is not a
party to the action, introducing prior convictions of traffic violations
having no bearing on veracity is judicially inefficient. Since most
jurors are motorists, the chances are quite good that many of them
will also have a record of traffic violations. Realizing that if they
were the witness, the same would be used to cast doubt on their
credibility, many jurors will simply ignore the evidence or else become antagonized.
Since the effect on the jury may be highly negative, a second
reason for excluding proof of prior traffic convictions is the abuse
to the witness. The court in Ingle said "responsible counsel will not
abuse the rule."'" Counsel have not always been noted for such restraint, however.22 It should be remembered that "witnesses have
rights as well as parties; it is too often the case that they are set up
as marks to be shot at."'23 When this element of abuse is overlooked,
the witness stand becomes a nightmare of pain and embarrassment.
A witness of upstanding character in the community, coerced into
exposing a prior drunken driving charge, may find himself prejudiced thereafter. Under these circumstances witnesses with the true
" It would seem that the same reason for not allowing evidence of general
character of the party to a civil suit should apply to evidence of prior criminal convictions for impeachment purposes when the party becomes a witness
on his own behalf and consequently subject to cross-examination. See
STANSBURY § 103, at 238-39; 59 Wis. L. Rv. 312, 320-21 (1959).
"0Ingle v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 S.E.2d
265, 270 (1967).
o As one author has eloquently stated:
One may consciously accept impeachment evidence for what it is
worth, but the barbs of prejudice possess an uncanny faculty for impressing the unconscious self. Warning judicial instructions may
carefully distinguish the uses to which particular items of proof may
be put, yet it is highly improbable that cold, judicial analysis will
temper or control the juror's very human propensity to take all things
into account.
Slough, Impeachment of Witnesses; Common Law Principles and Modern

Trends, 34 IND. L.J. 1, 21-22 (1958). See also, 59 Wis. L. REv. 312, 322
(1959).
- 271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967).
"In WIGMORE § 983, at 550-51 the suggestion is made that abuse of
witnesses may be one policy reason for excluding some evidence that is
relevant.
23Id. at 551.
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facts will hesitate voluntarily to subject themselves to the ordeal. 24
Consequently, the judicial process is hampered.
In many jurisdictions allowing evidence of all crimes for impeachment purposes, it is possible for the trial judge to exclude
evidence of some prior convictions.2" After Ingle, this safeguard
may or may not exist in North Carolina. Having stated the absolute rule that all convictions are admissible to impeach a witness,
the court said, "furthermore, the judge is in charge of the trial, and
he has plenary power to protect a witness from harrassment and to
keep cross-examination within the bounds of reason. ' 26 Thus the
phantom of certainty vanishes. Attorneys and trial judges are left
to ponder what will happen on appeal if the judge exercises his discretion and excludes evidence of a prior criminal conviction. Will
the Supreme Court uphold the mandate that all convictions are admissible, or will the court uphold the trial judge's exercise of
plenary power?
The need to avoid cluttering up the trial with confusing, collateral issues and to prevent abuse of witnesses supports having broad
discretion in the trial judge. Since most courts place no time limit
on convictions admissible to impeach a witness," absent discretion
in the trial judge to eliminate some convictions, the jury might be
considering a conviction so remote as not even to have bearing on
general character. 28 Moreover, at the trial the judge has the
advantage of demeanor evidence to guide him.2"
It is interesting to note that in the case of McMullen v. Cannon 3 cited in Ingle to support the admissibility of traffic convictions,
the Indiana court definitively resolved in the negative the issue of dis" WIGMORE § 921, at 446.
" "There should be some discretion in the court to determine whether
the question is asked for the purpose of honestly discrediting the witness
or whether its purpose is merely to arouse suspicion in the mind of jurors."
Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1924); see Hunter v. State,
193 Md. 596, 69 A.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1949); Commonwealth v. Quaranta,
295 Pa. 264, 272, 145 A. 89, 92 (1928).
2271 N.C. 276, 282, 156 S.E.2d 265, 270 (1967).
Ladd 176; MCCORMIcK § 43, at 91.
8
' See Simond v. State, 127 Md. 29, 39, 95 A. 1073, 1077 (1915) where
the court said that to permit evidence of a conviction for drunkeness ten
years prior tended "to reflect on the intelligence of the jury to suppose they
would be influenced in passing on credibility by such evidence."
2 Being able to observe the reaction of both the witness and the jury,
the trial judge is in a better position to detect abuse than is the appellate
court with only a record of the trial.
" 129 Ind. App. 11, 150 N.E.2d 765 (1958).
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cretion in the trial judge to eliminate some evidence .3 However, until
the North Carolina court further elucidates the nature of this "plenary power" and the "bounds of reason," the answer in this jurisdiction is uncertain.
The argument has been made that if the legislature labels certain conduct a crime, it is indicative of the moral tenor of society,
and he who violates that law should thereafter be accountable for
impeachment purposes in a court of law. 2 It should not be forgotten, however, that "there may be convictions of violations of
hundreds of police regulations, which in no real sense can be taken
as tending to make one so convicted unworthy of belief." 3 No one
would contend that, with traffic fatalities mounting each year, traffic
laws should be regarded lightly, but the law makes provision for
punishment of such offenders, and the witness stand is not the proper
place. Veracity and honesty should be the criteria as to the type of
criminal convictions permitted in evidence. The trial judge should
have discretion to eliminate evidence of convictions that are irrelevant, remote and abusive. Only when these prerequisites are met
will the jury have testimony that can be weighed with intelligence
rather than emotion.
SARAH E. PARKER

Labor Law-Decreasing Importance of Employer Motivation
as an Element of Unfair Labor Practice
Though inquiry under section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor
Relations Act specifically requires a finding of discrimination and a
"1The court followed the decision in Niemeyer v. McCarty, 221 Ind.
688, 700-01, 51 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1943) where the court held that the trial
judge was not authorized to exclude entirely evidence of a prior criminal
conviction even though the extent to which cross examination may be
carried is within his sound discretion. 129 Ind. App. 11, 150 N.E.2d 765,
767 (1958).
.State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 116, 287 P. 909, 921 (1930).
"Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 173, 155 A. 153, 157 (1931).
261 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964): "It shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under section
157 of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964): "Employees shall have the right to self-
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resulting discouragement of union membership, such finding has
normally turned on whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by antiunion purpose or animus.2 Where the employer's conduct is "inherently destructive" of important employee rights and
is largely without legitimate business justification, courts have had
no difficulty in holding that antiunion purpose can be inferred from
the conduct itself.3 However, the necessity of an affirmative showing
of the employer's antiunion purpose in activities not "inherently
destructive" of employee interests has been a source of continuing
uncertainty in the interpretation of sections 8(a) (1) and (3).4
The means of combatting union activity are becoming increasingly sophisticated. The clever and well-advised employer can find
many ways to conceal his antiunion purpose, to camouflage antiunion purpose with purported business justifications. Thus, instead
of discharging employees who are sympathetic to the union, the
employer may reassign them to jobs with dangerous equipment, give
more desirable assignments to non-union men, or direct strict enforcement of certain theretofore loosely enforced shop rules. It
cannot be said that these activities are "inherently destructive" of
employee rights, nor does the employer have difficulty in making a
case for the contention that the action was necessitated by legitimate
business reasons. Consequently courts have been caught in the
semantic tangles of requiring an affirmative showing of antiunion
purpose on one hand, and an inclination to balance conflicting legitimate interests on the other.
The courts have interpreted section 8(a) (3) to mean "discrimination ...

[with intent] to encourage or discourage member-

ship in a labor organization," and employer responses to union activity have been considered primarily under this section.' The most
emphatic statement of the importance of employer intent or motivaorganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection..."
'See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1964); Radio Officers Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
'Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
"See Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insdate
Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CnI. L. Rnv. 735, 743 (1965).
'See, Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 1195, 1198 (1967).
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tion is contained in American Ship Building Company v. NLRB.'
The Court, however, has not chosen to continue the reasoning of
American Ship Building, and the decisions in NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers,Incorporated7 and NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Company'
have diminished the importance of employer motivation as an element of unfair labor practice. 9
The question in American Ship Building was whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice when he temporarily lays-off
or locks-out his employees in support of his economic position after
reaching a bargaining impasse. In anticipation of a contract expiration the employer, a shipyard owner, entered into a series of negotiating sessions with the union, but failed to reach a new agreement. There was no strike at the expiration of the contract, but the
employer's experience with the union caused him to fear that a
strike would occur later during his peak repair season. The employer
felt that such a strike would do serious harm to his business. The
contract expired during the employer's "off" season, and, by laying
off his employees and shutting off his operation the employer took
advantage of an opportunity to deny the initiative to the union. 10
In holding that the employer had not violated the statute, the
Court gave careful consideration to the importance of antiunion
animus in violations of 8(a) (1)" and 8(a) (3).12 While admitting

that some acts are so damaging to legitimate employee interests that
inquiry into actual motivation is unnecessary, the court stated that in
most cases an affirmative showing of antiunion animus is required.'3
Moreover, the Court agreed that the employer's action discriminated
against the employees and to some extent interferred with the exercise of their rights under the act. Nevertheless, the Court did not
feel that the discrimination or the interference with employee rights
was sufficient to label the activity an unfair labor practice absent a
showing of antiunion purpose.14
0 380 U.S. 300 (1965).

388 U.S. 26 (1967).

U.S. 375 (1967).
o The Court also seems less concerned with employer motivation under
section 8(a) (5). See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), where the Court
states that affirmative showing of a failure of subjective good faith is unnecessary in making out a charge of refusal to bargain.
Ship Bldg,!;f1o. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 303-4 (1965).
"'American
1
2 1 d. at 305.
2
1 Id. at 308.
13
Id. at 311.
8389

14Id.
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The lines of the controversy over employer intent are drawn
with particular clarity by the concurring opinions. Three members
of the Court reject the majority's contention that an affirmative
showing of antiunion animus is necessary under section 8(a) (3)
unless the activity complained of is "inherently destructive" of important employee rights. 5 One concurring opinion would eliminate
consideration of employer intent or motivation and rely completely
on the test of whether the legitimate business interests of the employer justify his interference with employee rights.1"
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,Incorporated, 7 the employer
allowed strike breakers and replacements to collect accrued vacation
benefits on the same basis as would have been allowed under the
expired contract, while at the same time denying accrued vacation
benefits to strikers. There was no finding that the employer acted
with an antiunion purpose, intending his action to discourage the
strikers' activity.' 8 After carefully reviewing the Supreme Court's
reasoning in American Ship Building, the circuit court held that the
employer's activity was not so destructive of employee interests as
to make inquiry into motivation unnecessary. Thus, the court held
that the Board had erred in finding a violation of 8(a) (1) or (3)
without making an affirmative showing of antiunion animus.'0
The Supreme Court reversed. Though purporting merely to review cases involving antiunion motivation in order to distill a general rule, the Court apparently reconsidered the reasoning of American Ship Building:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important
employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed
and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that conduct was motivated by business
considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory
conduct on employee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate
and sub20
stantial business justification for his conduct.
8
" Id. at 323
Brown, 380 U.S.
v. Erie Resistor,
18380 U.S. at

1¢NLRB
18
Id. at
19

20

(concurring opinion of White, J.); compare NLRB v.
278 (1964) (dissenting opinion of White, J.), with NLRB
373 U.S. 221 (1963).
340 (concurring opinion of Goldberg and Warren, JJ.).

v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967.)

34.
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 363 F.2d 130 (1966).
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Under this rule, the employer has the burden of showing that
he was motivated by business considerations whenever he is found
to have engaged in discriminatory activity "which could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent ....-'2 Dissenting,
Mr. Justice Harlan points out that this reasoning is a considerable
deviation from that of American Ship Buildding.2
In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Company,2" the union lost an
economic strike. Due to cutbacks in the work schedule and the hiring
of some permanent replacements, the employer was not immediately
able to rehire all the strikers who wished to return to their jobs. It
was shown that the employer had every intention of returning to
pre-strike production levels as soon as possible. Six of the strikers
continued to be available for rehire. Several weeks later the employer filled the jobs formerly held by these employees with new
personnel. 24 The circuit court held that the right of the strikers to be
rehired must be determined at the time when the strike ends, and,
following American Ship Building, held that the employer's action
did not constitute an unfair labor practice absent a showing of antiunion motivation.25
The Supreme Court disagreed on both counts,2" and citing Great
Dane, stated that the facts were sufficient to sustain a finding of
unfair labor practice irrespective of the Court's holding as to -when
a striker looses his right to rehire.2 The Court found that the
workers in question were available at the time the employer filled
21Id.

"'Prior to today's decision, § 8(a) (3) violations could be grouped
into two general categories: those based on actions serving no legitimate
business purposes or actions inherently severely destructive of employee rights where improper motive could be inferred from the actions
themselves, and in the latter instance, even a legitimate business purpose could be held by the Board not to justify the employer's conduct; . . . and those not based on actions 'demonstrably so destructive
of employee rights and so devoid of significant service to a legitimate
business end,' where independent evidence evincing the employer's
antiunion animus would be required to find a violation.
Id. 2at 37.
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
2
1Id. at 377.
"' NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 366 F.2d 126 (1966). The circuit
court decided Fleetwood prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Great Dane.
.' Significantly, the Court commented on the issue of employer motivation
though it was unnecessary in reaching the majority's result. See NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 383 (1967) (concurring opinion of
Harlan, J.).
"' NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967).
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their jobs with new personnel. He could have rehired the strikers;
he did not. Nor did he give any justification for not rehiring them.
Under these facts the employer committed an unfair labor practice
and no inquiry into his motivation was necessary. The employer was
obliged to come forward with legitimate business justification for
his action. Only then would there have had to be an affirmative
showing of antiunion animus.
Thus, under GreatDane and Fleetwood Trailers, inquiry into the
employer's motivation is required only if (1) the activity complained of damages employee interests to a "comparatively slight"
degree, and (2) the employer comes forward with evidence of substantial business justification for the activity. Unfortunately this
rule does not completely close the door to confusion, and employers
may still be afforded opportunity to discriminate with impunity
against employees because of union activity, disguising discrimination with "legitimate business reasons."
. The semantic tangles and inconsistencies which consideration of motivation has produced are not very useful in establishing
unfair labor practice. No matter what is said about employer motivation, in the final analysis the business interests of the employer
must be balanced against the organizational and bargaining rights
of the employees. Nor is the balancing of conflicting interests anything new under the act. The Board has engaged in this balancing
process since its inception.
The objectionable feature of the Great Dane rule is the necessity
of determining whether the employer's conduct interferes with employee interests to a "substantial degree" or to a "comparatively
slight" degree before weighing the employer's economic interests
against the rights of the employees under the act. There is a better
and simpler rule. Alleged violations of section 8(a) (1) and (3)
can be grouped into two categories: (1) those activities which are
so inherently harmful to employee interests that no economic justification is sufficient to redeem them, and (2) those activities where,
once the employer has come forward with legitimate economic justification for his action, it is appropriate to balance the economic
justification of the employer against the conflicting rights of the
employees. Problematical attempts to produce evidence of the employer's state of mind or subjective intent would be completely unnecessary.

DONALD W. CARSON

1968]

NLRB

Labor Law-Extension of the Discretionary Jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 gives to the
National Labor Relations Board power to assert jurisdiction over
any question of representation or any unfair labor practice "affecting [interstate] commerce."' The Act further provides:
[t]he Board, in its discretion, may . ..

decline to assert juris-

diction over any labor dispute involving any class or category
of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of
such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial

to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction ....

2

The Board in Flatbush General Hospital,3 decided in 1960, de-

clined to assert jurisdiction over private hospitals. Had it been so
inclined the Board could have properly done so, but it felt that the
operation was "essentially local in nature and therefore, the effect
on commerce ... is not substantial enough to warrant the exercise
of . . . jurisdiction." 4 The Board also felt that if labor disputes

arose in private hospitals the states would step in and regulate such
disputes.
5
the Board reexamined its position
In Butte Medical Properties

with respect to private hospitals and overruled Flatbush. It adopted
a new standard by which jurisdiction will be asserted over private
hospitals which receive at least 250,000 dollars in annual gross
revenue. The Board found
that the considerations bearing on .

.

. the jurisdictional deter-

mination in this industry have markedly changed since the Flat'Labor Management Relations Act §§ 9(c) (1) (B), 10(a), 29 U.S.C.
cited as Taft-Hartley].
§§ 159(c)(1)(B), 160(a) (1964) [hereinafter
'Taft-Hartley § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1964) (emphasis
added). The term "labor dispute" includes questions of representation as

well as unfair labor practices. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1086, 1093 (1960).

*126 N.L.R.B. 144 (1960).
"Id. at 145. Until 1960 the Board had asserted jurisdiction over private
hospitals in only three situations:
where the hospital was located in the District of Columbia, where
the operations of the hospital vitally affected national defense, and
where the hospital was an integral part of the establishment whose
operations met the Board's jurisdictional standards.
Id.
, 168 N.L.R.B. No. 52, 66 L.R.R.M. 1259 (1967).
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bush decision and that it will effect the policies of the Act to
assert . .. discretionary jurisdiction over .

.

. [this] Employer

as well as over proprietary hospitals generally. 6

In refusing to follow Flatbush the Board considered several
factors which indicate the impact of the operation of private hospitals on interstate commerce. The Board pointed out that there
are about 970 private hospitals in 44 states in the United States
and they constitute one of the country's largest industries; that personnel such as nurses, dieticians and therapists often must be recruited from other areas; that "there has been a substantial increase in the number of beds, admissions, census, personnel, payroll, assets and gross revenues .

. . ."

The Board enumerated the

purchase of supplies and equipment by all private hospitals and
noted the resulting significant effect on commerce. Impressive also
were the billions of dollars spent by 79.2 percent of Americans for
health insurance which results in substantial payments to hospitals,
as well as expenditures by the federal government on behalf of recipients of public health and welfare benefits. Similar factors were
involved in the simultaneous assertion of jurisdiction by the Board
over private nursing homes where the employer receives at least
100,000 dollars in annual gross revenue. 8
While the effect of an employer's operations on interstate commerce is a prime consideration in deciding whether or not to assert
jurisdiction in most cases, there is an area of the Board's discretionary jurisdiction where it is apparently of no consequence. Even
though an employer's operations may affect commerce and may
measure up to the Board's applicable jurisdictional dollar standards,9 the Board has not taken jurisdiction over nonprofit educational, research and charitable organizations "where the activities
involved are non-commercial in nature and intimately connected
with the . . . purposes and . . . activities of the institution." 10

This idea is conceptually known as the Columbia University doctrine'1 and has been applied in a long line of cases. 12 However, if the
666 L.RR.M.
* Id.at 1260.

at 1261.

8
University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 66 L.R.R.M.
1263 (1967).
9
8 (1958).
0 The standards can be found in 23 NLRB ANN. REP.(1951).
" Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427
229 NLRB ANN. RE'. 34 (1964).
" Horn & Hardart Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1368 (1965) (employer was cor-
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enterprise, even though a nonprofit educational, charitable or research organization, has activities commercial in nature jurisdic13
tion will be asserted.
There is a considerable doubt as to the propriety of the Board's
view in this matter. In so holding, the Board very early in the course
of its opinions in this area pointed to the Conference Report on the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 wherein it is stated:
[t]he nonprofit organizations [other than nonprofit hospitals]
excluded under the House bill are not specifically excluded in
the conference agreement, for only in exceptional circumstances
and in connection with purely commercial activities of such
organizations have any of the activities of such organizations
poration operating food service facilities in a hospital); Massachusetts
Institute of Tech., 152 N.L.R.B. 598 (1965) (employer was data processing
research laboratory operated by a university); Prophet Co., 150 N.L.R.B.
1559 (1965) (employer was nationwide food service enterprise operating
University dining facilities); Iowa State Memorial Union, N.L.R.B. Admin.
Decis., 1964, 55 L.R.R.M. 1362 (1964) (employer was student union at a
college); University of Miami, 146 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1964) (employer was
a university division operating three ocean-going vessels for courses and
research); Crotty Bros., N.Y., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 755 (1964) (employer
managed food service facilities on a college campus); Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 146 N.L.R.B. 20 (1964) (employer was community service organization); Sheltered Workshops, 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960) (employer
provided work rehabilitation for handicapped persons); Lutheran Church,
Mo. Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954) (employer was a radio station operated
by religious organization); Armour Research Foundation, 107 N.L.R.B. 1052
(1954) (employer was engaged in research in conjunction with a university); Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424 (1952) (employer was
university; union was seeking to represent clerical employees in library).
'" Bay Ran Maint. Corp., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 74, 63 L.R.R.M. 1345 (1966)
(employer provided cleaning and maintenance services for hospital); Maritime Advancement Programs, 152 N.L.R.B. 348 (1965) (employer created
to administer trust fund for training unlicensed seamen); Woods Hole
Oceanographic Inst., 143 N.L.R.B. 568 (1963) (employer operated oceangoing vessels to conduct marine research and teach oceanography); South
Bend Broadcasting Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 1166 (1956) (employer a university-owned corporation operating a radio and television station); Massachusetts Institute of Tech. (Lincoln Laboratory), 110 N.L.R.B. 1611 (1954)
(employer operated research facility in connection with university and
federal government); California Institute of Tech., 102 N.L.R.B. 1402
(1953) (employer operated research facilities under university auspices
in conjunction with private industries); Kennecott Copper Corp., 99
N.L.R.B. 748 (1952) (employer was hospital and dispensary maintained by
copper company for employees); Sunday School Board of S. Baptist Cony.,
92 N.L.R.B. 801 (1950) (employer published and distributed religious
literature); Port Arthur College, 92 N.L.R.B. 152 (1950) (employer was
a radio station operated by a college); General Elec. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1247
(1950) (employer was hospital operated by G.E. for employees and families) ;
Illinois Institute of Tech., 81 N.L.R.B. 201 (1949) (employer was collegeoperated research foundation for industry and government).
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or their employees been considered as affecting commerce so
as to 4bring them within the scope of the National Labor Relations
Act.'
The Board takes this language as providing a "guide," if not a
"mandate," and as approval of the Board's practice prior to the
legislation in 1947." The language of the Conference Report seems
only to indicate approval of the Board's practice of not taking jurisdiction when the activities of the organization are not considered
to affect commerce. It is not at all clear from the language that the
Board should refuse to assert jurisdiction if the activities of educational, charitable and research organizations do in fact affect commerce. Whether or not the Board has properly interpreted the Conference Report, the questionability as to the nonassertion of jurisdiction over these organizations remains.
It is freely admitted by the Board that activities of educational,
10
charitable or research organizations may and do affect commerce.
This being so, it is difficult to ascertain why jurisdiction should not
be asserted in light of the purpose and policy of the Act "to promote
the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both
employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce,
...and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor
disputes affecting commerce.' 7 These organizations buy goods and
services and often sell services ;:" they hire employees as well. Any
of these would be difficult to accomplish today without affecting
interstate commerce. The sheer number of cases where the Board
refused to assert jurisdiction indicates the substantial impact on commerce resulting from the activities over which the Board will not
assert jurisdiction.'"
"IH. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947), cited in 1

N.L.R.B.,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS

AcT, 1947, at 505, 536 (1948).
1 Trustees of Columbia Univ., 97 N.L.R.B. 424, 427 (1951).
26
University of Miami, 146 N.L.R.B. 1448, 1450 (1964).
'7Taft-Hartley § 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964).
" Crotty Bros., N.Y., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 755 (1964). In this case a nonprofit educational institution hired a corporation to manage its food service
facilities. The corporation was in the business of providing food service
management for educational, hospital and business establishments in several
states. Jurisdiction was not taken. The case was followed in Prophet Co.,
150 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1965).
1 Note 12 supra. Twelve cases are cited. Further implications as to the
effect on interstate commerce can be drawn from the application of these
cases to organizations similar to those in the cited cases. For instance there
are many organizations in the United States associated with the Young
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It might be argued that these nonprofit charitable, educational
and research organizations with primarily noncommercial activities perform functions that may otherwise have to be performed by
the government, either local, state or national, and that, therefore,
they should not be subjected to the regulation in labor disputes
since government activities are not. However, recent labor strife
concerning teachers, nurses and sanitation workers illustrate the
very definite need in these areas for regulation of labor disputes.
Work stoppages in the governmental sector jumped from 42 involving 12,000 workers in 1965 to 142 involving 105,000 workers
in 1966.20 Further, there is some question as to whether the governments should or even would operate some of the activities engaged in by some of the organizations over which the Board refused
to assert jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the Board should take jurisdiction over these
organizations, and, that, despite the Board's interpretation of the
Conference Report, it is perfectly free to do so. If necessary the
Congress should consider empowering the Board to do so.
PENDER R. McEELROY

Pleadings-Limitations on the Reply
In Davis v. North Carolina State Highway Commission,1 the
North Carolina Supreme Court echoed a long standing notion about
the nature of the reply, which merits examination in light of the
proposed changes in the state's rules of civil procedure, as well as
present practice. The complaint in Davis stated that the state highway commission had taken plaintiff's property on January 14, 1965,
when in fact it was not needed at that time. It was further alleged
that the taking was accomplished by means of false representations,
with intent to deceive plaintiffs and force them out before their
departure was necessary. Included was a prayer for 50,000 dollars
actual and 1,000,000 dollars punitive damages.2
Defendants moved to strike the portions of the complaint alleg-

Men's Christian Association; there are many nonprofit research foundations
universities.
associated with colleges andCENSUS,
STATISTICAL
1o U.S. BUREAU OF THE
STATES 249 (88th Ed. 1967).

-271 N.C. 405, 156 S.E.2d 685 (1967).
2 Id. at 406-07, 156 S.E.2d at 686-87.

ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
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ing false representations and asking for punitive damages. In their
answer, defendants admitted taking the property on January 14,
1965, and stated that they had deposited 15,500 dollars as their
estimate of the value of the property.' Plaintiffs filed a reply stating
that the property had actually been taken on April 24, 1967. They
alleged that defendants had pretended to take it on January 14, 1965,
pursuant to a scheme to induce them to leave so that the property
would deteriorate in value during the interim. Claiming they had
been defrauded out of the use of the property for two years, plaintiffs prayed for damages based on the fair market value of the
property on April 24, 1967, which they alleged to be 45,000 dollars.
The portions of the complaint pertaining to fraud and punitive
damages and the entire reply were ordered stricken. The trial court
held that the only issue to be tried was that of the value of the
property on January 14, 1965. From this ruling plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed. 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that since both the
allegations of the complaint and the reply were grounded in variations of intentional tort, the highway commission was clearly immune from suit under the state Tort Claims Act.! By way of dictum
the court stated that, even if the reply was sufficient to state a cause
of action, it was properly stricken because the reply is a defensive
pleading and the cause of action must be stated in the complaint.'
Plaintiffs often have to contend with the problem of anticipatory
pleading in the complaint versus new affirmative matter in the reply.
Dicta such as that found in the principal case tend to perpetuate the
problem. It is said that "[t]he purpose of the reply is to deny such
allegations of the answer as plaintiff does not admit and to meet new
matter set up in the answer .... [i]t must be limited to an admission

7
or denial of the new matter set up in the answer."
Apparently, the two principal errors which the North Carolina
courts find in replies are (1) inconsistency with the complaint and

rd. at 407, 156 S.E.2d at 686-87.
'Id. at 407, 156 S.E.2d at 687.
5N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1963). Plaintiffs clearly lost the case on
3

the basis of this statute, and not the ruling on the reply. The commission
is only liable for negligence, and is not subject to suit except as provided
in the act. Ayscue v. Highway Comm'n, 270 N.C. 100, 153 S.E.2d 823 (1967),
Nello L. Teer Co. v. Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C. 1, 143 S.E.2d 247 (1965),
Midgett v. Highway Comm'n, 265 N.C. 373, 144 S.E.2d 121 (1965).
:271 N.C. 405, 409, 156 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1967).
Spain v. Brown, 236 N.C. 355, 357, 72 S.E.2d 918, 919 (1952).
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(2) attempts to state a cause of action, rather than to reply to allegations of new matter in the answer. Such inconsistency is forbidden in North Carolina by statute,' and there is sufficient judicial
interpretation of the term to give meaning to the prohibition. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has held that inconsistency means
that the complaint and reply are contrary to one another, so that one
is necessarily false if the other is true.' Plaintiff's new matter may
be totally unconnected with the complaint as long as it is responsive
10
to defendant's answer.
The court in Davis made no mention of inconsistency. However, the facts of the case indicate that such an argument could
certainly have been made, since the complaint and the reply contained
conflicting allegations as to the date of the taking of plaintiffs'
property. Inconsistency has been found in instances where it was
not as clearly apparent as in Davis. In Miller v. Grimsley," plaintiff, suing defendant for cutting timber on plaintiff's land, admitted
in the complaint that his deed had reserved a portion of the land
to the use of defendant and described that portion to some extent.
When defendant answered setting up the deed, plaintiff's reply,
stating that the reservation in the deed was too vague for any purpose, was stricken as inconsistent? 2 Inconsistency as to theory of
the cause of action, however, is apparently permissible. The court
found no inconsistency in Berry v. Hyde Land & Lumber Company"
where the complaint alleged that defendant's canal blocked plaintiff's
ingress and egress (tort). Defendant answered that he had a contract with plaintiff to dig the canal. Plaintiff replied that the canal
was not dug according to the terms of the agreement (contract).
It is much easier to determine the boundaries of consistency, however, than it is to tell when a reply has lost the defensive character
deemed essential by the North Carolina courts. A most striking
contrast to the principal case came in Gilliam FurnitureIncorporated
v. Bentwood Incorporated.4 Here plaintiff brought suit on a note,
claiming defendant had guaranteed it. Defendant answered that
the alleged guarantee was made to "save face" for one of the com8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-141 (1953).
o Scott v. Jordan, 235 N.C. 244, 247, 69 S.E.2d 557, 560 (1952).
10 Boyette v. Vaughan, 79 N.C. 528, 530 (1878).
11220 N.C. 514, 17 S.E.2d 642 (1941).
"2Id. at 515, 17 S.E.2d at 643-644.
183 N.C. 384, 111 S.E. 707 (1922).
14267 N.C. 119, 147 S.E,2d 612 (1966).
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pany's officers and that, being without consideration, it was of no
legal effect. Plaintiff replied that if the guarantee was not authorized, it was fraudulently executed. Plaintiff was later given leave
to add to his reply "certain additional facts" which he claimed to
be material to the controversy. The court made essentially the same
statement as in Davis about the necessity of alleging causes of action
in the complaint, but then proceeded to treat the reply as an amended
complaint, ordering the pleadings to be recast later.'" Also varying
somewhat from the holding in Davis was Bryan v. Acme Maimfacturing Company."' In an action to cancel notes due, the complaint
alleged delivery of useless cotton fertilizer instead of the desired
tobacco fertilizer. Defendant answered that cotton fertilizer was
ordered and included a copy of the order form. Plaintiff was allowed
to allege in his reply, not only fraud in procuring the order, but
also misbranding of the product in violation of a statute. This was
held merely to amplify the complaint.17 It could be said that plaintiff
in Davis should have been entitled under Furniture Company to
have his "certain additional facts" concerning the alleged later taking
and scheme to be treated also by the court as an amended complaint.
It is also arguable that the allegations that these same events, which
occurred subsequent to the original complaint, should be construed
as merely amplifying the complaint as in Bryan.
Even after the adoption of the proposed new rules of civil procedure in North Carolina, plaintiffs will have to contend with a
degree of uncertainty about what is to be allowed in the reply and
whether their errant replies will be stricken or simply treated as
amended complaints. The question is whether the matter is not
really one of form rather than substance. The statutory provision
which grants judges power to permit amendment of any pleading
at any stage 8 and the North Carolina Supreme Court's statement
-- Id. at 121, 147 S.E.2d at 614. See also Every v. Every, 265 N.C. 506,
144 S.E.2d 603 (1965) where no defects were found although plaintiff's
complaint alleged domestic difficulties as grounds for alimony and in reply
to defendant's defense of a separation agreement she alleged fraud and want
of consideration.
209 N.C. 720, 184 S.E. 471 (1936). See also the earlier case of Winstead v. Acme Mfg. Co., 207 N.C. 110, 176 S.E. 304 (1934) where the same
attorney for the plaintiff, against the same defendant got into difficulty with
his pleading
and was not even allowed to amend his complaint.
7
" Bryan v. Acme Mfg. Co., 209 N.C. 720, 722, 184 S.E. 471, 472 (1936).

" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-163 (1953).
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that such power is inherent even in the absence of statute 9 support
the desirability and propriety of denominating all new affirmative
matter in the reply as an amendment to the complaint.
The proposed new rules limit the scope of the problem considerably since a reply is only allowed in response to a counterclaim
denominated as such, or when ordered by the court.2" Thus, unless
the courts hold contrary to the apparent intention of the new rules,
the number of instances when plaintiff may run afoul of North
Carolina restrictions on the reply will be sharply reduced. Noting,
however, that under the new rules, the complaint may contain claims
which are alternative, inconsistent, or unrelated, 2 the striking of
the reply as not being defensive seems to find even less justification.
WILLIAM

S.

GEIMER

Taxation-Reintroduction of the Premium Payment Plan?
In Revenue Ruling 67-4631 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has taken the position that when a husband transfers all incidents of ownership of an insurance policy to his wife more than
three years prior to his death, but continues to pay the premiums
until his death, the premiums paid within the -last, three years are
paid in contemplation of death and represent a transfer of an interest in the policy. The interest transferred is measured by the
proportion the amount of premiums so paid bears to the total amount
of premiums paid; therefore, the proportionate value of the insurance bought by these premiums is includible in his gross estate
under section 2035.2 Arguably, this ruling is a reintroduction of the.
old "premium payment" plan rejected by Congress in 1954.
In making this ruling, the Commissioner could have taken two

"'Gilliam Furniture Inc. v. Bentwood Inc., 267 N.C. 119, 120, 147 S.E.2d
612,"613
(1966).
PROPOSED N.C. RuLEs CIv. PROc. 7(a) (1967).
"'PROPOSED N.C. RULES CIV. PROC. 8(e) (1967).
'Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967 IN'T. REv. BULL. No. 52, at 15.
2
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035. For example, if A buys an insurance
policy worth one hundred thousand dollars and pays eight thousand dollars
in premiums over a four year period, with six thousand dollars being paid
over the last three years prior to death, the Commissioner would include in
his gross estate three-fourths of the value of the policy or seventy-five
thousand dollars, and not the six thousand paid for the premiums,
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other positions . He might have included the entire proceeds of
the policy in decedent's estate on the theory that the payment of
the last premium kept alive the right to receive the proceeds upon
death. Or he could have included in the taxable estate only the
amount of the premium payments actually made by the decedent
within the three year period. However, the Commissioner chose the
third alternative, ruling that "unlike the unrestricted gift of money,
a premium payment is a gift of insurance protection, a transfer of
an interestin the policy."' 4 The Revenue Ruling's position is contrary
to that in Lamade v. Brownell.5 The two fact situations seem indistinguishable. The court in Lamade holds that where the insured has
absolutely assigned the policy to his wife, having never exercised
any incidents of ownership in the policy, the proceeds are not includible in his gross estate even though the insured had paid premiums
on it for the two years immediately prior to his death. The court
said that "the payment of premiums on said policy by the decedent
for the two years immediately prior to his death was by way of
gift.",6
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 changed the then existing
law and provided in Section 2042' that the sole test for determining
whether proceeds, not payable to the executor, are includable in the
decedent's estate is whether the decedent retained any of the incidents of ownership in the policy at his death." The congressional
intent was to place life insurance on a par with other property,
which may be given away free from estate tax if not made in contemplation of death or in violation of the other inter vivos transfer sections. It was felt by the majority of members of the House
Ways and Means Committee that to discriminate against life
insurance was unjustified, in that it should be the nature of the dis*Moses, Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts Can Be Attractive Estate
Planning Toot, 18 J. TAXATION 206, 211 (1963).
'Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 52, at 15.
'245 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Pa. 1965). Cited with approval in United
States v. Rhode Island Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 12 n.4 (1st Cir. 1966).
6245 F. Supp. at 697.
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
8
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2nd Sess. 90 (1954). The House Ways
and Means Committee said: "The bill (sec 2042) would make a basic change
by excluding life insurance proceeds from the taxable estate of the insured
unless at his death he possesses 'incidents of ownership' of the policy. Where
the insured gives away the beneficial interest in the policy, but pays the
premiums, the death benefits would no longer be taxed in his estate." Id. at
B 14.
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position rather than the property which determines the testamentary
character of the gift.9
Section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code, is not, of course,
the only section under which the proceeds of life insurance can be
included in the gross estate. Section 203510 treats a transfer of
the incidents of ownership within three years of death as being
in contemplation of death. However, the Revenue Ruling applies
where all the incidents of ownership of the policy itself are transferred more than three years before death. The only question bf
this Revenue Ruling is whether the money used to pay the premiums, admittedly transferred in contemplation of death, represents
more than the actual dollar amount of the premium.
The Commissioner cites several cases in support of his affirmative position. Chase National Bank v. United States" is cited for
the proposition that a "transfer" means more than the passing of
items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee, and
includes the transfer of property procured through expenditures
by the decedent which results in having it pass to another. The
court in this refund case was concerned with plaintiff's argument
that because the proceeds were payable from the insurance company
to the beneficiary, rather than directly from the insured, there was
nothing on which a transfer tax from the insured to the beneficiary
could be imposed. The crux of the argument centers on the word
directly. The court said that "the power to tax the privilege of transfer at death cannot be controlled by the mere choice ... of the par-

ticular methods by which his purpose is effected, so long as he retains control over those benefits."'" This case is distinguishable
from the Revenue Ruling, because it involves a complete transfer
of the policy in which the decedent has no control over the benefits
already transferred. The only property under his control is the
money used to pay the premiums.
' Id. The minority position is also stated in the Reports "But life insurance
is not like other property. It is inherently testamentary in nature. It is designed, in effect, to serve as a will, regardless of its investment features.
Where the insured has paid the premiums on life insurance for the purpose
of adding to what he leaves behind at his death for his beneficiaries, the insurance proceeds should certainly be included in his taxable estate." Id.
10 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
11278 U.S. 327 (1929). Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.

1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940), is cited for the same proposition.
22 278 U.S. at 338.
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Liebman v. Hassett,3 according to many writers, 14 constitutes
valid authority for the Commissioner's position in the Revenue
Ruling. The case involved an assignment of a policy by the decedent to his wife two years before his death, thus raising a presumption of a transfer "in contemplation of death." Since the assignee had paid the two premiums during the period between assignment and death, it was held that the face value of the policy
less the pro rata amount of insurance purchased with the two premiums paid by the assignee was to be included in the gross estate.
In anticipation of the position taken by the Commissioner in this
Revenue Ruling two writers 5 have already explored the differentiating factors between the Liebman situation and the rationale of the
present ruling. The most distinguishable factor is that in Liebman
the policy itself was transferred in contemplation of death. In the
Revenue Ruling the policy and all incidents of ownership were
transferred more than three years before death with only a premium payment being transferred in contemplation of death. Moreover, it is necessary to consider the word "transfer" as used in
Section 2035, which includes in the gross estate "property [except
real property situated outside of the United States] to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer . . . in contemplation of his death."' 6 The emphasis is on
a transfer of property made during decedent's life, and what is included is the value of the property which was the subject of the
inter vivos transfer. "Although the tax is to be measured by the
value of the transferred property as of the date of the donor's
death, this does not mean that, for the purpose of determining what
148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
"See W. WARREN & S. SURY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION
523 (1961 ed.) ; Mannheimer, Wheeler, Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance
By the Insured, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 260 (1954); Moses, Irrevocable Life Insurance Truists Can Be Attractive Estate Planning Tool,
18 J. TAXATION 206, 211 (1963); J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U., Spring 1962, 117,
131.
" Brown & Sherman, Payment of Premiums as Tratsfers in Contemplation of Death, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 790 (1962). The authors also point
out that even if there had been no assignment the same portion of the proceeds would have been excluded. The case was decided under the Revenue
Act of 1926, Sec. 302(g). This section made life insurance, payable to
named beneficiaries, taxable to the extent that it was "taken out" by the decedent. Under T.D. 5032, 36 TREAS. DEC. INT. REv. 15 (1941), "taken out"
meant
6 the extent decedent paid the premiums.
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
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property was transferred, the gifts should be regarded as having
been made as of the date of death."'17 It is arguable therefore that
if the decedent owns no part of the policy (having transferred all
incidents of ownership to the assignee more than three years before
death) the value of the gift should be determined by what property
is still under his control, i.e. the money used to pay the premiums.
Reinforcing this argument is the expressed wish of Congress to
eliminate the payment of premium plan in section 2042 of the 1954
Code,' s and the fact that Liebman is a 1943 decision. Whether
Liebman should be considered good authority in a contemplation of
death case, even if it were on "all fours," is questionable in view of
the 1954 changes in section 2042. It seems reasonable to assume
that Congress intended to eliminate the payment of premium test
altogether, considering the expressed purpose of the Committee to
treat insurance like any other property. If decedent transfers income producing property, the taxability of the income depends on
whether the transferor completely divested himself of all interests in
the property, and if he did, the income is not taxable to him. 9
Similarly, the increased value of the policy should not be taxed to him
because he has completely transferred all incidents of ownership.
The recent case of Scott v. Commissioner"° is cited by the Commissioner as holding that upon the husband's death, the proportionate part of the proceeds of the policy attributable to his payment
of the premiums is includible in his gross estate. The facts show
that decedent and his wife owned the policies as community property
under California law. The wife predeceased her husband and bequeathed to her sons her one-half community interest in policies
on his life. After her death, the husband paid premiums on the
policies, and the court held that the proportionate part represented
by his payment of premiums was includible in his estate. 21
McGhee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1958).
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d CONG. 2d SEss. 90 (1954).

See Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1964); Jacob Gidwitz, 14 T.C. 1263
(1950) af'd, 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952); James E. Frizzel, 9 T.C. 979
(1947), aff'd on reconsideration, 11 T.C. 576 (1948), aff'd 177 F.2d 739
(5th Cir. 1949).
F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
The regulations since 1949 have stated that in determining whether or
not a decedent possessed any incidents of ownership in a policy, regard must
be given to the effect of the state or applicable law upon the terms of the
policy. Thus, California property law must be consulted to determine
whether incidents of ownership are possessed in an insurance policy purchased with community funds. See R. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
20374

21
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California cases clearly hold that such insurance contracts may be
separate property, community property, or mixed, depending upon
the source of the premium payments. 22 Thus, to the extent of determining whether a policy is community property the premium
payment test is preserved. This is quite different from the Revenue
Ruling in that the question is not the determination of a community
property interest, but whether the transfer involved more than
the actual money given in contemplation of death.
The issue facing the Commissioner involved the basic determination of exactly what property interest the payment of a premium
represented. As stated by the Supreme Court, the estate tax "extends to the creation, exercise, acquisition, or relinquishment of any
power or legal privilege which is incident to the ownership of property."23 Basic to a transfer is the transmission from one to another
of an interest in property. The interest must be capable of existing
and must be one which is in fact transferred.2 4 If the interest exists, then a determination of some value on the interest should be
possible. To find the fair market value of a property interest at the
decedent's death the test is to put oneself in the position of a potential purchaser of the interest at that time.2" It is submitted that a
purchaser would give little for the "interest" decedent had in the
policy for the three years prior to death. He had transferred all
incidents of ownership and therefore had no control over the property which was in the hands of the recipient.2"
It is hoped that the reasoning of the Lamade case, combined
with the expressed intent of Congress, will be followed when Revenue
Ruling 67-463 is litigated. To find for the Commissioner would be
a reintroduction of the payment of premium test, at least in spirit.
This test was abandoned by Congress in 1954 and should not be
reestablished by judicial interpretation of section 2035. If the result
advocated by the Revenue Ruling is desirable, then section 2035
or section 2042 should be amended by Congress to reflect such a
desire.

JAMES M. MILES

1-33 (2d ser. 1938). See also Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933); Gettman23v. Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817 (Dist. Ct. 1948).
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945).
"' Eleanor A. Bradford, 34 T.C. 1059, 1064 (1960).
TAXATION
(1938).
22

2"

United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962).

But see Walter v. United States, 341 F.2d 182 (6th Cir. 1965).
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Taxation-The Tax Benefit Rule of Perry Overruled
In Alice Phelan Sullivan Corporationv. United States' taxpayer,
a California corporation, received two parcels of land, each of which
it had previously donated and claimed as a charitable deduction.'
The first donation, valued at 4,243.49 dollars, was made in 1939;
the second, valued at 4,463.44 dollars, was made in 1940. Under
the tax rates applicable in those years,' the claimed deductions
resulted in an aggregate tax benefit of 1,877.49 dollars to taxpayer.
The conveyances, however, were made subject to the condition that
the realty be used either for religious or educational purposes. In
1957 the donee decided not to use the property and therefore reconveyed it to taxpayer. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
characterizing the reconveyances as taxable at the 1957 corporate
rate,4 included in taxpayer's gross income the amount of 8,706.93
dollars-the value of the charitable deductions previously claimed
and allowed.6 Relying on Perry v. United States,7 taxpayer paid
and sued for refund s in the Court of Claims on the theory that
the reconveyances constituted a return of capital' and that a proper
assessment could require no more than payment to the government
of the tax benefit originally obtained.Y0 The court held that recovery
'381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
'See
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170.
8 The corporate tax rate in 1939 was 18 per cent; in 1940, 24 per cent.
'The applicable corporate tax rate in 1957 was 52 per cent.
'This resulted in a deficiency assessment of 4,527.60 dollars.
Gross income normally includes only the amount of the previous deduction regardless of any increase in value. See Buck Glass Co. v. Hofferbert, 176 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. First State Bank,
168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948); Crabb v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 772 (5th
Cir. 1941); Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
"160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958). In this case taxpayers in 1944, 1945,
1946, 1947, and 1948 made charitable gifts of cash and securities to a town
for the purpose of constructing an addition to a library. Taxpayers deducted the appropriate amount from their gross income each year. In 1953
the gifts were returned to taxpayers. It was held that taxpayers should
have added to their income tax the amount by which their income taxes in
previous years had been decreased.
'The amount of the refund sought was 2,650.11 dollars.
' See Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 271 (Ct. Cl. 1958), in
which the court stated: "As stated, the return to the taxpayer of the property
he had tried to give away cannot possibly be considered as income-he
merely got back his own property."
""That is, 1,877.49 dollars instead of the Commissioner's assessment of
4,527.60 dollars,
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of charitable contributions for which full tax benefit had been enjoyed is properly classified as income taxable at the current rate
at the time of recovery. The Perry decision, with its new tax
benefit rule, 1 was expressly overruled.' However, Judge Collins,
even though writing the opinion for the court, criticized the holding.'3 Upon examination of the law and scrutiny of the court's
reasoning, it is justifiable to conclude that the decision is more
14
legally correct than equitably just.

The recovery of charitable contributions removes the equitable
basis' 5 upon which previous deductions were taken. The rule re-7
16
quiring taxation of such recoveries or an appropriate adjustment
in favor of the government is necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of a taxpayer and to offset the tax benefit of deductions
which subsequent facts have rendered unwarranted.'
Recoveries
have been taxed as income under the theory that since deducted
items result in the non-taxation of a part of gross income, these
'The Perry Case set forth what has been called the "new tax benefit
rule" or the "tax dollar benefit rule." That is, a taxpayer who recovers
gifts is required to add to his income tax in the year of recovery no more
than the amount of taxes saved in prior years due to charitable contribution
deductions. See 33 TuL. L. Rxv. 247 (1959).
"2Concluding its opinion, the court says:
Since taxpayer in this case did obtain full tax benefit from its earlier
deductions, those deductions were properly classified as income upon
recoupment and must be taxed as such. This can mean nothing less
than the application of that tax rate which is in effect during the year
in which the recovered item is recognized as a factor of income.
381 F.2d 399, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
"In the words of judge Collins,
This opinion represents the views of the majority and compiles with
existing law and decisions. However, in the writer's personal opinion,
it produces a harsh and inequitable result. Perhaps, it exemplifies a
situation 'where the letter of the law killeth; the spirit giveth life.'
Id. at 403, n.5.
1, In the instant case, the court says of Perry that "it achieved a result
which was more equitably just than legally correct." Id. at 403.
13 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170.
'6 See Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946);
Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), aff'd sub liom.
Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 658 (1940).
1? See Perry v United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
18 See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129, 176
(1943).
19 See National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 875 (9th
Cir. 1940); Estate of Collins, 46 B.T.A. 765 (1942). But see, Helvering
v. State-Planters Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1942), where
another theory relying on estoppel or implied waiver is set forth.
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items when recovered must stand in the place of the gross income
which previously escaped taxation.' " The lack of adequate statutory
20
treatment of recoveries, however, has lead to extensive litigation.
The only exception to the taxation of recoveries is found in
the equitable tax benefit rule"' whereby recovered items may be
excluded from income so long as their previous deduction did not
provide a tax saving.2" Initially, the rule was not accepted unanimously, some courts adopting the view that a recovery of a deducted
item is includible in taxable income regardless of whether the deduction resulted in a tax benefit.23 However, the tax benefit rule
achieved limited statutory recognition in 1942.4 Moreover, its
overall equitable policy was guaranteed expanded recognition by
the Supreme Court in Dobson v. Commissioner.5 Today the tax

benefit rule has been broadened by both the Internal Revenue Code
of 195426 and by the Income Tax Regulations.2 7 The goal of the
2
tax benefit rule has been regarded as commendable by both courts 1
and writers.2 9
In denying taxpayer's claim in the instant case the court rightly
determined that the present regulations on the tax benefit rule controlled the tax consequences of the recovery of charitable contributions.3" The principle applies not only to bad debts, prior taxes and
20
For collected cases see 1 J. MERTENS 1962 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§§ 7.34-7.37.
2
See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).

22 See Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Related Problems, 20 TAXEs 473
(1942) ; Plumb, The Tax Benefit Ride Today, 57 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1943);
33 TUL. L. REv. 247 (1959); 44 VA. L. REv. 639 (1958).
"'See Commissioner v. United States & Int'l Sec. Corp., 130 F.2d
894 (3d Cir. 1942), modified, 138 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1943).
2
INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 22(b) (12), added by 56 STAT. 812 (1942).
only bad debts, prior taxes and delinquency amounts.
applied
The2320
statute
U.S.
489 to
(1943).
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 111. See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
1016(a) (2), which makes the tax benefit rule applicable to excessive deductions based upon wear and tear, amortization, obsolescence and depletion.
2 TREAs. REG., § 1.111-1 (1956).
"8See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); California Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
" See Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federaf Income
Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confwsion, 14 TAx L. REv. 225, 252 (1959),
where it is said: "The role of the tax-benefit doctrine as an approach to
taxability in the cancellation of indebtedness area has been far from clear.

As a general proposition, the theory seems logical and fair. . .

."

See also

Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Related Problems, 20 TAXES 473 (1942);
Plumb, The Tax Benefit Ride Today, 57 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1943).
The court said:
Drawing our attention to the broad language of this regulation
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delinquency amounts, 3 but also "to all other losses, expenditures, and
accruals made the basis of deductions from gross income for prior taxable years."32 In applying the principle the court rejected taxpayer's
argument that the reconveyances represented merely the return of
capital. In doing so it relied upon the authority of numerous cases3"
and also the reasoning expressed in the dissenting opinion of the
Perry case to the effect that "[h]aving been written off, the later
realization of the claim was, again for tax purposes, like a windfall
to the taxpayer, and within the broad definition of taxable income." 4
But for the fact that taxpayer deducted the value of the contributions
from his gross income, it is difficult to see why the return to taxpayer
5 In any event, the label
of property he had given away is income.Y
placed on the reconveyances should not be controlling as to the
equitable tax consequences.
The primary point of controversy between the government and
taxpayer arises because the tax benefit statute 8 and the income tax
regulations 37 are silent as to the tax rate applicable to recoveries.3 8
Taxpayer suggested that the fair solution would be to add the
amount of tax saved in previous years due to the gift deductions
to its tax for the year in which the property was returned. Thus,
the precise amount of the tax benefit enjoyed would be restored to
the government.39 This equitable solution was rejected by the court
[TREAs. REG., § 1.111-1], the Government insists that the present recovery must find its place within the scope of the regulation and, as

such, should be taxed in a manner consistent with the treatment provided for like items of recovery, i.e., that it be taxed at the rate prevailing in the year of recovery. We are compelled to agree.
381 F.2d 399, 402 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
" INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 111.
"2 TREAS. REG. § 1.111-1 (1956).
" Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946);
California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 235
(Ct. Cl. 1962); Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d
932 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ; Estate of Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939),
aff'd sub norn. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940).
"5 Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270, 273 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
1d.
I at 271.
"See note 32 supra.
' See note 27 supra.
28 See definition of "recovery exclusion" in

INT.

REV.

CODE

of 1954, §

111(b) (4).
"9For a good discussion, see Pavenstedt, The United States Court of
Clai4s as a Forum for Tax Cases, 15 TAx L. Rnv. 201 (1960).
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on the ground that it exceeded the legal limits of both statutory
and judge-made law.4" In arriving at its decision to tax the recoveries at the current rate in the year of recovery, the court relied
upon such policy considerations as annual accounting, 41 the statute
of limitations, 42 general administrative ease,43 and the lack of judicial
power to legislate. 44 Strong as these policy considerations are, they
should not outweigh the need for justice. The court's interpretation
of the present tax benefit rule necessarily promotes injustice.4 ' The
recoveries, for example, may come in a year of high income so that
the taxpayer pays a much greater tax on the recoveries than he
saved by the deductions. Also, the recoveries may come in years
when tax rates have increased. Moreover, the inclusion in one year
of deductions taken in several years inevitably pushes the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket. 6 This is not to say, however,
that the present tax benefit rule cannot work in favor of the taxpayer 47 although the odds are against it. To remedy this injustice
the taxpayer could file an amended return for the year in which
"oSee Bird v. United States, 241 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1957); Friehofer
Baking Co. v. Commissioner, 151 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1945); Boehm v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1945); Ben Bimberg & Co., Inc. v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1942); Universal, Inc. v. Commissioner, 109
F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1940); National Forge & Ordnance Co. v. United States,
151 F. Supp. 937 (Ct. Cl. 1957); United States v. Detroit Moulding Corp.,
56 F. Supp. 754 (E.D. Mich. 1944); H. Sheldon Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
13 B.T.A. 1296 (1928); Birmingham Terminal Co. v. Commissioner, 17
T.C. 1011 (1951). See also S. SuRREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 538 (1960); J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.37
(1962); Rev. Rul. 59-141, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 17.
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 441. See also Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks
Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931), where the court said:
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce
revenue ascertainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it practicable to produce a regular
flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assessment, and collection capable of practical operation.
TNT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 6511.
I2
"See cases cited in note 40 supra.
""[T]he court cannot legislate and any change in the existing law
rests within the wisdom and discretion of the Congress." 381 F.2d 399, 403
(Ct. Cl. 1967).
" See Plumb, The Tax Benefit Ride Today, 57 HAumv. L. REv. 129, 176-

77 (1943).
"This, of course, is less likely in the case of a corporate taxpayer.
The taxpayer would benefit if the deduction was taken in a profitable
year, while the recovery came in a loss year or a year of low income or in a
year when tax rates were lower. See Inland Prod. Co v. Blair, 31 F.2d
867 (4th Cir. 1929).
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the deduction was
allowed thereby making a fair adjustment with
48
the government.
Although the remedy of an amended return would violate the
concepts of annual accounting and undoubtedly would cause some
administrative inconvenience, such drawbacks have never prevented
change.4 9 The tax benefit rule itself deviates from the concept of
annual accounting. 0 Congress, in the name of equity, has deviated
from the statute of limitations and annual accounting and has accepted administrative inconvenience by enacting provisions covering
the carryover-carryback of losses, 1 recoveries from unconstitutional
processing of taxes,52 inconsistently treated items, 53 and periods of
abnormally high income.5 4 To allow an amended return for recoveries of charitable contributions would be no greater departure.
If the court was correct in its holding that judicial legislation'5
cannot go as far as the taxpayer wished, it is submitted that Congress should reevaluate the tax benefit rule. Legislation granting
the taxpayer an option to account for the recovery of a charitable
contribution in the year of recovery or to file an amended return
for a previous year would not only achieve substantial justice,50 but
also would promote public policy by encouraging taxpayers to make
contributions to charity.5"
D. S. DUNIrE
" See, Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. REV. 129, 177
(1943).
4Id. at 178-79.
"0See Hearings Before House Ways and Means Committee on Revenue

Revision
of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. I, 80, 87-88 (1942).
1
See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 172(b).
11Id. § 1346.
r"Id. § 1311.
"Id. at 1301-1304.
"See Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1942),
where the court said:
Judicial legislation is one of the facts of life, an inescapable and necessary one. But courts may not, as legislatures may, roam at large,

confined only by the Constitution; their function, when dealing with

legislative legislation, does not go beyond that of filling in small gaps
left by the legislature-and to closing those gaps in accordance with
what appears to have been the legislative purpose.
" Although some may not agree that granting an option to the taxpayer

achieves substantial justice, this would be in accord with other sections of
the Code, such as section 1341.
"'For additional discussions of the tax benefit rule, see Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the FederalIncome Tax: A Problem of Creeping
Confusion, 14 TAx L. REv. 225 (1959); Lassen, The Tax Benefit Rule and
Related Problems, 20 TAXES 473 (1942); Pavenstedt, The United States

Court of Claims as a Forum for Tax Cases, 15 TAx L. REv. 201 (1960) ;
Plumb, The Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1943); 33
Tui. L. Rav. 247 (1959); 44 VA. L. REv. 639 (1958).
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Torts-Causal Relationship
The existence of a causal relationship between defendant's act
or omission and plaintiff's injury is an essential element in any
negligence action.' In Maharias v. Weathers Brothers Moving &
Storage Company2 defendant used a room in his warehouse for
refinishing furniture and had allowed rags soaked with inflammable liquid to accumulate in a corner. A fire started and spread to
plaintiff's adjoining building. Expert testimony showed that the
fire could have started by spontaneous combustion, but that it was
possible that it had started from any one of a number of sources.
The court affirmed a non-suit for insufficient evidence of the causal
relationship. There were three distinct possibilities. The fire could
have started (1) in the rags and from spontaneous combustion,
(2) in the rags but from an outside source, or (3) at another place
within the room and without fault on the part of the defendant. If
defendant's liability was to hinge on whether the fire actually
started in the rags, then perhaps the court was justified in refusing
to allow the case to go to the jury since there was no way to determine exactly where the fire started. However, even if this be the
case, it seems strongly arguable that the very fact that defendant
allowed a condition to exist which created a risk of fire should, in
itself, go far toward establishing the chain of causation. But why
should the point at which the fire started be determinative? In a
California case,' the defendant had stored large quantities of paint
The traditional test which courts have applied to determine whether
the causal relationship exists is the familiar "but for" rule-but for the
negligence the injury would not have occurred. Although this rule has not
gone without criticism, see, e.g., Green, The Causal Relationship Issue in

Negligence Law, 60 MicE. L. Rav. 543 (1962), it has been used effectively
in the great majority of the cases. However, in a limited number of cases
involving multiple causation the rule has proven inadequate, and courts
have formulated the "substantial factor" test-was defendant's negligence a
"substantial factor" in contributing to the plaintiff's injury? See Anderson
v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920),
where the fire set by defendant merged with a second fire from another
source. Either one, acting alone, would have produced the same result.
Obviously the "but for" rule would not impose liability, but the defendant's
negligence was a "substantial factor" in contributing to the loss. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
2257 N.C. 767, 127 S.E.2d 548 (1962).
' Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60, 285
P.2d 364 (1955).
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thinner on the premises. Even though he was not responsible for
the starting of the fire, the court held that the evidence was ample
to warrant the conclusion that the inflammable material contributed
substantially to the spread of the fire and increased the difficulty of
fighting it. It has been suggested that a similar approach could have
4
been taken in Maharias.
In the recent case of Phelps v. Winston-Salem' the city's agent
was the manager of a large building in which stalls were rented to
local produce dealers. One of the tenants had built a shed in which
he "cured" tomatoes. The roof of the shed was cluttered with
crates, paper, and other debris. The exhaust pipe from an oil
heater protruded through the roof and on a previous occasion had
started a small fire. The manager had never reported this incident,
nor had he taken steps to see that the combustibles were removed.
There was also evidence of several "pot-bellied" stoves being in the
building, and one tenant had been allowed to store cylinders of
ethylene gas. A nightwatchman first saw the fire "about two feet
over the top of the Blalock shed."' It was small, "something 'like
two feet high."'7 He barely had time to alert the other tenants before there was an explosion which spread the fire." Firemen arrived and seemed to have the situation under control when a second
explosion put the entire building in flames.' In affirming a non-suit
the court said that the jury should not be allowed to "speculate" on
the origin of the fire.10 The eyewitness testimony of the nightwatchman, together with other evidence, was more than adequate to
'See Note, Spreading Fires, Tenth Annual Survey of North Carolina

Case Law, 41 N.C.L. Rav. 521 (1963).
272 N.C. 24, 157 S.E.2d 719 (1967). Plaintiff also alleged that defen-

dant was negligent in failing to provide firefighting equipment. The court

held that lack of such equipment was not a causal factor because there was
nothing to show that the nightwatchman would have had time to use it.
Accord, Wainwright v. Jackson, 291 Mass. 100, 195 N.E. 896 (1935).
- 272 N.C. 24, 27, 157 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1967).
Record at 82: "the fire was very small ....

"

record at 89.

' Record at 83, 86.
'Record at 41.
"The court cited Maguire v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 154 N.C. 384, 70

S.E. 737 (1911), for the proposition that the plaintiff must prove the origin
of the fire. However, in Maguire the only evidence was that defendant's
train passed by two hours before the fire was discovered on plaintiff's adjoining land. Contrary to a statement in Phelps, there was insufficient evidence of a foul right-of-way. Other railroad cases where there was evidence
of a foul right-of-way held that defendant was liable when sparks from the
engine ignited combustibles on the right of way, and circumstantial evidence
was sufficient to prove this. See cases cited note 14 infra.
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sustain the inference that the fire actually started in the combustibles
on the roof of the shed." However, the opinion of the court is
unclear as to whether it accepts this explanation, or whether it is
concerned with the possibility that the fires started elsewhere and
somehow spread to the top of the shed. As previously pointed out,
the point at which the fire started should make no difference." If
it did start in the combustibles, then it is a reasonable assumption
that they were ignited by the heater flue as on the previous occasion.' 3
In refusing to submit this possibility to the jury, the court has taken
a very restrictive view of the probative value of circumstantial evidence. In McRainey v. Virginia & Carolina Southern Railway, 4
the evidence was also purely circumstantial. Defendant-railroad allowed its right-of-way to become cluttered with combustible material.
The fire was discovered more than three hours after the train had
passed. No one saw the engine emitting sparks and there was no
evidence of burned cinders on the right-of-way. The jury was allowed to infer that the spark which ignited the material had come
from defendant's engine. If the Phelps fire started at another location and was communicated to the roof of the shed, the combustibles
were still a substantial factor in contributing to its spread. 5 Admittedly this might not be the proper analysis had the fire been a
conflagration by the time it reached the shed, but evidence clearly
shows that the fire was very small when first seen.
In concerning itself with the origin of the fire, the court in
Phelps overlooks the possibility that the ethylene gas cylinders could
have caused one or both of the explosions. Although the fire chief
stated that the cause of the explosions was unknown,'" there was
11 Record at 40, 82, 86, 89.
" See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
"8There was some question as to whether the

oil heater had been lighted
on the day of the fire; see Brief for Appellee at 6, and Brief for Appellant at
28. However, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
would seem to support the inference that the heater flue could have been hot.
14168 N.C. 570, 84 S.E. 851 (1915). See also Gainey v. Rockingham
R.R., 235 N.C. 114, 68 S.E.2d 780 (1951); Betts v. Southern Ry., 230 N.C.
609, 55 S.E.2d 76 (1949),; Simmons v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 174
N.C. 220, 93 S.E. 736 (1917). For two recent fire cases which give an indication of the quantum of evidence that will be sufficient to avoid a non-suit,
see Drum v. Baisner, 252 N.C. 305, 113 S.E.2d 560 (1960) and Patton v.
Dail, 252 N.C. 425, 114 S.E.2d 87 (1960).
OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
ESTATEMENT (SECOND)
"°Record at 48, 50.
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testimony which negated several other possible explanations, 17 and
further testimony indicated that at least one exploded cylinder had
8

been found.1

Another fire case which deals with the cause issue is Broughton
v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey.9 The prior lessee of the
filling station testified that he noticed the odor of gasoline while
digging near a large underground storage tank. His records indicated that the tank was losing ten gallons per day. The tank was
buried so that it was on a level with the basement of the station, and
the ground sloped in that direction. A few months after decedent's
employer took over the station a heavy rain caused the basement to
flood. A three-fourths-inch coating of gas was found on the top of
the water. The basement was drained and cleaned, but three days
later the fumes were again noticeable. When the manager struck a
match to assist a customer in looking for his keys, a bluish flame appeared along the floor. The customer and manager escaped but decedent was killed in the ensuing explosion. The court held that there
was insufficient evidence of negligence, but also stated that the evidence of causal relationship was inadequate, alluding to the possibility that gas could have gotten into the basement due to improper
use of the pumping equipment by the filling station attendants.
However, in Masten v. Texas Company 0 the court held that there
was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury. Plaintiff's well
had contained pure water prior to the installation of defendant's
gas pumps. There was a strata of rock which ran from the pumps
to the well, and the slope of the ground was in the same direction.
Plaintiff recovered for contamination of his well.
Two "harmful substance" cases take a very harsh approach, and
illustrate how one unjust decision may lead to another. The cases
are particularly significant because they deal with the evidentiary
requirements unclouded by any subsidiary elements of multiple
causation or intervening cause. In the first case, Wall v. Trogdon,21
the plaintiff and two witnesses testified that they saw defendant's
cropdusting plane emit spray as it circled near the fish pond, that
they noticed an oily substance on the surface of the water, and that
17

Record at 43, 56.
Record at 57, 61.
"201 N.C. 282, 159 S.E. 321 (1931).
20194 N.C. 540, 140 S.E. 89 (1927).
21249 N.C. 747, 107 S.E.2d 757 (1959).
'8
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immediately thereafter the fish began to die. An expert fish biologist
testified that several other possible causes had been ruled out and that
poisoning was the "only possible cause of death" 22 which he could
discover. In affirming a non-suit the court discounted the expert
opinion as "purely speculative and founded on possibilities,"2 and
indicated that the plaintiff should have offered evidence of the constituent elements of the spray, that the oily substance on the water
was the spray, that it was poisonous to fish, and that it did in fact
kill plaintiff's fish.
Other jurisdictions do not seem to impose such harsh requirements. In S.A. Gerrard Company v. Fricker4 the defendant contended that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that the substance which allegedly killed his bees was in fact poisonous to them.
The court held that the mere fact that the substance come into contact with the bees and that they died was sufficient. And in Pitchfork Land and Cattle Company v. King 5 the plaintiff brought an

action for damages allegedly caused by defendant's negligence in allowing herbicide chemicals to drift into the plaintiff's crops. Defendant, contending that there was no causal relationship, offered expert testimony that the effects of such a chemical would appear not
more than ten days after application and that the damage to plaintiff's crops did not appear until fifteen days after the crop spraying.
Evidence also showed that the damage was confined to a narrow strip
rather than a wide area as would be expected if the spray had been
dispersed by the wind. An expert testified that he had seen such a
confined damage pattern before and that the more probable explanation was that an airplane which was leaking spray had flown over
the plaintiff's land. The damaged crops were located from seven
and one-half to fifteen miles from the point at which the cropdusting
22Id.at 751, 107 S.E.2d at 760.
"Id. at 754, 107 S.E.2d at 762.

" 4 Ariz. 503, 27 P.2d 678 (1933) ; see Lundberg v. Bolon, 67 Ariz. 259,
194 P.2d 454 (1948); Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 199 Ark. 846,
136 S.W.2d 484 (1940). See- generally Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 436 (1950).
" 162 Tex. 331, 346 S.W.2d 598 (1961). See Casey v. Phillips Pipeline
Co., 431 P.2d 518 (Kan. 1967) "(Evidence which showed that there had been
a rupture of a high pressure gasoline line, that it was in close proximity to
plaintiff's lake, that a "mist" was seen hanging over the lake, that the lake
water was used to water plaintiff's grass crop, and that soon thereafter the
grass died, was held sufficient to establish the causal relationship). See also
Ebers v. General Chemical Co., 310 Mich. 261, 17 N.W.2d 176 (1945) (Evidence held sufficient even though etymologist testified that they did not know
what killed plaintiff's trees).
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had been conducted. The court held that there was sufficient evidence
on the issue of cause to be submitted to the jury. In a North Carolina case, Nance v. Merchant's Fertilizer & Phosphate Company,2
evidence tended to show that the defendant emptied waste into a
stream. Heavy rains caused the stream to overflow into plaintiff's
pasture. Soon afterwards his hogs began to die. Examination of
the hogs' entrails showed that they were perforated and traces of
acid were found in samples of mud from the pasture. The court
held that even though the evidence was circumstantial, "the proba'27
tive force was for them [the jury]-not us."

In the second "harmful substance" case, Reason v. Singer Sewing Machine Company,28 the court relied heavily on Wall. Plaintiff
was sprayed in the face with oil from defendant's defective sewing
machine and two hours later her eyes began to burn and water. A
doctor who examined her the next day testified that the second degree burns on her eyelids could have been caused by "either hot oil
. . . or warm oil so spraying, depending on the chemical composition."29 The court said that the plaintiff had not shown the chemical
composition of the oil or that it was hot. The case never reached the
jury. Admittedly questions of physical injury may reach a point
where difficult problems of medical causation are involved8W But
where the relationship between act and injury is of such a nature that the layman can readily comprehend cause and effect,
there seems to be no justification for such an approach. Indeed,
the court has held on previous occasions where the question of
causation appeared to be much more obscure that the issue was for
the jury. For example, in Metz v. City of Asheville3 the court allowed the jury to find that pollution of the stream which ran near
decedent's house could have caused his death from typhoid, even
28200 N.C. 702, 158 S.E. 486 (1931).
2
Id. at 706, 158 S.E. at 488.
8259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397 (1963).
29
Id. at 266, 130 S.E.2d 398.
8
oThe question of medical causation is clearly beyond the scope of this
note. However, for some case law in this area, Gillikin v. Burbage, 263 N.C.
317, 139 S.E.2d 753 (1964) (proof insufficient to establish causal relationship between blow to plaintiff's back and ruptured disc); Lee v. Stephens,
251 N.C. 429, 111 S.E.2d 623 (1959) (proof insufficient to establish causal
relationship between head injury and cerebral hemorrhage); Byrd v. Express Co., 139 N.C. 273, 51 S.E. 851 (1905) (proof insufficient to establish causal relationship between failure to deliver medicine on time and
death of a patient). See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 487 (1965).
' 150 N.C. 748, 64 S.E. 881 (1909).
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though neither his wife nor his child caught the disease. And in
Cook v. Town of Mebane32 testimony indicated that there never had
been pools of stagnant water or mosquitoes prior to defendant's
polluting the stream with sewage. The court held that the question
of whether the pollution caused plaintiff's mill workers to get
malaria was for the jury. In Harper v. Bullock33 the jury was allowed to find the causal relationship where decedent died after eating
weiners which contained decomposed meat, although another who
had eaten them did not die, and although decedent's doctor testified
that she had been suffering from nephritis and did not die from the
effects of the meat.
There may be many factors contributing to the approach which
the court has taken in these cases, and an attempt to enumerate them
would be impractical. The most obvious factor is simply a failure
to give the proper probative value to circumstantial evidence. Of
course the burden of proof on the issue of causation, like other elements of the negligence case, is normally on the plaintiff.3 4 He must
show by the greater weight of the evidence, 5 be it direct or circumstantial, that defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in contributing to the injury. But he need not negate entirely the possibility of other "causes" for which the defendant is not responsible.3 ,
Since the issue is essentially a factual determination, it should normally be one for the jury, and it has been stated that court, should
seldom rule on it as a matter of law.37
191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407 (1926).
' 198 N.C. 448, 152 S.E. 405 (1941).

" There are rare decisions which shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See, e.g., Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). See

also W. PROSSER, TORTS 247 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
" There are, however, a limited number of cases in which much less than
a preponderance of the evidence is required to establish the causal link. See
Malone, Ruminations on Cause-liz-Fact,9 STAN. L. Rav. 60 (1956). For a
rather liberal decision in the area of medical malpractice see Hicks v. United
States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), noted in 45 N.C.L. REv. 799 (1967).
In Bear v. Harris, 118 N.C. 476, 24 S.E. 364 (1896), defendant moved plaintiff's boat without permission and it was damaged by a storm. The court
held that it was no defense to show that the damage might have been the
same or greater had the boat been at its original mooring. Where the tort
is intentional it is clear that courts will impose liability for a greater range
of consequences. Are cases such as Bear an indication that courts will also
be more lenient in establishing causation when the tort is intentional? See
e.g., Lee v. Stewart, 218 N.C. 287, 10 S.E.2d 804 (1940) (trespasser accused of causing fire).
"6See PROSSER 246. See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 433B,
comment b at 443 (1965).
"' Kearns v. Railroad, 139 N.C. 470, 476, 52 S.E. 131, 134 (1905) (dis-
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In speaking of circumstantial evidence, the court in Phelps stated:
[I]n criminal cases it [circumstantial evidence] must point unerringly to the guilt of the defendant, and in effect, must show
not only that the defendant is guilty but that upon no reasonable
interpretation of the evidence could he be innocent. And also,
that if the evidence is consistent with a finding of either guilt or
innocence, that the innocent interpretation must be adopted.
The law in civil cases is so similar that little difference can be

found. The innocent interpretation is applicable when we recall
that the defendant, in such cases is not required to prove his

lack of responsibility, but the plaintiff must affirmatively fix it
by the greater weight of the evidence. And it is not sufficient
to show that the circumstantial evidence introduced could have
produced the result-it must show that it did.38
Although this statement is somewhat clarified by the "greater weight
of the evidence" language near the end, it still seems totally unnecessary to analogize guilt in a criminal case to proof of cause in a civil
case. And to state that circumstantial evidence must show, not
that it could have produced the result, but that it did, is clearly erroneous. The Phelps court also cites American Jurisprudence, and

states that
[P]roof of the burning alone is not sufficient to establish liability, for if nothing more appears, the presumption is that the
fire was the result of accident or some providential cause.80
However, the cited section of American Jurisprudence deals with
the law of arson, and reads as follows:
[P]roof of the burning alone is not sufficient to establish the
corpus delicti, for if nothing more appears the presumption is
...that the fire was the result of accident
or some providential
40
cause rather than of criminal design.
senting opinion) : "[I]t is also the better doctrine that where the negligent act
has been established or admitted, it is only in clear and exceptional instances
that the question of proximate cause should be withdrawn from the jury
and determined by the judge." (Emphasis added). See PROSSER 246; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 433B comment b at 443 (1965). It has
also been suggested that, as a practical matter, once it is shown that the
harm suffered by the plaintiff is clearly within the ambit of risk created by
the defendant, courts are often willing to allow the issue of cause to get
to the jury on the "slightest factual plausibility;" see Malone, Ruminations
on Cause-In-Fact,9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956).
,'272 N.C. 24, 28, 157 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1967) (Emphasis added).
Id. at 31, 157 S.E.2d at 724 (Emphasis added).
405 Ams. JTJR. 2d Arson and Related Offenses § 46 at 836 (1962)
(Emphasis added).
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How can the crime of arson, where the question is whether a criminal
agency started the fire, be analogous to a civil case where the issue
is whether an accumulation of combustible materials was the "cause"
of the fire?
Another factor may be faulty conceptualization and analysis.
For example, in Phelps the court was obviously concerned with the
possibility that an outside source ignited the combustibles as evidenced by statement that the origin of the fire could have been a discarded cigarette or match. In making this a point of emphasis the
court indicates that it was thinking in terms of an intervening cause
which would insulate defendant from liability."' While the doctrine
of intervening cause is quite different from cause-in-fact, it is significant to note that Phelps is in conflict with the rule which is wellestablished in other jurisdictions.4 In the case where defendant had
stored paint thinner the fire did not originate from any act or omission on his part.4 3 His liability was for creating a dangerous condition which was conducive to the starting or spread of a fire. And in
B.W. King Incorporatedv. Town of West New York4 the defendant-municipality allowed wood, lumps of coal, coal dust and other
debris to accumulate on an unused pier. The fire was started by a
trespasser who flipped, a lighted cigarette onto the pier. The court
held that since the defendant had kept the premises in an unsafe
condition, it was liable even though the fire was started by
the act of a third party. Such an act was reasonably foreseeable as
the natural and probable consequences of the negligence. In this
respect, Phelps also seems to be in conflict with clear North Carolina
precedent. In Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Company45 lightning
struck defendant's power line and blew out an insulator. Molten
parts of the insulator fell into dry brush which had accumulated on
"
On the doctrine of intervening cause see PROSSER 309.
42 The great majority of jurisdictions impose liability where defendant
has permitted his property to exist in such an unsafe condition that a fire

may easily be started, regardless of the origin of the fire. See Annot., 18
A.L.R.2d 1081 (1951).
" Reid & Sibell, Inc. v. Gilmore & Edwards Co., 134 Cal. App. 2d 60,
285 P.2d 364 (1955).
"49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967); accord, Menth v. Breeze Corp., 4
N.J. 428, 73 A.2d 183 (1950).
" 190 N.C. 664, 130 S.E. 735 (1925). See Harton v. Telephone Co., 141
N.C. 455, 54 S.E. 299 (1906), where the court said "the test is whether the
intervening act and the resultant injury is one that the author of the primary negligence could have reasonably forseen and expected." Id. at 464,
54 S.E. at 302.
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the right-of-way and started the fire. The court held that defendant
was negligent in maintaining his property in such condition and
that the intervening cause did not absolve him from liability. In
Newton v. Texas Company46 defendant maintained a distributing
plant where he stored large quantities of gasoline. Gas leaked from
the warehouse and into the street. In imposing liability for the ensuing explosion, the court said that a reasonable inference could be
drawn that the spark came from a passing train, from carelessly
discarded matches, cigarettes, or otherwise. Thus Phelps cannot be
correctly explained on the grounds of an intervening cause which
may have ignited the combustibles.
These cases indicate that the court has taken a very restrictive approach to the issue of causal relationship. While all the reasons
may not be apparent, the implications are quite clear-trial practitioners who find themselves confronted with the issue of cause had
best proceed with utmost care.
JAMES

G.

BILLINGS

Torts-Products Liability-Is Privity Dead?
The movement to abolish the privity requirement in "warranty"
actions has in the past decade played an increasingly successful role
in the American judicial theater.' The crusade has not left the
North Carolina Supreme Court unaffected, and a recent decision by
that court may prove to be the signal for privity's final exit from the
legal stage in North Carolina.
In Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Company' the North Carolina
Supreme Court sustained a complaint based on warranty and
" 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433 (1920). The court said:
[I]f the defendant, by its negligence, produced a situation or condition
of danger by allowing gasoline to escape . . . where it would probably
come into contact with fire, sparks . . . or live ashes from a lighted
cigar or cigarette . . . we do not see why this would not be negligence ....
[I] f the negligence of the defendant combined with the
act of some other person . . . the defendant would be liable, though
he had no connection with the conduct of the third party and had no
control over him.
Id. at 563-64, 105 S.E. at 434.
' Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
2271 N.C. 485, 157 S.E.2d 98 (1967).
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negligence even though no privity of contract existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant-manufacturer. Plaintiff, a farmer, purchased a chemical weed killer from a retail seller who in turn had
procured it from the distributor, an agent of the manufacturer.
Instructions on the bags of the chemical specified its use as a weed
killer on corn, but warned against planting another stand of corn or
other crop of the small grain variety on the same land in the same
year. Plaintiff used the chemical on his corn crop with satisfactory
results. The following year the plaintiff planted soybeans and peanuts on the land and due to the low yield and poor quality he suffered financial loss for which he brought suit.
The privity rule for warranty and negligence actions has traditionally been an obstacle to the consumer for recovery from the manufacturer. The court explicitly removed this barrier in negligence
actions-a rather hollow victory since the "inherently dangerous"
exception had already swallowed the rule 3 -but just how far the
court went in discarding privity in "warranty" actions is uncertain.
To understand the changed position taken by Corprew, a brief
review of case law on the privity requirement is necessary, including a look at a recent food and drink case which may have significant consequences in this area.4 North Carolina freed itself
from the doctrine of caveat emptor and adopted the rule of implied
warranty in sales between purchaser and seller as early as 1925.,
In an early decision dealing with food,' however, the court held that
no liability to the ultimate consumer arose on an implied warranty
where no contractual relation, i.e., privity, existed between the manufacturer and the consumer. The manufacturer, said the court, was
not an insurer of his product. An exception was recognized to the
privity requirement in Simpson v. American Oil Company.7 A spray
can of "Annox" insecticide purchased by the plaintiff had a statement printed on it informing the user that the contents were deadly
to bugs, but non-poisonous to human beings. The plaintiff deGwyn v. Lucky City Motors, Inc., 252 N.C. 123, 113 S.E.2d 302 (1960);
Tyson v. Long Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959).
'Tedder v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
Swift & Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N.C. 162, 129 S.E. 543 (1925).
'Thompson v. Ballard & Ballard, 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935). The
plaintiff sued for breach of implied warranty when he became ill after eating
baked bread and subsequently discovered a dead mouse in the sack of flour
produced by the defendant, but bought at a local grocery.
1217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
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veloped a severe skin ailment after spraying a room with the insecticide and brought suit against the manufacturer. The court
held that where an express warranty on the product's container
was addressed to the ultimate consumer no privity was required.
In Davis v. Radford8 the plaintiff's intestate died after using a salt
substitute which contained poisonous ingredients. Suit was brought
only against the retailer, but in dictum the court suggested that,
based upon Simpson, the plaintiff could bring an action against the
distributor on implied warranty despite the lack of privity. The
court said that the wholesale distributor would be primarily liable
since the retail seller could recover over against him. By a later
holding9 it seems that to come within the Simpson rule in non-food
cases, the express warranty must appear on the package itself and be
addressed to the ultimate consumer. Yet language in another case
strictly limits the Simpson doctrine to food and drink for human
consumption sold in sealed containers with labels addressed to the
purchaser. ° A green fly in a soft drink bottle offered the court an
opportunity to re-examine its policy on privity in implied warranty
actions in Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Company," but the court
reaffirmed its view that warranty was contractual in nature and required privity. A concurring opinion, 2 however, argued for privity's
abandonment and gave the first suggestion of possible change.
This, then, was the procedure generally followed in an implied
warranty action before the court altered its position. One injured by
a defect in a product could bring an action on implied warranty only
against the immediate seller with whom he was in the "holy state
of privity."' The seller, in turn, could seek redress on the same
theory against the distributor or manufacturer who was in privity
with him.' 4 The obvious defects in this procedure are that the retailer may be insolvent, there may be a multiplicity of actions, the
suit may become barred by the statute of limitations, and often the
court may lack jurisdiction over the parties.
8233 N.C. 583, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951).
'Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367 (1963).
" Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co., 261 N.C. 660, 136
S.E.2d 56 (1964).
11263 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753 (1964).
1 Id. at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 754.
12 Aldridge Motors, Inc. v. Alexander, 217 N.C. 751, 9 S.E.2d 469 (1935).
1'Id.
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In Tedder v. Pepsi Cola Bottling
a decision handed
down in the late spring of 1967, the first shift took place. A woman
became ill after drinking a portion of the defendant's bottled beverage which contained deleterious matter. She sued the bottler for
breach of implied warranty of fitness though the drink was purchased at a local supermarket. The bottler's employee had placed the
bottles on the shelves of the grocer, and the plaintiff was the only
person to handle the bottle before opening. The court held that the
mass advertising conducted by the bottler and the direct manner of
travel of the product from the bottler to the consumer were sufficient
to take the case to the jury on the theory of implied warranty. The
court stopped short of abolishing the privity requirement in the
food and drink area. Whether or not a manufacturer by placing
his product on the market impliedly warrants to the ultimate consumer that the food and drink in sealed containers is fit for human
use was not decided by the court. However, the court did make reference to the legal principles of Justice Sharp's concurrence in
Terry which had argued for privity's repudiation in cases involving
food products. Tedder can be viewed as a narrow decision, limiting
the area emancipated from the privity requirement to cases of food
and drink sold in sealed containers where there has been mass advertisement and direct travel of the product to the consumer.
What is Corprez's affect on the privity requirement? The decision lacks clarity and is open to at least four possible interpretations.
(1) The narrowest interpretation would limit the area free of
the privity rule to cases where a product was sold in a sealed package
which contained a label of warning or instruction. If either element
were lacking, the consumer would have to meet the privity requirement to state a cause of action against the manufacturer. For example, if a new outboard motor boat sunk shortly after being
launched and several persons were drowned, the owner could not sue
the maker even if a label appeared on the vessel since it was not sold
in a sealed package.
(2) Under a less narrow interpretation of Corprew, the privity
rule would be eliminated in cases where the article is sold in a sealed
container. Both Tedder and Corprew involve products marketed in
closed packages. Under this interpretation a label or advertising
would not be required, but the privity rule would still be viable for
" 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337 (1967).
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such products as lawn mowers, automobiles, and airplanes which
are not sold in sealed packages. The matter of the sealed container,
however, would seem to go more to the evidence of breach as is discussed later.
(3) Since the court found that the statement on the package
amounted to an express warranty that the chemical would not be
harmful to crops planted in the next year, a third interpretation is
that the court in effect was restating the doctrine set out in the
earlier Simpson decision, i.e., that where a warranty appears on the
product addressed to the ultimate consumer no privity is required.
Under this interpretation it is the label, not the container, that is important. Thus the exception to the privity rule would again include
non-food items. If so construed, privity would remain a requirement
except where a label of warning or instruction is printed on the
product; or where, as in Tedder, there is mass advertising which can
be viewed as equivalent to a label. The court's thinking quite possibly could revolve around the notion that the label or mass advertising bridges the gap between the manufacturer and consumer and
creates a type of privity or bond between the two sufficient to sustain
an action. This reasoning might be influenced by the fact that the
plaintiff could have been induced to purchased the product by the
representations made by the producer on the product itself, or by the
advertisement.
The question immediately arises: Should a label be required?
If a person is injured when the blade flys off a lawn mower the
first time it is started, should he have to show that there was a
label of safety or warning on the mower before he could sue the
manufacturer? Under this latter interpretation he would.
(4) There is broad language in the opinion making it susceptible to the more liberal interpretation that the court has finally
abrogated the privity requirement for warranty and has adopted
in effect a theory of strict liability:
Under modern marketing conditions a manufacturer places
goods upon the market in sealed containers, and the container
without substantial change is sold to the ultimate purchaser in the
condition in which it is placed by the manufacturer on the market for sale. By placing its goods upon the market, the manufacturer represents to the public that they are suitable and safe
for use, and by packaging, advertising, and otherwise, frequently
upon a national scale, it does everything it can to induce that
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belief. The middleman is no more than a conduit, a mere mechanical device through which the thing is to reach the ultimate consumer. The manufacturer has invited and solicited
the use of its product, and when it leads to disaster it should not
be permitted to avoid the responsibility by saying that it made no
contract with the consumer. The manufacturer should be held
liable because it is in a position to insure against liability and add
the cost to the product.' 6
In this paragraph the court states the forceful argument that a
manufacturer ought to be held accountable if his product causes injury to a lawful user or consumer even though the manufacturer is
not negligent. This sounds like the theory of strict liability in tort.
In dictum 1 the court strengthens this interpretation by reference to
Justice Sharp's concurring opinion in Terry. Evidently the court
intended to incorporate into Tedder the legal principles stated in
this concurrence which had cogently argued for the demise of privity
in food product cases, contending that the manufacturer should be
held liable, label or not."' Though the case concerned food products
in sealed containers, the same policy arguments apply to non-food
articles as in Corprew. Under this last interpretation, a consumer
would have recourse against the manufacturer whether or not the
product was in a sealed container or a label was attached thereto.
The manufacturer would be subject to strict liability.
While rejoicing at the prospects of privity's departure, lawyers
must remember that the manufacturer is not being served to the
" Corprew v. Geigy Chemical Corp., 271 N.C. 485, 491, 157 S.E.2d 98, 102
(1967). It is arguable that the court was talking about negligence only, but
the broad language would indicate that the court was also referring to "warranty."
" As to implied warranty as between manufacturer and consumer, in
the absence of immediate privity of contract, in respect of food and
drink placed on the market by the manufacturer in sealed containers,
see the legal principles set forth in the concurring opinion of Sharp,
J., in Terry v. Bottling Co., 253 N.C. 1, 138 S.E.2d 753, and the application thereof in our decision of May 10, 1967, in Tedder v. Bottling
Co., 270 N.C. 301, 154 S.E.2d 337.
Id. at 498, 157 S.E.2d at 107.
8
Having held him to his label in Simpson v. Oil Co., smpra, can we
seriously argue or reasonably contend that a manufacturer or supplier
who, after extensive advertising, sells a retailer bottled drinks, canned
pineapple, or boxes of candy for resale to the consumer, does not likewise represent to the buying public that his product is fit to eat, even
though no label or imprint on the container specifically says so?
Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 12-13, 138 S.E.2d 753,
761 (1967) (Sharp, J., concurring).
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consumer on a silver platter. The plaintiff must still prove his case.
It is necessary for him to show that: (1) he was injured by the
manufacturer's product; (2) the injury was due to a defect in the
product; (3) the defect existed when the product was sold to the
plaintiff; and (4) the product was being reasonably used for the
purposes intended. 19
In the area of damages, the type of loss for which recovery is
sought will be important. Where economic loss is involved the
plaintiff must show compliance with the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code to recover from the seller.20 Recovery in a tort
action for personal injury and property damage is possible against
the seller and the manufacturer under the Code,2 ' since it is neutral
on the privity requirement.2 2 Under two of the interpretations of
Corprew, proof of a label would be necessary if the customer sought
recovery from the manufacturer for injury to person or property.
Corprew sued for losses incurred when crops were damaged, which
the court treated as property damage. If the plaintiff had been
seeking to recover the cost of the chemical because it was ineffective,
the recovery sought would have been for loss of the commercial
bargain-economic loss. In such an action in contract " the court
probably would not have allowed the plaintiff to go against the
manufacturer, even though a label were present, since the plaintiff
would be seeking recovery on his contract in the absence of privity.
If the plaintiff attempts to recover the loss of the bargain from the
seller, he needs no label since his action is directed against the seller
with whom he contracted. Here the purchaser has relied only on
the bargain between himself and the seller. These two parties set the
terms of the agreement and if the bargain is not fulfilled the plaintiff
has recourse against the seller.
The proof of the elements necessary for recovery against the
19 Id.
at 3, 138 S.E.2d at 755.
20
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-103(1) (d) ; § 2-106(1) ; § 2-607(3) (a).
21
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2) (b).
§ 2-318, comment 3.

" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

"The New Jersey court has had trouble already in mixing the contract
and tort theories in Santor v. A &M Karagheunian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d
305 (1965), where it allowed a purchaser to recover the value of the product
from the manufacturer for the loss of the bargain. The California court, in
dictum, separated the two types of losses and stated that strict liability
should govern personal injuries as well as physical injury to property, but
that "breach of warranty" was the proper action to recover for loss of
commercial bargain. Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 1, 403 P.2d
145 (1965).
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manufacturer on a "warranty" action remains a formidable task.
The plaintiff can perhaps take advantage of circumstantial evidence
and inferences from the facts, but he will still have to overcome
any inference that the defect was caused by intervening parties,
including himself, or by a long lapse of time between manufacture
and use.2 4 There is no warranty that the product will not eventually
deteriorate after a long period or if it is misused and abused.2 5
These are matters of evidence, but proof that a defect existed when
it left the manufacturer is only one step removed from proving
fault, i.e., negligence, by the producer. For products sold in sealed
containers the burden is perhaps less weighty since there is a reasonable inference that any harmful substance in the product became
sealed within it when it was manufactured. This, of course, is not
conclusive. The fact that the package is sealed goes far in proving
that the defect was in the package when sold to the plaintiff, but the
manufacturer need not fear that it will be "taken to the cleaners"
by every claimant seeking enrichment on a spurious claim.26
In a products liability case where a person has suffered personal
injury or property damage, he has recourse against the processor
under the theories of negligence, warranty, or strict liability. Corprew has implications for the plaintiff regardless of which theory he
selects.
(1) Negligence remains a proper theory for recovery, and Corprew only officially cancels the privity requirement. The plaintiff,
however, will have to sustain the extra burden of showing fault by
the manufacturer without the aid of res ipsa loquitur and under the
27
weight of the "similar instances" rule in North Carolina.
(2) The plaintiff can also sue for breach of warranty-express,
implied and implied for special purposes.2 8 Under the Simpson doctrine he could rely on express warranty for his cause of action, but
"Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826
(1964); Gomex v. E.W. Bliss Co., 27 Misc. 2d 649, 211 N.Y.S.2d 246
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
"See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the

Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1144 (1960).
- Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 10, 138 S.E.2d 753,
759 (1964).
2 Graham v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 257 N.C. 188, 125 S.E.2d
429 (1962); Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180
S.E. 582 (1935).
"'For an example of an implied warranty for special purposes, see UNIFORm COmmERciAL CODE § 2-315, comment 2.
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this might be limited to food and drink unless Corprew reasserts that
doctrine for nonconsumption items. Under a theory of implied
warranty in food cases he might bring an action under the Tedder
decision.2 9
To be considered with a "warranty" theory is the impact of the
Uniform Commercial Code which went into effect in North Carolina
last year. The Code establishes a warranty by law in all sales of
goods, 0 but does not require privity for a warranty action against the
manufacturer. As noted, the Code's official position is one of neu2
trality,' but it requires that notice of breach of warranty be given,
and the warranties themselves can be disclaimed. 3
(3) Finally, if Corprew can be interpreted broadly as rejecting
the privity rule for "warranty actions," the plaintiff could bring an
action under the theory of strict liability. The language used in the
opinion resembles the language of strict liability in tort, 4 but the
court uses the phrase "breach of warranty" instead. Strict liability
is non-fault liability. The manufacturer is held liable for injuries
caused by a defective product even if it has exercised the highest
degree of care and skill. If the court has indeed adopted strict
liability in tort for the manufacturer, it is submitted that the continued use of the word "warranty" is undesirable and should be rejected in favor of the more accurate phrase-"strict liability in
tort." "Warranty" is a contract term, as is recognized by the court,"
and in this area the distinction between tort and contract is important. Professor Prosser, in several law review articles, 80 refers
to sales warranty as the offspring of the illicit relationship between
29 Problems may arise in determining what the implied warranty covers.
In Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961), where a bottle
of Coke exploded in the plaintiff's hands, the court held there was no liability
even to the retailer since an implied warranty did not extend to the container. Under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2) (e), recovery
against the retailer would be allowed.
0
" UNIFORM
"1 UNIFORM
2
UNIFORM
3

COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE §H 2-313 to -315.
CODE § 2-318, comment
CODE § 2-607(3) (a).
CODE § 2-316.

3.

' Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 18 HASTINGs L.J. 9, 15
(1966). Prosser states that twenty-two jurisdictions have adopted strict
liability for all products on one theory or another.
2

Terry v. Double Cola Bottling Co., 263 N.C. 1, 3, 138 S.E.2d 753,

754 (1964).

" Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
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tort and contract and argues for its discontinued use to describe strict
liability.3 7 Liability for "breach of warranty" is the proper term
to be used to refer to a breach in a contractual relation. Strict liability should be employed to describe the liability imposed by law on
the manufacturer regardless of fault. The Restatement of Torts
adopts the strict liability theory without using the word "warranty"3 8
and a comment urges this practice.3 9 This section of the Restatement
has been adopted in several states by judicial decision.40
By using the terminology of strict liability as recommended by
the Restatement, the court would also avoid the confusion and problems that are likely to arise with the notice of breach and disclaimer
" "Why not, then, talk of strict liability in tort, a thing familiar enough
in the law of animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, libel, misrepresentation, and respondeat superior, and
discard the word "warranty" with all of its contract implications ?" Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Conomer), 50 MINN. L.
REv. 791, 802 (1966).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
"RESTATEMENT
states:

(SECOND)

OF TORTS §

402A (1965), comment m,

The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions ...
of the Uniform Commercial Code, as to warranties; and it is not
affected by limitations on the scope and content of warranties, or by
limitations to "buyer" and "seller" in [the Code]. . . . Nor is the
consumer required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a
reasonable time after it occurs as is provided by [the Code]. The
consumer's cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it is between the seller and his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product into the consumer's hands. In short, "warranty"
must be given a new and different meaning if it is used in connection
with this Section. It is much simpler to regard the liability here stated
as merely one of strict liability in tort.
"' Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965);
Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965); Ford
Motor Co, v. Lonam, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
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sections of the Code. 4 1 The Code is a statute designed to codify
the law of commercial transactions. Strict liability in tort-and it
bears repeating-is liability without fault, imposed by law on the
manufacturer for personal injury or physical damage to property
caused by its product.
At the least it seems safe to forecast that Corprew signals
stormy weather for privity in the near future. Currently, the case
can be limited to the abolition of the privity rule only where labeled
products are sold in sealed containers. With the proper set of facts,
however, the court might be convinced to impose strict liability
expressly on the manufacturer across the board since it is clear that
the theory does not provide automatic recovery for the consumer.
ROBERT A. WICKER

Trusts-Cy rres Enacted in North Carolina
The 1967 General Assembly enacted legislation giving North
Carolina courts power to use the doctrine of cy pres' in charitable
trust administration. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
long rejected the cy pres doctrine2 while upholding modification
"'In a California case which involved the UNIFORM SALES ACT, not
the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, the California court held that where
damages were sought for personal injuries no notice was required in an
action for breach of warranty. The court treated the potential liability as
non-contractual in nature and referred to it as strict liability. Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). See generally
Comment, Products Liability-Sales Warranties of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 46 N.C.L. REv. 451 (1968).
3The words "cy pres" are Anglo-French for "as near" and were originally part of the phrase "cy pres comme possible" meaning "as near as possible." The doctrine of cy pres gives to a court the power to alter the particular purpose of a charitable trust under certain circumstances. Where
the testator or settlor intended that the trust property be applied to some
particular purpose and yet also had a more general charitable intent, he
presumably would have desired that the property be applied to a purpose
"as near as possible" to the specific disposition chosen by him rather than
that the trust be allowed to fail. Therefore, if the particular purpose named
by the settler becomes impossible, illegal, or impracticable, the court will
exercise its cy pres powers to select a disposition similar to that named by the
settlor or testator. The cy pres doctrine is limited in its use to charitable
trusts and is widely accepted among United States jurisdictions. See G.
BOGERT, TRUSTS § 431 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; A.
SCOTT, TRUSTS § 399 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as SCOTT].
' As to the previous status of the cy pres doctrine in North Carolina, see
E, Fiscii, THE CY P'ns DQrTRINE IN TH UNITED STATES § 2 .03(g) (1950)
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of trust provisions under an equity court's general power to supervise trust administration. Because of new problems developing as
to charitable trusts, the cy pres power has become an increasingly
valuable tool of trust administration and public policy. This note will
analyze the 1967 legislation, fit it into the scheme of existing North
Carolina law, and forecast possible future applications of the cy pres
doctrine.
The 1967 Charitable Trusts Administration Act3 sets forth the
generally accepted requisites4 for a court's use of cy pres power:
1. the existence of a charitable trust, bequest, or devise;
2. impossibility, impracticability, or illegality of fulfilling the
settlor's particular intent;
3. a general, rather than specific, charitable intent by the settlor;
4. the absence of an alternative disposition provided by the
settlor.
Where these requirements are met, the court can order modification of trust provisions to apply the trust fund or income "as
nearly as possible" to the disposition outlined by the settlor. Courts
must exercise discretion in selecting an alternative disposition;
nevertheless, a major limiting factor exists in the requirement that
the disposition selected closely approximate the settlor's intent as set
out in the trust instrument. Although the cy pres power can be exercised only by the court, some interested party or the Attorney
General must initiate an action ior application cy pres of trust funds.5
The language of the 1967 Act 6 gives authority to the North Carolina
[hereinafter cited as FIscHr]; Note, 27 N.C.L. REv. 591 (1949); Note,
1 N.C.L. REV. 41 (1922).
N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 36-23.2 (Supp. 1967) [hereinafter cited as the 1967

Act]. For examples of similar statutes, see ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 145 (1958);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 196 (1957); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 2328 (1959).
See other cy pres statutes collected in SCOTT § 399 n.2.
The 1967 Act is based on the MODEL ACT CONCERNING TiHE ADMINISTRA-

TION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEVISES AND BEQUESTS, 9 UNIFORm LAWS

ANNO. 25 (1967).
'See BOGERT §§ 436-438; FISCH § 5.00; Peters, A Decade of Cy Pres,

39 TEMPLE L.Q. 256 (1966).
'The 1967 Act also deals with the troublesome question of which
charitable intent to follow where the settlor has designated an alternative
charitable disposition, but it also fails: the intention shown in the original
plan is to prevail. For a discussion of the effect of an alternative plan, see
BOGERT § 437.
'For an interpretation of the language of the 1967 Act, see [19671 N.C.
GEN, STAT. Comi!'w REP, item 10,
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courts to make needed changes in charitable trusts for the public
benefit yet protects the charitable intent of the trust's creator.
Prior to the 1967 Act, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
rejected the doctrine of cy pres whenever the question was raised,
basing this position on vintage decisions of questionable validity.
Despite a well-established judicial policy favoring charitable trusts
as well as a trend toward more court-ordered adjustment of both
private and charitable trust terms, the court failed specifically to
adopt the cy pres doctrine. This failure is all the less understandable
in light of a strong legislative policy favoring validity of charitable
trusts. As an alternative to cy pres power, the court has used its
equitable power over trust administration to produce results much
like those obtained in other jurisdictions under the cy pres doctrine.
Charitable trusts have been saved from failure in particular cases;
however, the decisions are unclear as to how far the courts can or
will go to avoid frustration of the settlor's charitable intent. A brief
survey of the salient case law and statutory development will demonstrate the reasons for the 1967 Act.
North Carolina courts initially accepted the validity of charitable
7
trusts and jurisdiction over their administration in broad terms.
This acceptance was followed by complete disavowal of the cy pres
doctrine." Early opinions failed to distinguish between prerogative
cy pres, which had been productive of abuse in England, and judicial
cy pres, which is limited by usual equitable rules.' The court feared
complete perversion of the settlor's intent under the cy pres doctrine.
Simultaneously, the rule developed that a charitable trust instrument
indefinite on its face as to objects or beneficiaries left too much discretion to the trustee and, therefore, was unenforcible. As a corollary, the court held the doctrine of cy pres inapplicable to cure such a
deficiency, treating the doctrine as purely arbitrary and prerogative.
The rare use of judicial cy pres to remedy uncertainty in an at' Griffin v. Graham, 8 N.C. 96 (1820).

'McAuley v. Wilson, 16 N.C. 276 (1828).
'Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N.C. 26 (1845); Holland v. Peck, 37 N.C. 255

(1842). For a discussion of the confusion between judicial and prerogative
cy pres, see BOGERT § 432; FiscH § 2 03(g).
" Taylor v. American Bible Soc'y, 42 N.C. 201 (1857); Bridges v.
Pleasants, 39 N.C. 26 (1845); Holland v. Peck, 37 N.C. 255 (1842). For a
discussion of the connection between cy pres and charitable trusts invalid
for definiteness, see BOGERT § 434.
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tempted charitable trust 1 further demonstrates the early courts'
failure to understand the doctrine.
These first cases firmly established the rule that courts in North
Carolina do not have cy pres powers. Thus, when a situation arose
for use of the cy pres doctrine, the court properly noted that the doctrine would allow the application of excess trust funds "as near as
may be" to the settlor's specific intent, but it declined so to order
because North Carolina courts do not have such power. 2 In later
cases where the cy pres issue has properly been urged upon the court,
it has been summarily rejected because it is "well settled" that cy
pres power does not exist in North Carolina courts.' 3 In other
cases, the court has discussed the application of the cy pres doctrine
and refused it where the doctrine would have no possible validity.14
Apparently, the merits of the cy pres doctrine have not been discussed by a North Carolina court since 1857, and thus it seems that
recent North Carolina judicial rejection of cy pres is based wholly
on stare decisis.

Even in the absence of cy pres power, however, the cases reveal
an increasing judicial willingness to modify specific provisions of
charitable trusts which would otherwise fail or prove ineffectual.' 5
Where trust funds prove inadequate to achieve the designated purpose, the courts have consistently applied the fund as far as it will
go to carry out "the leading and primary intent of the testator."'

6

Fiscrr § 5.01(b); But cf. BOGERT § 434.
'2 Trustees of Davidson College v. Chambers, 56 N.C. 253 (1859).
Where the trust fund was excessive for its purpose, the court refused to apply
the excess amount cy pres. There is some question as to whether a gift
to a particular college is made with general charitable intent. See BOGERT

§ 437.
1 See, e.g., Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224,
199 S.E. 30 (1938); Thomas v. Clay, 187 N.C. 778, 122 S.E. 852 (1924);
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 107 S.E. 238

(1921).

"Lemmonds v. Peoples, 41 N.C. 137 (1848) (a private trust); Board
of Educ. v. Town of Wilson, 215 N.C. 216, 1 S.E.2d 544 (1929) (application of tax funds to purposes designated by statute).
" This trend in North Carolina is in accord with a similar trend which
has developed throughout the United States and has led to the adoption of the
cy pres doctrine in many jurisdictions. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and
Changing Philosophies, 51 MIcH. L. Rnv. 375 (1953); Fisch, Judicial Attitudes Towards the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 25 TEMPLE L.Q.
177 (1951).
" Paine v. Forney, 128 N.C. 237, 241, 38 S.E. 885, 886 (1901); University of North Carolina v. Gatling, 81 N.C. 508 (1879).
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Most jurisdictions hold that such facts call for the cy pres doctrine ;",
but, the North Carolina court has contended that its remedy does
not amount to the application of the cy pres rule because the fund is
applied to the "very purpose named" by the settlor and not to a purpose "equally as good."' 8 The court departed from "the very purpose
named" in Trustees of Watts Hospitalv. Board of Commissioners."
Increased hospital operational costs had made trust income inadequate. Therefore, the trust indenture was modified to allow conveyance of the hospital property to the county. This holding was
based upon the inherent power of an equity court "to modify the
terms of the trust to the extent necessary to preserve the trust estate
20
and to effectuate the primary purpose of the creator of the trust"

Language of this sort is normally used in other jurisdictions to
justify the application of cy pres powers. 2 '
The North Carolina Supreme Court has also used the administrative change concept 2 2 to order sale of trust property where necessary
to avert failure of the trust or material impairment of its usefulness.23 In order "to give effect to the general intent expressed" by
the settlor, the trust corpus will be liquidated despite a trust provision forbidding its sale.24 The earlier cases provided that the sale
proceeds be used for the express purpose chosen by the settlor for the
original property. Implicitly, alteration of trust provisions was
7

"
BOGERT § 438.
" Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 328, 107 S.E.
238, 241 (1921).
9231 N.C. 604, 58 S.E.2d 696 (1950).
20
Id. at 615, 58 S.E.2d at 705.
" See, e.g., Noel v. Olds, 78 App. D.C. 155, 138 F.2d 581 (1943).
22 Cy pres power is more extensive than the ordinary power of the court
to permit deviation from the terms of a trust whether it be private or
charitable. The court under cy pres can order the application of trust property to a charitable purpose other than that designated in the trust instrument; however, this could not be done under the deviation or administrative change rule. See ScoTT § 399.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has drawn no distinction between
charitable and private trusts in its use of the administrative change concept.
Compare Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Johnston, 269 N.C. 701, 153
S.E.2d 449 (1967) (court-ordered sale of private trust property), with
Brooks v. Duckworth, 234 N.C. 549, 67 S.E.2d 752 (1951) (court-ordered
sale of charitable trust property). Nevertheless, using the administrative
change rule, the court has ordered the change of the particular purpose of a

charitable trust. Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
28 Bond v. Tarboro, 217 N.C. 289, 7 S.E.2d 617 (1940); Holton v. Elliot,
193 N.C. 708, 138 S.E. 3 (1927); Ex Parte Wilds, 182 N.C. 704, 110 S.E. 57
(1921); Church v. Ange, 161 N.C. 315, 77 S.E. 239 (1913).
"'Brooks v. Duckworth, 234 N.C. 549, 67 S.E.2d 752 (1951).
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held permissible so long as the means, and not the settlor's designated ends, were changed. However, in Johnson v. Wagner2 5 the
court abandoned the "very purpose" requirement and applied the
cy pres doctrine without identifying it. Trust land impracticable
for its designated use as a religious assembly was sold and the proceeds dedicated to "other religious purposes" in accordance with the
terms of an entirely separate trust created by the settlor. In ordering this change of purpose, the court ascertained the settlor's general charitable intent and directed the trust res to a similar but different purpose within that intent.
As the Johnson and Watts Hospital decisions demonstrate, the
North Carolina judiciary has become willing to modify specific
trust provisions where the trust has become impossible or impracticable.2" This judicial policy is completely in accord with the favored
position enjoyed by charitable trusts 7 in both case law and statute.
The North Carolina cases on charitable trusts are replete with references to the rule that every effort should be made to save a trust
which is by definition beneficial to the public.2" A lone exception to
this general attitude has been the hostility of the courts to charitable
trusts with uncertain or indefinite dispositive provisions.
The 1925 General Assembly acted expressly to validate charitable
trusts with indefinite objects or discretionary powers of selection in
the trustee.2" The 1925 Act enables the trustor to give the trustee
2=219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941).
For opinions where the court demonstrated its responsive attitude
toward the need to adjust trust terms by direct or implicit approval of plans
suggested by the trustees, see Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. McMullan,
229 N.C. 746, 51 S.E.2d 473 (1949) (trustees' plan to modify means and
time of trust income dispersal approved); West v. Lee, 224 N.C. 79, 29
S.E.2d 31 (1944) (court failed to comment on alternate application of funds
by trustees); Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N.C. 298, 1 S.E.2d 845 (1939) (alternate
plan for use of trust property, approved as proposed by trustees). See
also McKay v. Trustees of the Gen. Assem. of the Presby. Church, 228 N.C.
309, 45 S.E.2d 342 (1947) (dictum). The court found no impossibility of
the designated purpose, but indicated that the fund might have been applied
to a similar purpose had there been impossibility.
2'The public policy favoring charitable trusts is especially apparent
in their exemption from most federal, state, and local taxation. See FiscH
§ 4.02(b).
"8Brooks v. Duckworth, 234 N.C. 549, 67 S.E.2d 752 (1951); Johnson
v. Wagner, 219 N.C. 235, 13 S.E.2d 419 (1941) ; Wachovia Bank and Trust
Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N.C. 324, 107 S.E. 238 (1921); Paine v. Forney, 128
N.C. 237, 38 S.E. 885 (1901); Keith v. Scales, 124 N.C. 497, 32 S.E. 809
(1899).
2' N.C. Gx. STAT. § 36-21 (1957) (hereinafter referred to in the text as
the 1925 Act).
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discretion to deal with unforeseen contingencies, thus reducing the
need for court intervention in charitable trust administration. There
was speculation that this legislation would lead to judicial adoption
of the cy pres doctrine. 30 Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that if
the legislature deems it proper to grant a trustee discretionary powers
where a trust is indefinite, then the courts should exercise similar
powers where a trust's specific purpose has been frustrated but the
testator's general charitable intent is evident. The North Carolina
Supreme Court ignored this opportunity to adopt the cy pres rule
and proved its reluctance to abandon precedent by invalidating a
charitable trust for indefiniteness regardless of the 1925 Act."1 The
legislative response was a clear restatement of the public policy favoring the validity of charitable trusts even though they be indefinite.32
In broadly construing the language of this subsequent legislation,
permit us to misunderthe court commented that the statute "will not
3
meant.".
power
law-making
stand what the
The 1967 Act is properly viewed as the third step in a statutory
scheme insuring the validity of trusts having a general charitable
purpose. It is clear that the law-making power intends that the cy
pres doctrine be effectively employed by the courts. Now that a
strong legislative basis exists, the North Carolina Supreme Court
should reconsider the value of the cy pres doctrine for the first time
in over a century and adopt it as an important tool of trust administration. With such a conclusion to the long trend toward more
court-ordered modification of charitable trusts, predictability can be
established for a facet of charitable trust administration previously
characterized by the uncertain application of equity's general administrative powers. The public interest in charitable trusts as well
as the settlor's interest in the effectuation of his charitable purpose
require that the courts act to save duly constituted charitable trusts
under a rule with clearly delineated guidelines such as those of the
cy pres doctrine as embodied in the 1967 Act.
Two subjects of current interest may soon call for the application
: See Note, 4 N.C.L. REv. 15 (1926).
"Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224, 199 S.E.
30 (1938) (funds to be paid out within 20 years by trustees to charitable
organizations of a designated class).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-23.1 (1957). For a discussion of this legislation,
see Note, 25 N.C.L. REv. 476 (1947).
"sBanner v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 266 N.C. 337, 340, 146 S.E.2d
89, 92 (1966).
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of the cy pres doctrine by the courts of North Carolina and other
states: federal regulation of charitable trusts and racially discriminatory trusts 4
Charitable foundations (corporations) and trusts now play a
large role in the economy of the United States. 5 Alleged rampant
abuses perpetrated by donors, settlors and trustees acting under the
guise of charitable intent have precipitated proposals for federal
legislation to regulate these financial giants.36 Where trusts are involved, the illegality of trust provisions which contravene federal
regulatory legislation and rulings may prove fertile ground for use
of cy pres powers by state courts. For example, regulations seriously
37
curtailing certain commercial activities involving trust property
might well impair a charitable trust's effectiveness to such an extent that court action to carry out the testator's intent as near as
possible would be required. The doctrine of cy pres might be used
to excise specific trust provisions illegal under federal law. Should a
federal regulatory agency 38 be created to supervise the financial activities of charitable trusts, a partnership for the control of the
charitable giants may emerge comparable to that between the Securities Exchange Commission and state courts for the control of
business corporations.
A recent United States Supreme Court decision indicates that a
charitable trust which performs functions "in the public domain" may
be held to violate the fourteenth amendment if it discriminates among
the races." Since the definition of a charitable trust requires that
it be beneficial to the general public,40 the presently expanding state
action concept may in the future subject many charitable trust activi",See Note, 40 N.C.L. REV. 308 (1962).
" See CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, HOUSE OF
87th Cong., 2d Sess., TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND

REPRESENTATIVES,

CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY (Comm. Print

1962) (Patman Report).

"Id.
See Krasnowiecki and Brodsky, Comment on the Patinan Report, 112
U. PA. L. REv. 190 (1963) ; Riecker, Foundations and the Patman Committee
Report, 63 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1964).
8 See articles cited supra note 37.
o Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). When a public park which was
trust property had previously been operated by the city, but had since come
under private trustee's control, the Court held that the park's mass recreational activities were plainly in the public domain and that the courts, under
the fourteenth amendment, could not aid private trustees in performing those
activities on a segregated basis.
"oSee ScoTT &368,
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ties to fourteenth amendment requirements. The courts often state
that charitable trusts perform services which would otherwise be
government responsibilities.4 1 Cy pres power could be used by state
courts to remove the offending provision or, if the trust be rendered
impossible by its illegality, to apply the fund to a similar non-discriminatory purpose."
Using the doctrine of cy pres as suggested above, the state judiciary can insure the continued existence of charitable trusts in
forms beneficial to the community while acting to control those features of charitable trusts not in the public interest.
DAVID MCDANIEL MOORE II
"1 See, e.g., Pierce v. Attwill, 234 Mass. 389, 125 N.E. 609 (1920).
"2 See La Fond v. City of Detroit, 357 Mich. 362, 98 N.W.2d 530 (1959)
(equally divided court). Where the bequest was to the city to establish a
white playground, four justices voted to apply the trust cy press for the
benefit of all children.

